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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The fundamental characteristic of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership 
and control. In their influential work, Berle and Means (1932) were the first to introduce 
this idea by recognizing that the ultimate owners of the corporations, the shareholders, 
delegate their management tasks to agents—the managers. Conceptually, the sharehold-
ers of publicly listed corporations hire the managers to run the corporation in their inter-
est. However, the separation of ownership and control gives rise to principal-agent con-
flicts between the managers (agents) and the shareholders (principals), that is, the man-
agers do not act in the best interest of the shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
formally show that these agency conflicts can lead to agency costs of equity: The man-
agers are likely to entrench themselves or to pursue the maximization of their private 
benefits without taking into account the shareholders’ interests. 
 To circumvent these agency conflicts that impede the value creation for sharehold-
ers, the corporation can install certain corporate governance mechanisms. These mecha-
nisms should attenuate the managerial entrenchment by aligning the interests of the 
managers and the shareholders. In my view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide the 
most appropriate definition of corporate governance: “Corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment” (p. 737). Hence, corporate governance refers to all of the 
mechanisms and instruments in place that control managerial actions. These mechanisms 
should ensure the proper management of the corporations in the shareholders’ interests 
that in the end should ensure the returns on the shareholders’ investments. 
 The corporate finance literature provides many examples of corporate governance 
mechanisms. The most direct governing body in publicly listed corporations is the board 
of directors or the supervisory board. The board of directors should monitor the corpo-
rate executives on behalf of the shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the 
existence of an efficiently working board of directors limits managerial entrenchment. 
Additionally, the literature emphasizes the importance of the corporation’s ownership 
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structure (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), executive compensation and incentive pack-
ages (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990), and capital structure (e.g., Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack, 1997) as corporate governance mechanisms. One important external corporate 
governance tool, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, is the market for corporate 
control, or the managerial labor market. The literature argues that the corporations that 
are exposed to a potential takeover threat are more efficiently managed (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick, 2003). More recently, the corporate governance literature has stressed the 
importance of the product market as a governance tool (Giroud and Mueller, 2011).1 
 Aside from these indirect monitoring tools, shareholders—as the ultimate owners of 
the corporation—also have a very explicit corporate governance tool at their disposal, 
namely direct interventions. My dissertation focuses on these direct interventions as an 
important corporate governance mechanism. In particular, I study shareholder engage-
ment practices that aim at improving corporate environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) policies that ultimately translate into shareholder value creation. Tirole (2006) 
defines these practices as “active monitoring” that involve “interfering with management 
in order to increase the value of the investors’ claims” (p. 27).  
 At this stage, how I define shareholder engagement in this dissertation is important. 
Conceptually, I allege that shareholder engagement describes all of the actions that the 
shareholders could undertake to promote changes in corporations. These actions can 
range from class-action lawsuits, over aggressive stake acquisitions by hedge funds, to 
the launching of media campaigns. In its most basic form, shareholder engagement oc-
curs on an annual basis during the annual general meeting (AGM) of the corporations 
through proxy voting. At every AGM, the shareholders are asked to vote on particular 
issues like board composition, executive compensation policies, or the introduction of 
new governance standards. Generally, all of the major shareholders, like insurance com-
panies, asset managers, and other institutional investors, participate in the proxy voting 
but also the small, retail investors who just hold a couple of shares are eligible to partici-
pate. 
 However, shareholders can even go beyond mere proxy voting and do more in order 
to bring about change. Shareholders themselves can file shareholder proposals (or reso-
lutions) that are put on the voting agenda of the AGM. In doing so, they can determine 
parts of the voting agenda and can communicate their requests to a wider shareholder 
audience. I consider the filing of shareholder proposals as another shareholder engage-
ment strategy. Furthermore, I believe that the filing of proposals can be especially im-
portant to institutional investors who have the fiduciary duty to act according to their 
beneficiaries’ investment guidelines and beliefs. Another increasingly important en-
gagement tool are private dialogues and management meetings, especially for institu-
tional investors. These private negotiations generally take place behind closed doors 
between large institutional investors and the management. Using these private negotia-
                                                          
1 A very detailed discussion of all of the available governance mechanisms is beyond the scope of the introduc-
tion of such a dissertation. For a more detailed discussion of the variety of potential governance mechanisms, 
see for example Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
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tions, institutional shareholders can directly communicate and discuss their concerns and 
suggestions with the management. An interesting feature of private engagements is the 
fact that they are generally not observable by other shareholders and that they always 
occur in the shadow of a potential filing of a shareholder proposal. 
 These different shareholder engagement practices— the proxy voting, filing of 
shareholder proposals, and the private negotiations— constitute examples of the voice 
dimension of Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty continuum. Hirschman postu-
lates that dissatisfied customers of a company can express their discontent through three 
different channels. First, customers can simply continue buying the product and do noth-
ing. In doing so, they express loyalty towards the company. Second, customers can go to 
another producer of the same product (if available) and thereby cease buying from the 
inferior producer. Hirschman calls this the exit option. Third, customers can communi-
cate their discontent to the producer of the product and in doing so, try to promote a 
change in the corporation using their voice (Hirschman, 1970, p. 4). I compare Hirsch-
man’s concept to a situation where shareholders are not satisfied with either the corpora-
tion’s performance or its practices. I do so by studying shareholder engagement practices 
in the form of filing and withdrawing shareholder proposals, proxy voting, and private 
negotiations, which are all varieties of Hirschman’s voice dimension. Hence, in this 
dissertation, I study the voice engagement of shareholders. 
 However, in the context of my dissertation, shareholder engagement is more than 
just expressing one’s discontent with corporate performance and managerial actions. I 
argue that the shareholder engagement has another facet that amplifies its importance in 
today’s capital markets. Specifically, I consider the shareholder engagement as a way to 
invest responsibly and sustainably by trying to improve corporate ESG policies. Increas-
ingly, the clients and the beneficiaries of large institutional investors are scrutinizing 
where and how the returns on their investments are generated. Often, the beneficiaries 
request that their investment returns come from sustainable and responsible investments. 
Further, retail investors also tend to be more and more selective when making invest-
ment decisions. However, is just investing in sustainable businesses actually responsible 
if the ‘irresponsible’ ones are left aside? I claim that the answer to this question is no. In 
this dissertation, I argue that shareholder engagement should be used especially by, but 
not exclusively by, large institutional investors who have the economic power to pro-
mote changes at corporations in order to make them more responsible and sustainable. 
By raising their voice, they can “invest for change” (Landier and Nair, 2009) and not by 
simply using the exit option. 
 In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and the current European debt crisis, the 
topic of this dissertation could not be more up to date. Governments, politicians, and also 
major parts of the society are asking for higher levels of shareholder involvement in the 
decision-making process of large corporations. In the most recent discussions, most of 
the emphasis is on the shareholders’ voting and engagement on executive pay packages. 
A prominent example of this public outrage is the Swiss initiative against excessive 
executive pay practices (Abzocker-Initiative). The majority of Swiss voters supported 
this initiative in a referendum in early March 2013. The positive voting outcome for this 
referendum implies that publicly listed corporations in Switzerland are now exposed to a 
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binding shareholder vote on executive pay. In other words, the shareholders now decide 
the structure and level of executive pay. This dissertation does not directly take a stance 
on binding shareholder votes on executive pay. Rather, my dissertation sheds more light 
on the level and the effectiveness of the shareholder engagements. Thereby, I contribute 
to the more general discussion on shareholder engagement in the sense that I not only 
investigate the engagement concerning executive pay practices but also other corporate 
issues like corporate governance structures, corporate human rights policies, worker 
safety standards, corporate environmental policies, and so forth. With my work, I also 
show that shareholder engagement has gone on for quite some time, even before politi-
cally imposed regulations on the shareholders’ involvement were introduced. 
 In the remainder of this introduction, I briefly sketch the contents of the different 
chapters and provide a brief summary of the key findings, followed by a more detailed 
discussion of each of the chapters. The first part of my dissertation (Chapters 2 and 3) 
focuses on the public shareholder engagement in US corporations. In particular, I pro-
vide evidence on the shareholder proposals that are quite frequently used by shareholders 
in the United States to express their concerns about particular corporate policies. I con-
sider the shareholder proposals to be part of the public shareholder engagement universe, 
that is, these engagements are publicly observable by other shareholders and market 
participants. In Chapter 2, I investigate the determinants of the occurrences of the share-
holder proposals in US corporations and their corresponding voting outcomes at the 
AGMs. I provide answers to the questions on which corporations become targeted by the 
shareholder proposals and what determines the voting outcomes of these proposals. 
Then, in Chapter 3, I research in more detail the substantial number of the shareholder 
proposals that get voluntarily withdrawn by the sponsoring shareholder prior to the 
AGM every year. Hence, I investigate what leads shareholders to withdraw their pro-
posals. Apparently, a specific private and confidential facet within the public shareholder 
engagement universe makes these shareholders withdraw their public proposals. I con-
jecture in Chapter 3 that withdrawn proposals are the strongest kind of shareholder pro-
posals that exist in the United States. 
 In the second part of my dissertation (Chapters 4 and 5), I turn to an analysis of the 
private shareholder engagements. Contrary to the public shareholder engagements, the 
private engagements are not observable and take place behind closed doors between the 
shareholders and the corporations. The private engagements are usually management 
meetings, telephone calls, letter writing, or direct private dialogues between the equity 
holders and the corporations. These kinds of engagements are generally undertaken by 
the larger institutional investors who have the economic power and the resources to 
effectively engage the corporations on a bilateral basis. In Chapter 4, I examine the pri-
vate engagement activities of a large UK-based institutional investor who also provides 
engagement services to institutional clients. Using a proprietary data set on its global 
engagement activities, I study the evolution of the investor’s private engagements over 
time and which corporations from which geographical regions are most likely to be tar-
geted by the investor. Additionally, I investigate the determinants of the private engage-
ment’s success in this Chapter. Having studied both private and public shareholder en-
gagements separately (Chapters 2–4), Chapter 5 includes both engagement means in the 
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analysis. That is, I study the simultaneous presence of private and public engagements, 
the presence of both engagement means in a corporation’s recent history, and a corpora-
tion’s history of successful engagements to shed light on the question of how both inter-
act. My goal is to show in Chapter 5 that the shareholder engagements take place 
through observable and visible means, like shareholder proposals; but that a substantial 
fraction of the engagements take place through private means, like dialogues between 
institutional investors and corporations. We, as researchers, should not neglect the pri-
vate facet of the shareholder engagement because its presence ultimately affects the 
presence and the effectiveness of the public shareholder engagement and vice versa.  
 Having written four extensive chapters on the topic of shareholder engagement and 
active ownership, I conclude the following. Shareholders, as the ultimate owners of 
corporations and important capital providers, have the responsibility to monitor manage-
rial actions and corporate behavior as the most important stakeholder group. In doing so, 
the shareholders can hold their managers accountable and responsible for their actions 
and can promote more sustainable behavior in the corporate world. My results indicate 
that shareholder engagement was already present more than ten years ago and that today 
a lot of engagement is performed, especially by institutional investors. However, I claim 
that there is much more possible that is legally allowed in terms of the shareholder col-
laboration and coordination of engagement efforts. Taking into account the growing 
demand for sustainable investments, the institutional investors should use engagement as 
a way to invest responsibly. I aver that the shareholders should not wait for politics to 
impose regulations and restrictions on certain corporate policies, but that shareholders 
should proactively raise their voice to promote corporations to be more sustainable and 
responsible.  
1.1 Industry competition, ownership structure, and shareholder 
engagement 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation studies the occurrence of shareholder proposals and the 
corresponding voting outcomes when two other important corporate governance mecha-
nisms are absent: The market for corporate control and product market competition. This 
chapter focuses on voted proposals and studies whether the shareholder proposal mecha-
nism can act as a substitute for other corporate governance mechanisms. My main re-
search hypothesis is that the simultaneous absence of product market competition and 
the market for corporate control significantly increases the likelihood of corporations 
becoming targets of the shareholder proposals. Using data on shareholder proposals from 
1997–2006 at S&P1500 corporations, my results support this hypothesis. These results 
are distinctive from those of the other studies on shareholder proposals because I take all 
of the filed shareholder proposals into account when modeling the targeting likelihood. 
That is, in the analysis I also incorporate those proposals that were omitted and with-
drawn prior to the AGM, because they essentially were filed and the corporation is liter-
C H A P T E R  1  
 6 
ally exposed to the proposals. Hence, my results are more robust compared to the other 
studies conducting similar analyses.  
 Regarding the determinants of the voting outcomes, I find that the proposals receive 
fewer votes when they are large and when they have a high concentration of equity own-
ership within the board. I argue that the negative effect of the equity concentration in the 
board reflects the fact that the board members are voting against the shareholder pro-
posals and in doing so, are suppressing the voting outcomes of those proposals. This 
result is especially pronounced in poorly governed corporations. Chapter 2 also reflects 
the importance of shareholder proposals as a governance mechanism: the number of filed 
proposals increases over time, and the institutional investors more and more frequently 
use the proposals as a monitoring device. 
1.2 The determinants of withdrawn shareholder proposals 
In Chapter 3, I present evidence on a specific subset of shareholder proposals, namely 
withdrawn proposals. The withdrawn proposals occur when shareholders voluntarily 
withdraw their filed proposal before the actual AGM takes place. Consequently, no vote 
is held on the particular issue specified in the withdrawn proposal. How do withdrawals 
of the shareholder proposals occur? 
 Usually, shareholders file proposals to have a vote on a particular issue during the 
AGM. However, the mere filing of such a proposal does not necessarily lead to a ballot 
at the AGM. In the run up to the AGM, the corporations collect all of the filed share-
holder proposals, and the corporation has three options for each of these proposals: First, 
the management simply lets the proposal go to a vote during the AGM. Second, based on 
the contents of the shareholder proposal, the management team can ask the SEC for an 
official exclusion from the proxy materials due to a violation of the rules and regulations 
contained in the SEC’s rule 14a-8 on shareholder proposals. If the SEC permits the ex-
clusion of the proposal, it becomes omitted from the proxy materials and no vote is held. 
Third, the management team can invite the sponsors of the particular proposals into 
private negotiations on a withdrawal. I conjecture that these negotiations mostly happen 
for those proposals that could create negative publicity for managers, or those proposals 
that are the most adverse to managers such as eroding managerial power or cutting exec-
utive compensation. If the private negotiations yield a satisfactory compromise for the 
shareholder, he or she can then voluntarily withdraw the proposal before the AGM takes 
place. A compromise can be a partial or even a full implementation of the requests speci-
fied in the proposal. Therefore, a withdrawn proposal represents in my eyes a successful 
negotiation and thus a successful shareholder engagement. This argumentation is con-
sistent with Landier and Nair (2009) who argue that withdrawn shareholder proposals 
represent managers implementing the shareholders’ requests. In case no compromise is 
reached, the proposal is not withdrawn, and a vote is held during the AGM. 
 The corporate governance literature has widely neglected withdrawn shareholder 
proposals. Except for Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) and Chidambaran and 
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Woidtke (1999), no other studies explicitly investigate withdrawn shareholder proposals. 
I hypothesize in Chapter 3 that more powerful shareholders (in terms of stockholdings) 
are more likely to reach an amicable compromise with managers and that the likelihood 
of withdrawal is positively related to the ownership stake of the institutional investors in 
general. My results confirm these hypotheses. I find that the proposals filed by the insti-
tutional investors are the most likely to be withdrawn. Furthermore, I show that the own-
ership stake of the institutional investors is also positively related to the likelihood of 
withdrawal. My results indicate that in particular, the ownership stake of quasi-indexer 
institutions drive this effect. The proposal-level analysis in Chapter 3 also shows that 
insider ownership—as measured by CEO ownership—is significantly and negatively 
related to the likelihood of withdrawal, which indicates the bargaining power of the 
managers. My results also point to a cross-sectional difference between the corporate 
governance and the corporate social responsibility proposals. 
 Overall, Chapter 3 has important implications for managers and shareholders. The 
mere proxy voting and the filing of proposals are not what only matters in the entire 
public shareholder engagement process, what also matters are the private negotiations 
between the shareholders and the managers. Otherwise, one would not observe approxi-
mately 20% of all filed proposals being withdrawn every proxy season. Chapter 3 pro-
vides the first indicative evidence that private dialogues and negotiations could serve as 
important engagement devices for shareholders. How exactly this works in practice is 
investigated in the next chapter. 
1.3 The geography of shareholder engagement 
In Chapter 4, I turn away from the public tactics of shareholder engagement to the pri-
vate engagement strategies that the institutional investors adopt to promote changes at 
portfolio corporations. Specifically, I investigate the private engagement activities of a 
large UK institutional investor. Private engagements can be defined as bilateral talks, 
discussions, and personal meetings between the institutional investors and the managers 
of investee firms. Similar to public engagements, these private engagements are under-
taken in order to change the corporate governance structure or the corporate social and 
environmental practices. However, this private engagement route is a more direct en-
gagement tool because the institutional investor has immediate contact with the corpora-
tion and its management team. McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2013) show that the 
institutional investors use private engagements as one of their major tactics to influence 
the managerial and in turn corporate behavior.  
 Using proprietary information from a large UK-based institutional investor on its 
global engagement activities, I pose the following research question: Which corporations 
from which geographical regions are most prone towards the private engagements and 
for which corporations are these private engagements most likely to be successful? 
 I hypothesize that a home bias exists in the context of private engagements. Specifi-
cally, I conjecture that portfolio corporations that are not domiciled in the United King-
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dom are significantly less likely to receive engagements from the institutional investor. 
The underlying drivers of this hypothesized relation are the higher information asymme-
tries and transaction costs when a UK-based investor wants to engage with foreign cor-
porations. Furthermore, I posit that the foreign corporations located in very distant capi-
tal markets also display significantly less successful private engagements for similar 
reasons. 
 My results indeed indicate that there is a home bias in the private engagements. The 
corporations based in the United Kingdom receive significantly more engagements than 
their foreign counterparts. Additionally, I show that the larger corporations also get more 
engagements than the smaller corporations. Importantly, I find an important momentum 
effect in private engagements: the number of private engagements in the previous year 
significantly increases the intensity of the corporate engagements in the current year. On 
average, corporations from the United States and Continental Europe display significant-
ly more successful private engagements than UK corporations. The UK and Japanese 
corporations, on the other hand, have relatively higher success ratios with respect to 
engagements related to social issues. 
 Chapter 4 indicates that institutional investors are important players in the share-
holder engagement process. Even though my results are based on the private engage-
ments of a single UK-based institutional investor, I can conclude that the private en-
gagements of institutional investors are just as important a force as the public and ob-
servable engagement tactics like shareholder proposals. Importantly, these engagement 
activities do not exclusively strive for corporate changes regarding the governance struc-
ture of the corporations. Rather, I find that the institutional investor is also very keen on 
changing the corporate social and environmental policies such as respecting human 
rights, worker safety standards, or limiting environmental pollution. 
1.4 The market for public and private shareholder engagement 
While Chapters 2 through 4 focus on either public or private shareholder engagements, 
Chapter 5 adopts a more holistic approach towards shareholder engagement. In this 
chapter, I provide the first indicative evidence on the interplay between public and pri-
vate shareholder engagements in promoting corporate changes with regard to environ-
mental, social or governance issues. I show how public and private engagements evolve 
over time, which kind is the most effective, and which corporations are the most likely to 
be exposed to some type of engagement. Also, I show which corporations are the most 
likely to settle with the shareholders, that is, how likely the corporations are to change in 
response to certain shareholder engagements. 
 The most important contribution of this chapter to the corporate governance litera-
ture is the fact that I study both the public and the private side of shareholder engage-
ment at the same time. More precisely, I combine the research strands of corporate en-
gagement presented in the first part of this dissertation (Chapters 2 and 3) with the evi-
dence provided on private engagement activities of institutional investors (Chapter 4). 
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This is important because the literature discusses the public and the private shareholder 
engagements separately without taking into account the important interdependencies 
between the two means of engagement. 
 Chapter 5 relies on similar data sets as the chapters before. I also make use of the 
data on the public shareholder proposals of all of the S&P1500 corporations and merge 
these data with the proprietary database on the private engagements of the UK-based 
institutional investor. The time period under investigation for the common sample is 
1999–2011. The first part of this chapter is concerned with the evolution of private and 
public engagements. My descriptive results indicate that over time, the number of corpo-
rations exposed to the private or the public, or even both types of engagement, rises over 
time. However, it is important to note that on average more than half of the observations 
display neither the public nor the private engagements. Furthermore, I find that on aver-
age the corporations exposed to the shareholder engagements receive more private than 
public engagements. Regarding successful engagements, my results show that the public 
engagements are more successful than the private engagements. 
 The second and empirical part of Chapter 5 deals with the targeting and success 
likelihoods. I find that corporations are significantly more likely to be targeted with 
some type of engagement in the current year after being exposed to both the private and 
the public engagements in the previous year. This result implies that a particular type of 
corporation is targeted with both the public and the private engagements over and over 
again. One reason for this finding for example could be that these corporations are per se 
also the corporations that are most responsive to shareholder engagements. 
 With respect to the success of shareholder engagements, the results of Chapter 5 
indicate that those corporations that have the highest predicted honoring likelihood have 
current public engagements, no public engagements in the previous year, and have had 
many honored public engagements in the previous year. A high exposure of those corpo-
rations towards private engagements (irrespective of the time period) increases the hon-
oring likelihood even further. The results also indicate slight differences for different 
subsamples of engagements. 
 Overall, Chapter 5 of my dissertation illustrates that the shareholder engagement 
indeed consists of a public and a private domain and that both of them are significant 
drivers of the success for any kind of engagement. Therefore, Chapter 5 has important 
implications for institutional investors who like to engage with investee corporations on 
certain corporate issues. They have to consider the engagements that are and have been 
going on at the corporations before starting the actual engagement in order to increase 
the odds of being successful. 
 The following four chapters shed light on shareholder engagement as a corporate 
governance tool in more detail. The last chapter of my dissertation (Chapter 6) summa-
rizes this dissertation and provides the reader with the implications for managers, inves-
tors, and researchers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Industry Competition, Ownership Structure, 
and Shareholder Engagement2 
In this chapter, I study shareholder engagement through proxy proposals in the United 
States from 1997–2006. I investigate the determinants for being targeted by these pro-
posals and the corresponding voting results. By using a distinctive sample that also in-
cludes withdrawn and omitted proposals, I circumvent a selection bias towards those 
proposals that actually go to a vote. I hypothesize that a lack of industry competition in 
combination with higher managerial entrenchment increases the likelihood of being 
targeted. My empirical results support this hypothesis. Concerning voting outcomes, I 
find that insiders’ equity holdings have a significant and negative correlation. Hence, 
managers actively vote against shareholder proposals. 
  
                                                          
2 This chapter is based on Bauer, Braun, and Viehs (2012). I thank Alex Edmans for his generous comments, 
which greatly improved the chapter. I am thankful to Andriy Bodnaruk, Stuart Gillan, Julian Franks, James 
Hawley, Tessa Hebb, Kose John, and Frank Moers for helpful advice. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that managerial entrenchment and the corporation’s expo-
sure to industry competition jointly influence the occurrence and efficiency of share-
holder engagement in the form of proxy proposals. Using this channel, shareholders can 
monitor and pressure the management and the board to pursue actions that increase 
shareholder value. The filing of shareholder proposals is an important corporate govern-
ance mechanism in the United States. Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the so-called shareholder proposal rule, allows shareholders to file proposals to be 
included in the proxy statements that strive for changes in the corporations’ operations, 
governance structures, and social policies. I hypothesize that corporations with low 
competition and poor governance are more likely to be targeted by shareholders. Con-
cerning the success rate of the voting process, the roles of the outside shareholder base 
and the insider holdings of voting rights are pivotal. This chapter does not only investi-
gate the magnitude and frequency but also the actual outcome of the shareholder pro-
posals. 
 Over the last decade, both small individual shareholders, so-called gadfly investors, 
and institutional shareholders have become more active in trying to influence and change 
managerial actions and corporate governance structures. Examples from the 2008 proxy 
season are Carl Icahn and his confrontational request to remove the entire board of direc-
tors of Yahoo!, the Rockefeller family who strived for the separation of the positions of 
the chairman of the board and the CEO at Exxon Mobil, and the CalPERS’ shareholder 
proposal asking for the declassification of Standard Pacific’s Board of Directors. 
 Managers are exposed to several monitoring mechanisms. First, the managerial labor 
market is designed to ensure that they maximize the corporation’s value. The extent to 
which managers are exposed to takeover threats and the accompanying shareholder 
wealth effects is widely researched in the literature (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003). Second, the degree of industry competition can extend monitoring because it acts 
as an alternative or complimentary corporate governance mechanism in motivating and 
disciplining managers to exert optimal effort (e.g., Hart, 1983; Giroud and Mueller, 
2010, 2011). The industry competition as a governance device makes economic sense 
because competition in the industry reduces managerial slack and the room for opportun-
istic behavior. Therefore, I assume that the threat of being driven out of business is 
equivalent to being taken over. Both eventually result in the manager’s position being 
endangered. The industry competition as a purely exogenous governance mechanism 
cannot be altered by shareholders. This fact implies that the shareholder engagement is 
more likely to occur in industries in which the corporation competes with very few com-
panies for market share. I define competition as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of 
each corporations’ squared percentages of the industry’s total revenue; henceforth HHI) 
corresponding to the 3-digit SIC code. 
 I posit that if both industry competition and the managerial labor market fail to dis-
cipline managers, then the shareholders will adopt a different way of trying to influence 
managerial behavior and the corporate governance structures, namely voice engagement 
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through shareholder proposals. By raising their voice, shareholders can prevent manag-
ers from enjoying a quiet life, a concept that Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) put for-
ward. In this chapter, I assume that just dealing with the mere filing of the shareholder 
proposals is costly for managers. On the one hand, this is because of the negative public-
ity. For the manager, filing is a public signal of underperformance. On the other hand, 
the filing also resembles a significant opportunity cost for the managers who actively try 
to block the proposals. This costliness also siphons resources and time from the agenda 
of the annual general meeting. The siphoning makes shareholder engagement a pervasive 
nuisance for the entrenched manager. I argue that the occurrence of shareholder pro-
posals is particularly strong for poorly governed corporations that are not exposed to 
fierce industry competition and the managerial takeover market. In the absence of pun-
ishment for poor performance, the shareholders’ optimal response in these corporations 
is to propose steeper incentives for managers. Figuratively speaking, the absence of 
sticks requires the managers to be awarded carrots in order to exert optimal effort. How-
ever, the carrots in the form of option packages involve the downside of equity compen-
sation. As a result, the corporate insiders might then own a larger fraction of voting 
rights that could be abused to enforce certain corporate policies that are not in the inter-
est of the shareholders. Consequently, I also investigate how much the insiders’ voting 
rights influence the voting outcomes of the shareholder proposals. Specifically, I study 
whether the managers use their voting rights to vote against shareholder proposals. 
 I start by showing who gets targeted. I observe an increasing trend in aggregate in 
the shareholder proposals between 1997 and 2006. Corporations are more likely to re-
ceive shareholder proposals if they are both poorly governed and if the disciplining force 
of a highly competitive industry is absent. This finding is particularly strong for the 
shareholder proposals that pertain to internal governance and compensation, which is in 
line with the shareholders’ optimal response. The outside shareholder base and its struc-
ture play a significant role with respect to the occurrence and frequency of the share-
holder proposals. 
 Next, I look at what determines the success of the engagement. In particular, I look 
at the effects of insider and institutional ownership. My analysis shows that the voting 
outcomes of the shareholder proposals have a stronger correlation with the shareholdings 
of corporate insiders than they have with the holdings of outside investors. Therefore, 
the corporate insiders use their voting rights to block shareholder proposals when both 
the shareholders’ rights and the industry competition are absent. I find a significantly 
negative relation between my measure for the insider ownership and the number of votes 
cast in favor of the proposals. This result is robust to different measures of competition 
and governance quality. These findings indicate that the managers in these corporations 
are not able to shirk because the corporate insiders receive negative publicity from the 
engagement and have to actively vote against the proposals. This finding holds especial-
ly in the presence of steeper incentives. I argue that the shareholders of poorly governed 
corporations recognize that the managers of these corporations have more discretion, and 
thus shareholders use voice engagement in the form of their proposals to discipline and 
monitor the managers. 
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My results have several implications. If corporate insiders actively vote to block the 
shareholder proposals, then my results help to explain why previous studies find that the 
proxy proposal mechanism is ineffective in monitoring managers. The results of my 
empirical analysis ultimately relate to two different streams in the literature: shareholder 
engagement and industry competition as alternative or complimentary corporate govern-
ance mechanisms. To the best of my knowledge, no previous study explicitly investi-
gates the impact of the industry competition in combination with the managerial en-
trenchment on the presence and the effectiveness of the shareholder engagement. So far, 
the literature on shareholder engagement mainly focuses on corporate and ownership 
characteristics to draw inferences about the determinants of the likelihood of receiving a 
proposal and the corresponding voting results. In particular, the insider and outsider 
shareholder base influences the voting results of the shareholder proposals (Gordon and 
Pound, 1993; John and Klein, 1995; and Gillan and Starks, 2000). Furthermore, the 
chances of being targeted by the proposals are affected by the corporation’s past perfor-
mance and its size (John and Klein, 1995; Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996). The 
previous studies find no significant relation between the insider holdings of voting rights 
and the likelihood of receiving a proposal. 
 The institutional shareholders play an important role in the proposal process, both as 
proposal sponsors and as shareholders per se (Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996; Kahn and 
Winton, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000). These investors have more incentives and pow-
er to induce other (institutional) shareholders to vote with them. Consequently, the pro-
posals sponsored by institutions display the strongest voting support. They are also more 
effective in possible private negotiations with management that might eventually lead to 
changes in the corporate policies or the governance structures (Carleton, Nelson, and 
Weisbach, 1998; Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). This is especially true for the pro-
posals that are withdrawn prior to the annual meeting. These proposals provide evidence 
of the bargaining power of the institutional investors and/or the management in private 
negotiations. Withdrawn proposals also reflect the managers’ ability to shirk because 
they will negotiate about a possible withdrawal if they feel that the proposals erode their 
managerial power or expose them to negative publicity. Given that the managers are able 
to successfully negotiate a proposal withdrawal, they are in a comfortable position. 
Omitting these proposals from the analysis causes a serious bias towards ex post unsuc-
cessful proposals, which I address. 
 An emerging body of literature questions the absolute measure of corporate govern-
ance and proposes the addition of a moderating factor into the analysis, namely the de-
gree of industry competition. The theoretical work by Hart (1983) provides the founda-
tion for the argument that the industry competition can mitigate the principal-agent con-
flicts. The key idea in this concept is that good governance only matters relative to the 
industry or the geographic peers. Giroud and Mueller (2010) report that highly concen-
trated industries benefit from good corporate governance practices whereas in competi-
tive industries this effect is not observable. Likewise, Giroud and Mueller (2011) show 
that, on average, the corporations in highly concentrated industries suffer from exoge-
nous shocks that weaken their governance structures. In contrast, the corporations in 
highly competitive industries are not affected by these shocks. Further, they find that the 
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managers of corporations in highly concentrated industries enjoy a quiet life. Lastly, a 
corporation’s governance quality has to be evaluated against its operating environment 
(John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008). Ultimately, the evidence on industry competition as a 
governance mechanism alludes to a relation between the level of competition and the 
corporations’ governance quality. I provide direct evidence on the relative governance 
by showing that managers of poorly governed corporations in highly concentrated indus-
tries are prevented from exerting little effort because the shareholders become active and 
exert control. I show that only if the managers hold substantial fractions of the voting 
rights, and if they use those rights to vote against the shareholder proposals, then they 
are in a dominant position. A logical reaction is to exploit the voting rights in manage-
ment proposals. However, the shareholders are still able to attach negative publicity to 
their engagement, which is what the managers aim to avoid. 
 This chapter contributes to the literature on shareholder engagement in several ways. 
I start by examining the determinants of being targeted by shareholder proposals. Here, I 
contribute by studying the joint effects of the industry competition and the managerial 
labor market (i.e., antitakeover provisions) on the occurrence of proposals. Moreover, I 
contribute by studying under which circumstances corporate insiders are in a comforta-
ble position when the disciplining forces from the takeover market and industry are ab-
sent. To shed light on this hypothesis, I study if insider holdings of voting rights are used 
to block the shareholder proposals that eventually go to a vote at annual general meet-
ings. If these holdings significantly relate to the voting outcome, then I provide indica-
tive evidence that the managers actively vote against the shareholder proposals. Howev-
er, if the shareholders succeed at the AGMs with their proposals, then I find evidence of 
optimal contracting; and the managers are still controlled. I therefore provide evidence 
on the efficiency of the shareholder engagement in the presence of the insider holdings 
conditional on the corporation’s competitive and governance environment. 
 Furthermore, the uniqueness of my data set represents my third contribution. My 
database of shareholder proposals covers the period of 1997–2006. This database is 
distinctive because it also includes information about withdrawn and omitted proposals. 
Withdrawn proposals are subject to private negotiations between corporate managers and 
proposal sponsors prior to the AGM. Eventually, they are withdrawn from the voting 
process. Omitted proposals, on the other hand, are removed from the voting agenda 
because they violate the SEC’s regulations. In other words, these proposals are not put to 
a vote but they still occur. The studies on shareholder proposals (e.g., Gordon and 
Pound, 1993; Gillan and Starks, 2000) suffer from a selection bias in the sense that they 
focus only on proposals that the management admits to the voting process. These pro-
posals have a low ex ante probability of receiving a majority. Restricting the analysis to 
these instances neglects the bulk of the corporations where no such proposal is filed by 
the investor base. More importantly, the restriction neglects the corporations in which 
the proposals are withdrawn because of private negotiations. Hence, I investigate all of 
the companies in the COMPUSTAT universe that have complete financial and owner-
ship information available, irrespective of whether they were targeted or not, to circum-
vent this selection bias. The results of my chapter cast doubt on the prior studies’ conclu-
sions of ineffective shareholder voting. The shareholder proposals do not have to be 
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voted on successfully to be effective. In my setup, the mere filing of the proposals is 
sufficient in preventing managerial entrenchment. According to my data, shareholder 
engagement is effective. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I present 
my economic model and hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents the data and the data sources. 
In Section 2.4, I present the statistics on the shareholder proposals and my sample corpo-
rations. In Section 2.5, I perform the empirical analyses and present the results. Section 
2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Economic framework and testable hypotheses 
I conjecture that two important governance mechanisms influence the occurrence of 
shareholder proposals and the associated voting outcomes. The first channel is exoge-
nous in nature and cannot be changed by shareholders, namely the competitive environ-
ment a corporation is acting in. As a proxy for the competitiveness of the industry, I use 
the industry concentration level as measured by the HHI based on the 3-digit SIC code. 
As a second channel, I argue that the corporation’s governance quality determines its 
vulnerability to shareholder proposals. I use the corporation’s exposure to the takeover 
market as a proxy for the governance quality (i.e., the Governance Index as constructed 
by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; henceforth the G-index). A higher exposure to the 
takeover market lowers managerial entrenchment and increases the level of shareholder 
rights. 
 I develop an economic framework to derive my testable hypotheses. This two-
dimensional theoretical model illustrates how industry competition and the level of man-
agerial entrenchment jointly influence the probability of being targeted by shareholder 
proposals. Figure 1 displays the structure. 
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Figure 2.1: Economic Framework 
This figure shows the economic framework that provides the theoretical foundation for this chapter. I distin-
guish corporations along two dimensions: shareholder rights and the degree of the industry competition. In 
particular, I investigate dictatorship corporations (in the spirit of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) (G-index 
≥ 14) and democracy corporations (G-index ≤ 5) operating in highly concentrated (top quintile of the industry 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)) or highly competitive industries (bottom quintile of the industry HHI).
Depending on the number of punishing devices the corporations have in place (sticks) the likelihood of being
targeted by shareholder proposals varies. Most importantly, the upper right quadrant displays the highest 
likelihood of being targeted when other disciplining tools are absent. 
 
Throughout the analysis I assume that the G-index reasonably measures the shareholder 
rights and hence the managerial entrenchment or takeover protection. I follow Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) to classify corporations 
as either democratic or dictator that are exposed to either a highly competitive or a con-
centrated industry. Based on Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) I classify corporations 
with a G-index smaller or equal to 5 as democracy corporations and corporations with a 
G-index equal to or larger than 14 as dictatorship corporations. Concerning my industry 
concentration measure, I adopt the same measure as Giroud and Mueller (2010). Accord-
ingly, the industries in the top quintile with respect to the HHI of the respective 3-digit 
SIC code are considered to be highly concentrated. Correspondingly, industries in the 
lowest quintile of the HHI are considered as highly competitive industries. Consequent-
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ly, I differentiate between four different types of corporations: dictatorship/concentrated 
industry (Q1: Poorly governed corporations), democracy/concentrated industry (Q2), 
democracy/competitive industry (Q3: Well-governed corporations), and dictator-
ship/competitive industry (Q4). 
 Based on my setup, I hypothesize the following: First, I conjecture that corporations 
in Q1 are highly prone to receiving shareholder proposals because these corporations 
lack the disciplining forces from both the takeover market and competition. The share-
holders realize that the managerial discretion is the highest in these corporations and 
decide to file proposals that call for a change in the governance structures or the incen-
tive policies. In contrast, the corporations that belong to the Q2 or the Q4 exhibit com-
paratively lower vulnerability towards shareholder proposals because in either case at 
least one governance mechanism is effectively present. The corporations in the Q3 are 
least likely to be targeted by their shareholders. The reason for this claim is that the in-
dustry competition in this quadrant is high and these corporations also exhibit more 
shareholder rights that implies that both of the monitoring mechanisms are working 
properly, making it unnecessary for the shareholders to file proposals. Hence, I hypothe-
size: 
H2.1: The corporations with low shareholder rights and weak industry competition 
(Q1) are more likely to receive shareholder proposals. 
Second, the corporations located in the upper right quadrant should also exhibit steeper 
incentives in the form of option packages. This is because of the absence of punishing or 
disciplining devices from the takeover market and the industry. Therefore, the managers 
need to be given pecuniary incentives in the form of options in order to exert effort: 
H2.1a: The corporations that face little industry competition and have low sharehold-
er rights also have steeper incentives in the form of options than their well-governed 
counterparts. As a response, the shareholders file proposals on internal governance 
and compensation. 
Third, I posit that the outside shareholder base is an important determinant of the occur-
rence and frequency of shareholder proposals. The economic rationale is the following. 
A larger shareholder base—both in terms of the actual number of common shareholders 
as well as the density and structure of the institutional shareholdings—increases the 
probability of one shareholder actually becoming active and filing a proposal. Further-
more, if the ownership concentration among the institutional shareholders is high as 
well, then the collusion between these shareholders occurs more easily. Corresponding-
ly, I claim that the probability of being targeted with shareholder proposals increases 
with a concentrated institutional ownership and a larger shareholder base: 
H2.1b: A higher institutional ownership concentration and a large shareholder base 
positively relate to the magnitude of filed shareholder proposals. 
Lastly, concerning the voting outcomes of the admitted shareholder proposals, I argue 
that the internal shareholder base is a key determinant. The implicit collusion of the 
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insiders is simple because they share common interests, objectives, and incentives. I 
hypothesize that the insiders are reluctant to accept intervention into the corporate strate-
gy or the governance structure and indicate a preference to entrench. Hence, I argue that 
the insiders of the corporations in concentrated industries with strong takeover protection 
will exploit their holdings of voting rights in order to actively vote against the sharehold-
er proposals. The management’s alternative to blocking the shareholder proposals is to 
propose the compensation structures themselves via management proposals. In unreport-
ed tests on the managerial-sponsored compensation proposals, I find that these proposals 
have an unconditional acceptance rate of more than 95%. Based on my framework I 
conjecture that: 
H2.2: The voting outcomes of the admitted shareholder proposals have a negative re-
lation to the insiders’ equity holdings. 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Shareholder proposals 
I use a unique data set that provides information on all of the shareholder proposals 
brought forward to S&P1500 corporations between 1997 and 2006. The data is from 
RiskMetrics and consist of annual meeting dates, information about the proposal’s con-
tent, filers, status, and the corresponding voting results. In total, my data set includes 
9,082 shareholder proposals addressing corporate governance and corporate social re-
sponsibility issues. These proposals were either put to a vote, withdrawn prior to the 
annual meeting because of private negotiations, or were omitted from the proxy state-
ment because they violated the SEC’s proxy rules. I argue that previous studies suffer 
from a selection bias in that they neglect the withdrawn and omitted shareholder pro-
posals. I circumvent this bias because I include them in my empirical analysis to study 
the actual probability of being targeted by shareholders. 
 I manually classify both the proposal’s topics and sponsors into different groups. 
The coarse classification has four main categories: corporate governance (CG), corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), mixed issues, and other proposals. In the following empiri-
cal analysis I focus on the former two categories only. Following Karpoff, Malatesta, 
and Walkling (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and 
Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003), I break down the CG proposals into finer subclasses. 
The CG proposals consist of external corporate control proposals, internal governance 
proposals, and takeover proposals. The external governance proposals mostly consist of 
the proposals related to antitakeover devices and the market for corporate control in 
general. Most of the internal proposals deal with the board of directors, voting issues, 
and the executive compensation. Furthermore, I split up the CSR proposals into social 
and environmental proposals, which deal with the current buzzwords like human rights, 
health, diversity, and climate change. 
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Furthermore, I distinguish between four different proposal sponsor groups: individual 
investors (e.g., Evelyn Davis, the Rossi family, etc.), institutional investors (e.g., asset 
managers, investment companies, pension funds, etc.), coordinated activists (religious 
and other interest groups), and unions (e.g., AFL-CIO, Teamsters, United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters, etc.). Appendix 2.A displays examples of each proposal topic and sponsor 
category. 
2.3.2 Insider ownership data 
A cornerstone of my chapter concerns the ownership structure of my sample corpora-
tions. I am interested in the fraction of voting rights owned by corporate insiders (i.e., 
the board) and whether these voting rights are used to block shareholder proposals at the 
annual general meetings (AGM). Pieces of the insider ownership information come from 
RiskMetrics that include detailed director information and the amounts of voting rights 
owned by each individual director. However, when two or more directors have voting 
power over a set of stock owned by a trust, a foundation, or another corporation, Risk-
Metrics assigns the corresponding voting rights to each director sitting on the board. This 
assignment means that the insider stock ownership sometimes exceeds 100% because of 
the multiple assignments of the stakes. Hence, I recalculate the ownership data if the 
holdings exceed a prespecified threshold of 80% by using proxy statements of the rele-
vant corporations to get a more accurate measure of the director holdings. I use the fol-
lowing three-step method to recalculate the insider stock ownership that is based on 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985): (1) Shareholdings 
owned by a trust, foundation, or another corporation are considered to be managerial 
holdings if the directors and/or the officers of the holding corporation are also sitting on 
the board of this particular corporation in which their corporation owns a stake. (2) To 
avoid double counting, I assign the ownership owned by a trust, foundation, or another 
corporation to only the director with the highest hierarchical position in the sample cor-
poration. (3) In cases where the positions of the directors are unidentifiable, I attribute 
the stock ownership to only one director. 
 I then merge the RiskMetrics data with the COMPUSTAT Execucomp database to 
identify the incumbent CEO of the relevant companies. Following those steps I am able 
to calculate my proxies for the insider holdings: overall board ownership, the CEO hold-
ings, and the HHI of the board’s holdings of the voting rights as a concentration measure 
of the insider holdings. 
2.3.3 Institutional ownership data 
Next to the insider holdings of voting rights, I am also interested in the effects of the 
outside ownership structure on both the occurrence of the shareholder proposals and the 
outcomes of the proposals that are put to a vote. I use Thomson Reuters’ 13(f) filings to 
retrieve the data on the holdings of the institutional investors and construct the following 
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variables. I count the number of institutional 5% holders as well as the concentration of 
the institutional ownership with the following measure: 
 
ܪܪܫ௝௧ = ∑ ݏ௜௝௧ଶேೕ௜ୀ1 , (2.1) 
 
where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of percentages held by institutional inves-
tors (as designated by the Thomson Reuters’ institutional holdings 13f database) of firm 
j in year t. I sum the squared percentages of each institutional investor i at time t across 
N investors in firm j. I use the average of four quarterly filings per corporation and in-
vestor. Naturally, the index is bounded between zero and one. I further have a ratio of 
the total institutional share ownership. The economic logic behind counting the number 
of institutional blockholders is that more large shareholders are either more likely to 
disagree or to collude over shareholder proposals depending on the proposal content and 
sponsor identity. 
 In addition, I break down the institutional ownership structure further. Bushee 
(1998) classifies the Thomson Reuters database into eight distinct investor subgroups3: 
(1) bank investors, (2) insurance companies, (3) independent investment advisors, (4) 
investment companies, (5) corporate pension plans, (6) public pension plans, (7) univer-
sity funds and endowments, and (8) miscellaneous. Because of the potential ambiguities 
I summarize groups (3) and (4). I also compute the dollar values of the holdings in order 
to account for the differences in the market valuations and firm sizes. The economic 
reasoning behind the disaggregation of the institutional investor holdings is as follows: 
There are certain investor groups that are more likely to suffer from conflicts of interest 
and are subject to higher disagreement. Other investor groups, for example corporate 
pension funds and insurance companies, tend to outsource their proxy voting and are 
likely to vote with the management’s recommendation possibly because of existing 
business ties with the target corporations (e.g., Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehrani-
an, 2007; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). 
2.3.4 Firm, industry, and governance data 
I obtain the relevant firm-level data from COMPUSTAT. The data include information 
about the corporation’s cash position, size, market-to-book ratio, dividend yield, past 
performance, and leverage. I approximate the corporation’s age with the first listing date 
on CRSP. RiskMetrics is the source of the G-index, my measure for the governance 
quality, and the dual class status of my sample corporations. In my analyses I also con-
trol for managerial incentives. To do so, I use the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity 
developed by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). This variable takes into account that 
managerial effort is multiplicative with respect to firm size. To obtain a measure for the 
                                                          
3 The classification of institutional shareholders is publicly available at Prof. Bushee’s website: 
http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
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industry concentration level, I calculate the HHI for every 3-digit SIC industry based on 
all of the COMPUSTAT firms. I calculate the industry HHI by summing all of the 
squared market shares (based on total sales) for all of the corporations in the respective 
3-digit SIC industry. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of filed proposals and average voting results over time 
The graph below plots the number of filed proposals per year (broken down by sponsor identity) between 1997
and 2006 (left axis). The average voting result (in percent) of all of the voted shareholder proposals in a given 
year is shown by the dotted line (right axis). 
 
2.4  A closer look at shareholder proposals 
2.4.1 Shareholder proposals and voting results 
As my data set covers the time period between 1997 and 2006, I can investigate the 
evolution of shareholder engagement over time. Figure 2.2 shows the number of pro-
posals per year and per sponsor group over time. It also shows the average voting results 
in a given year. Several observations emerge from the evolution of the proposals. Initial-
ly, individual investors file by far the highest fraction of proposals, which gradually 
declines until 2006. Contemporaneously, the engagement by institutional investors has 
almost monotonically increased from 1997 to 2006. This result can be explained by a 
general increase in the institutional ownership in the US stock markets from 50 to over 
70% during my sample period (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2007). Further, some striking 
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findings are the sharp increase in the filed proposals by union funds after the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the seemingly reduced importance of coordinated 
activist groups over time. Concerning the success of the proposals, I recognize a steady 
increase in the average voting results that indicates that shareholder engagement through 
proxy proposals becomes more successful. 
 Investigating the voting results and the success rates of the different subsets of the 
shareholder proposals sheds further light on both the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
shareholder engagement (see Table 2.1). 
 I observe the largest number of voted proposals from the area of internal govern-
ance. However, the proposals with the highest voting outcome and acceptance rate are 
those on external governance. This rate might be because of the fact that takeover de-
fenses are more pervasive and, as such, easier to vote on since there is less disagreement 
between the shareholders.  
 Even though the average voting result of compensation-related proposals has signif-
icantly increased over time, only a tiny fraction of the compensation proposals eventual-
ly gets accepted every year (varying between 0 and 5.88% of all voted compensation 
proposals). The lower part of Table 2.1 shows that the occurrence of CSR proposals 
displays a significantly increasing time trend. However, their successfulness remains 
very low, which might be attributed to larger disagreement among shareholder groups 
concerning CSR issues. 
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2.4.2 Firm characteristics and proposals per governance quadrant 
I research four extreme samples of firms based on their prevalent level of shareholder 
rights and industry competition. I provide preliminary evidence for my hypotheses, 
based on Figure 2.1, and take a closer look at the proposal and the corporate characteris-
tics per quadrant to check for patterns. 
 I note in Table 2.2 that Q2 displays the highest frequency of shareholder proposals 
(132 filed, and 77 voted proposals). The Q1 corporations receive only 80 proposals of 
which 45 are put to a vote. This finding gives a first indication on whether shareholders 
experience engagement via vote as a disciplining device or not. If they do, I expect to 
observe that the majority of the shareholder proposals occur in the upper right quadrant 
of my economic framework. Notably, in Q1, a significant portion of the compensation 
proposals (43%) are eventually withdrawn from the proxy forms. Further, I find that this 
quadrant displays the highest unconditional voting outcomes for the CG proposals (47% 
on average). Well-governed corporations (Q3), on the other hand, display much lower 
unconditional voting results (26%) for the CG proposals. This result could indicate that 
shareholders view the proxy proposal process as irrelevant for well-governed firms, 
which is also supported by the fact that the number of filed proposals is also much lower 
than for the poorly governed corporations (44 vs. 80). 
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Table 2.2: Proposals per governance-competition-quadrant 
In this table, there are characterizations of each of the four quadrants from Figure 1 by the occurrence of share-
holder proposals. “High G” is defined as a corporation from the dictatorship portfolio with a G-score greater 
than or equal to 14. “High HHI” has an industry concentration index in the top quartile of the distribution. 
Panel A distinguishes quadrant 1 from quadrant 4, and Panel B contrasts quadrant 2 and 3. 
 Dictatorship and Low Competition (Q1) Dictatorship and High Competition (Q4) 
Panel A  Number of
Proposals 
Number of
Voted 
Proposals 
Average
%  
Votes 
Number of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals
% of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals
Number of 
Proposals
Number 
of Voted 
Proposals
Average 
%  
Votes 
Number of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals 
% of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals
(1) Corporate 
Governance 
61 34 47% 11 18% 55 19 41% 15 27% 
External 17 12 61% 1 6% 9 7 66% 2 22% 
Internal 33 17 44% 6 18% 32 8 27% 11 34% 
Takeover 4 2 34% 1 25% 5 1 16% 0 0% 
Compensation 7 3 12% 3 43% 9 3 28% 2 22% 
(2) Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
16 9 6% 3 19% 12 3 6% 4 33% 
Social 12 9 6% 2 17% 5 0 - 2 40% 
Environmental 4 0 - 1 25% 7 3 6% 2 29% 
(3) Other 3 2 5% 0 0% 3 0 - 0 0% 
(4) Mixed 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 
Total (1) – (4) 80 45  14  70 22  19  
   
 Democracy and High Competition (Q3) Democracy and Low Competition (Q2) 
Panel B  Number 
of  
Proposals 
Number 
of Voted 
Proposals 
Average
%  
Votes 
Number of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals
% of With-
drawn 
Proposals
Number 
of  
Proposals
Number 
of Voted 
Proposals
Average 
%  
Votes 
Number of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals 
% of 
Withdrawn 
Proposals
(1) Corporate 
Governance 
30 14 26% 9 30% 73 45 20% 11 15% 
External 0 0 - 0 0% 3 3 38% 0 0% 
Internal 19 7 41% 7 37% 46 31 22% 6 13% 
Takeover 1 0 - 0 0% 3 3 6% 0 0% 
Compensation 10 7 11% 2 20% 21 8 10% 5 24% 
(2) Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
14 4 23% 5 36% 57 32 10% 11 19% 
Social 8 4 23% 1 13% 48 30 10% 7 15% 
Environmental 6 0 - 4 67% 9 2 3% 4 44% 
(3) Other 0 0 - 0 0% 2 0 - 0 0% 
(4) Mixed 0 0 - 0 0% 0 0 - 0 0% 
Total (1) – (4) 44 18  14  132 77  22  
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Turning to the firm, stock, and ownership characteristics of these quadrants, Table 2.3 
provides evidence of the economic conditions for shareholder proposals to be successful. 
In Panel A of Table 2.3, I compare the extreme groups of the corporations: poorly and 
well-governed corporations (Q1 vs. Q3 corporations). The most striking differences 
between these two groups lie in the level of stock option incentives. The managers of the 
poorly governed corporations have significantly more option incentives than the manag-
ers of the well-governed corporations. This is in line with the hypothesis of my econom-
ic framework. According to Hall and Liebman (1998), remuneration in the form of stock 
options has become the dominant form of explicit incentives for CEOs. I also find that 
relative to their well-governed counterparts, the poorly governed corporations have more 
employees, are smaller in terms of total assets, less frequently have dual classes of com-
mon stock, are more often members of the S&P500, and have more institutional and 
blockholder ownership. Moreover, the boards of the well-governed corporations general-
ly have a smaller stake in their corporation, both in terms of the dollar value as well as 
the fractional ownership. 
2.5 Method and empirical results 
2.5.1 Endogeneity of the shareholder base and structure 
I investigate the effect of the ownership structure on the occurrence and the frequency of 
shareholder engagement as well as the corresponding voting outcomes of the proposals. 
For that purpose, I need to find suitable measures of (1) the ownership stakes held by the 
corporate insiders, (2) the number of institutional investors that hold stock in the corpo-
ration, and (3) the number of common shareholders in total. The problem with these 
variables is that they are strongly endogenous to firm and stock characteristics. For the 
last two variables, I therefore follow the method of Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) 
and Bodnaruk and Östberg (2013) and extract the residuals from the following regres-
sion to correct for the endogeneity before continuing with the empirical analyses. 
 I regress the skewness-adjusted number of the common shareholders (COM-
PUSTAT item #100, measured in millions) on firm age, market capitalization, return on 
assets, market-to-book ratio, the inverse of share price, the stock’s liquidity (monthly 
average trading volume), past year return, and past year volatility. These variables are 
chosen because the corporate and the stock characteristics attract different groups of 
investor clienteles and therefore cause different degrees of ownership concentration. As 
an example, an established NYSE blue-chip corporation with low volatility attracts more 
(institutional) investors than a young and risky corporation with little record of profita-
bility. I control for the exchange listing and the industry grouping according to the 
Fama-French 12-industry classification. The same regression is run for the number of 
institutional investors that uses the same control variables. The results of the regression 
are in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Determinants of shareholder base 
In this table, there is a regression of (1) the logarithm of the number of common shareholders (in millions) and 
(2) the logarithm of the number of institutional investors on the following variables: the logarithm of the 
market capitalization (number of shares outstanding times share price), the logarithm of the firm age, the return 
on assets (operating income before depreciation divided by total assets), the logarithm of the market-to-book 
ratio, the inverse of the share price, the firm’s liquidity of the stock (monthly trading volume), its past year 
return, and the volatility (standard deviation of monthly returns). I control for the exchange trading status and 
have NYSE as the base variable. I incorporate industry dummies according to the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification. My estimation technique is an OLS, and I adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. 
Significance at 10, 5, and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Variables Log(1+Number of Common 
Shareholders) 
 Log(1+Number of Institutional 
Investors) 
  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept -2.603*** -20.584  0.550*** 11.574 
Firm Variables      
Firm Age 0.148*** 10.047  0.137*** 27.415 
Market Capitalization 0.314*** 21.740  0.336*** 64.715 
ROA 0.004 0.492  0.002 1.529 
Market-to-Book 0.194*** 13.154  0.054*** 10.364 
1/Price 0.061** 2.113  -0.002 -0.283 
Liquidity 0.164* 1.850  0.215*** 5.140 
Past Year Return 0.000 0.184  0.000*** 6.107 
Volatility -0.942*** -8.197  -0.471*** -10.625 
Exchange Controls      
AMEX traded -0.061 -0.965  0.071** 2.423 
NASDAQ traded 1.568*** 4.471  -0.749*** -2.835 
      
Industry FF12 controlled yes  yes 
            
Adjusted R2 0.420  0.758 
Number of Observations 14,537   15,195 
 
Consistent with the literature on ownership structure, I note that larger and more liquid 
corporations are more likely to have a broader base of common shareholders. Surprising-
ly, I find that price matters to the common shareholder base but turns out to be nonsig-
nificant for the institutional shareholder base. The transaction costs seem to matter more 
to the common shareholder base than to the institutional investors, which is in line with 
the economic reasoning. I find that glamor stocks are more likely to have a large investor 
base and have more institutional investors. Being very liquid in terms of trading volume 
plays a significant role both for the common as well as for the institutional shareholder 
base. From this regression, I extract the residual values and use them for the ongoing 
analysis in the later stage regressions of the shareholder proposal occurrence, frequency, 
and outcome. 
 As a third group of potential holders of voting rights, I turn to the role of corporate 
insiders. In order to correct for biases in firm sizes, I multiply each director’s share of 
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ownership with the year-end stock price in order to arrive at the share ownership correct-
ed for dollar values. By construction, accumulating significant holdings at high share 
prices is more difficult for CEOs of large blue-chip stocks, which is why I account for 
the market cap. There is a rich body of literature pointing towards the endogeneity of 
insider holdings and executive compensation (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Dem-
setz and Villalonga, 2001). For that reason I decide to run the same regression as before 
for the share holdings of (1) the CEO of the corporations and (2) the holdings of all di-
rectors and officers in the corporation. I complement the set of stock and firm character-
istics with a list of governance variables that show the explanatory power of the insider 
holdings (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
 I find that for insider holdings, many of the previously observed coefficients of the 
shareholding structure are different. The insiders are more likely to hold larger fractions 
in value stocks and hold a larger fraction if the stock trades at low levels. The insiders 
also hold volatile stocks that performed well over the past year. With respect to the gov-
ernance variables, I observe that the separation of the CEO and the chairman of the 
board results in less ownership and thus the CEO controls less votes. A very strong vari-
able is whether the corporation has dual class status; in this case, both the CEO and the 
directors and officers hold a significantly larger fraction of the voting rights. The manag-
ers in the corporations with weak shareholder rights hold fewer shares. This is not neces-
sarily in contrast to my empirical predictions where I expected poorly governed corpora-
tions to have steeper incentives because other corporate governance mechanisms are 
absent. My analysis is concerned with the degree to which managers use the voting 
rights they are bestowed with, not the absolute value of their holdings. Moreover, I find 
that the more independent directors on the board result in a lower degree of equity par-
ticipation. This finding is indicative of the claim that independent directors are more 
likely to act in the interest of the corporate shareholders and thus restrict the use of ex-
cessive equity incentive practices. As before, I use the residual values of my regression 
in Table 2.5 in my later stage empirical analyses. 
 From this section, I conclude that there are significant stock and corporate character-
istics that affect the internal and the external shareholder bases of the corporation. Next I 
evaluate the effects of this shareholder base on the occurrence, frequency, and the out-
comes of shareholder engagement in the form of proxy voting. 
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Table 2.5: CEO, director, and officer holdings 
I regress the dollar value of CEO and director and officer holdings on a number of firm, governance, and 
ownership variables. All of the variables are as defined previously. Separate chair equals one if the functions of 
the CEO and the chairman of the board are separated. Board size and percentage of independent directors is 
obtained from the RiskMetrics “board and directors” tape. My estimation technique is an OLS, and I adjust the 
standard errors for heteroskedasticity. Significance at 10, 5, and 1% level are denoted by *, **, and *** respec-
tively. 
  Log(1+CEO dollar 
Holdings) 
  Log(1+Director and Officer 
Dollar Holdings) 
  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 7.585*** 22.415  9.736*** 28.772 
Firm Variables      
Firm Age -0.148*** -3.853  -0.262*** -6.630 
Market Capitalization 0.204*** 4.884  0.420*** 9.220 
ROA -0.018*** -3.114  -0.010* -1.644 
Market-to-Book -0.224*** -6.426  -0.276*** -7.288 
1/Price -0.854** -2.356  -0.986** -2.200 
Liquidity -0.658*** -8.118  -0.545*** -6.774 
Past Year Return 0.002*** 4.468  0.002*** 3.823 
Volatility 0.318*** 3.648  0.424*** 4.578 
Debt-Equity Ratio 0.000 1.238  0.000 -0.348 
Governance Variables      
Dual Class 1.025*** 10.600  1.270*** 14.125 
Separate Chair -1.055*** -23.102  0.153*** 3.050 
G-Index -0.041*** -4.556  -0.049*** -4.965 
Board Size -0.142*** -12.880  -0.053*** -4.569 
% Independent Directors -0.021*** -14.904  -0.037*** -24.183 
Ownership Variables      
Institutional Ownership -0.556*** -4.709  -1.592*** -12.313 
Shareholder Base -0.317*** -13.548  -0.452*** -18.346 
Exchange control      
NYSE dummy 0.123 0.539  -0.338* -1.646 
 
Industry FF12 controls 
 
yes 
  
yes 
            
Adjusted R2 0.251  0.284 
Number of Observations 9,052   9,690 
2.5.2 Empirical results: Determinants of being targeted 
In the following, I investigate my first hypothesis that poorly governed corporations are 
more likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. To shed light on this question, I 
adopt a pooled cross-sectional specification of the following kind: 
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#	݋݂	݌ݎ݋݌݋ݏ݈ܽݏ௜,௧
= 	ߙ௜ +	ߚ௜ܥ݋ݎ݌݋ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ + ߛ௜ܱݓ݊݁ݎ௜,௧ + ߜ௜ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ 
(2.2) 
 
In this specification, the dependent variable is the number of proposals a corporation i 
receives in year t. It is important to recall that the number of proposals of corporation i in 
year t refers to the total number of proposals received by the corporation, including the 
withdrawn and omitted proposals. The Corporation represents a vector of several corpo-
rate characteristics. Specifically, I use the firm’s cash position, age, total assets, market-
to-book ratio, dividend yield, past performance, leverage, and the shareholder base. 
Owner represents a vector of ownership variables. Here, I control for the institutional 
shareholder base and the disaggregate holdings of certain types of institutional investors. 
Governance is a vector that comprises several different governance variables. This vec-
tor includes the variables of main interest: the governance index, managerial incentives, 
and the HHI based on the 3-digit SIC code for the industry concentration. Furthermore, I 
control for industry (Fama-French 12-industry classification), stock exchange, and year 
effects. 
 Table 2.6 presents the results of four different censored Tobit specifications. Model 
1 uses all of the shareholder proposals in my sample (that is, the CG and CSR pro-
posals), Model 2 includes the CG proposals only, while Models 3 and 4 use the external 
and the internal control proposals respectively. Recall, that I conjecture that the share-
holder base and the governance quality are of particular importance for the filing deci-
sion of the proposals on any topic. Specifically, Residual Shareholder Base and HHI 
(institutional) represent my proxies for the size of the shareholder base and the level of 
concentration of the institutional holdings. The interaction term G-index*Industry HHI 
represents the most relevant variable concerning the governance quality of the corpora-
tions: A high G-index represents a low exposure to the takeover market, and a high In-
dustry HHI represents a low degree of competition. Hence, I expect to find a positive 
coefficient on this interaction term because this coefficient indicates that the degree of 
shareholder engagement is higher at corporations in which the pressures from the takeo-
ver market and the competition are absent. 
 The results in Table 2.6 support hypothesis H2.1: poorly governed corporations are 
more likely to receive a shareholder proposal. In all four models, the effect of the inter-
action term G-index*Industry HHI on the number of filed proposals is positive. This 
effect indicates that corporations that are not exposed to fierce competition and the take-
over market are more likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. The effect is signif-
icant in three out of four models: only for the external corporate control proposals is the 
effect nonsignificant. This absence of significance alludes to the fact that shareholders 
most likely recognize that the exposure to the takeover market cannot really be changed 
in poorly governed corporations, and thus the shareholders do not put forward proposals 
of this category. 
 Concerning the ownership structure of the corporations, I find a positive and highly 
significant coefficient on Residual Shareholder Base, which indicates that a larger 
shareholder base increases the probability of receiving a proposal. This result holds for 
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all four models. Furthermore, I find that the concentration of the institutional sharehold-
ings is always positively related to the number of shareholder proposals that a corpora-
tion receives in a particular year. Though the effect is nonsignificant in Models 1 and 4, 
this result is suggestive of the fact that a higher concentration of shareholdings among 
the institutions increases the likelihood that collusion on corporate issues might occur. 
This collusion, in turn, increases the probability that only one institution submits a pro-
posal. Overall, these results support hypothesis H2.1b that states that the structure of the 
shareholder base influences the occurrence of shareholder proposals. 
 The disaggregate institutional dollar holdings do not consistently influence the oc-
currence of shareholder proposals. Except for the holdings of insurance companies, all of 
the other coefficients are nonsignificant with mixed signs. This result does not necessari-
ly imply that institutional shareholders do not engage in corporate monitoring, it only 
shows that institutional shareholders do not use shareholder proposals as a monitoring 
tool. My result points to the possibility that institutions—on an individual basis—are 
more likely to engage in corporate monitoring through other channels as discussed in 
later chapters of this dissertation. They might, for example, follow the Wall Street Walk 
(e.g., Edmans, 2009), simply threaten to exit (e.g., Edmans and Manso, 2011), or adopt 
private negotiations with the management (e.g., Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998, 
and Chapter 4 of this dissertation). 
 The coefficients on the remaining control variables are generally consistent with the 
literature on shareholder engagement. I find that the likelihood of receiving shareholder 
proposals increases with poor past performance and corporate size. Moreover, my results 
indicate that mature corporations are more likely to be the targets of shareholder initia-
tives. The effects of my disaggregate dollar holdings of institutions remain inconclusive. 
Except for the negative effect of the shareholdings of insurance companies (significant in 
three models), no pattern in the disaggregate institutional holdings is observable. 
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I conclude from this section that the presence of shareholder engagement depends cru-
cially on the disciplining forces from the takeover market and the industry competition: 
If both are absent, the magnitude of shareholder engagement increases.4 That is, share-
holder engagement is a substitute for other governance mechanisms that are entirely 
absent or have failed. However, the analyses so far only give an indication about the 
presence of shareholder engagement; that is, in how far shareholders become active at 
AGMs. The results do not show if other shareholders vote with the “activist” sharehold-
ers or not. In other words, the results do not show how successful and efficient share-
holder engagement is or which factors influence the efficiency of the shareholder pro-
posals. I investigate this issue in the following section. 
2.5.3 Voting outcomes of shareholder proposals 
Having identified the determinants of being targeted by shareholder proposals, I now 
turn to the examination on the voting outcomes of the proposals. The voting outcomes 
are of particular interest as they amplify the shareholders’ ability to promote changes in 
the governance structures or the social policies of corporations. Knowing which factors 
lead to higher or lower voting results helps in shaping the voting recommendations of the 
proxy advisory firms and in guiding the shareholders as to where to bundle their efforts 
to file a proposal. Table 2.7 presents the results of my analysis of the voting outcomes. 
As before, I adopt a pooled cross-sectional approach. The four models are estimated 
using ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. I adopt 
the following specification: 
 
%	ݒ݋ݐ݁ݏ௜௧ = ߙ௜ +	ߚ௜ܨ݅ݎ݉௜௧ + ߛ௜ܱݓ݊݁ݎ௜௧ + ߜ௜ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ, (2.3) 
 
where the dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast in favor of a particular 
shareholder proposal. The explanatory variables are defined as before. In this subsection, 
I am particularly interested in the effect of the insider holdings of voting rights on the 
voting outcomes of the shareholder sponsored proposals, especially when other corpo-
rate governance tools are absent. Hence, the variables of major interest are: Board HHI, 
which measures the concentration of holdings among board members; Q1 dummy, which 
equals unity if the corporation is part of the upper right quadrant in my economic model; 
and the interaction term Q1 dummy*Board HHI, which measures the joint effect of poor 
governance quality in combination with the equity holdings of board members. 
 Overall, the empirical results of Table 2.7 support hypothesis H2.2 as the insiders’ 
equity holdings are negatively related to the voting outcomes of the shareholder pro-
posals: The coefficient on Board HHI is negative and significant in all four models. 
However, the economic magnitude is largest for the internal control proposals.  
                                                          
4 My results also hold for alternative measures of managerial entrenchment, e.g., a classified board or the 
Entrenchment Index (E-index) developed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). The results do not materially 
differ from the ones reported here. The results are available on request. 
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This result implies that as more voting rights are concentrated among the board mem-
bers, the lower the voting outcomes get. In other words, the insider holdings of the vot-
ing rights are voted against the shareholder proposals of any kind; they significantly 
suppress the voting outcomes of the proposals. This effect becomes even stronger when 
taking the governance quality of the corporations into account. The proposals submitted 
to the corporations that are poorly governed in terms of their exposure towards the take-
over market and the industry competition receive significantly less votes when the insid-
er ownership concentration is high. However, the voting results of the external govern-
ance proposals are not negatively related to the interaction term Q1 dummy*Board HHI. 
 Several other variables influence the voting outcomes of the shareholder proposals. 
In particular, the number of blockholders (# Blockholders), overall institutional holdings 
(Institutional ownership), and the ownership concentration among institutions [HHI 
(institutional)] significantly influence the voting outcomes of the proposals. These re-
sults stand in sharp contrast to Gordon and Pound (1993) who find that institutional 
shareholdings do not significantly affect the voting outcomes of shareholder proposals. I 
further find a negative relation between the scaled wealth-to-performance measure (as 
developed by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, 2009) and the voting outcomes in all four of 
the models. Because the scaled wealth-to-performance variable measures the incentives 
provided to managers irrespective of firm size, in my context it measures how manageri-
al incentives affect the voting outcomes. 
 The results of this section show that the corporate insiders are consistently voting 
against the shareholder proposals, particularly in poorly governed corporations.5 The 
shareholders recognize that the managers are in a dominant position if their corporation 
is not exposed to fierce competition and the managerial labor market. Consequently, they 
become active in the form of proxy proposals. However, the success of these proposals is 
heavily suppressed by the insiders’ voting rights. 
2.6 Concluding comments 
In this chapter, I shed light on the determinants of the occurrence and the successfulness 
of shareholder engagement via proxy proposals. I investigate whether the presence of 
disciplining forces from the takeover market and the industry are mitigating factors for 
the emergence of the shareholder engagement. Hence, I study whether shareholder en-
gagement act as a substitute for the other governance mechanisms. The results indicate 
that the managers have steeper incentives in the form of options as soon as they are not 
exposed to external governance channels. I find that the likelihood of receiving a share-
holder proposal significantly increases when the corporations are poorly governed: the 
corporations that are not exposed to takeover pressures and fierce competition in the 
industry are significantly more likely to be targeted by proposals. 
                                                          
5 The results do not change if I use the total percentage of equities held by insiders or piecewise linear owner-
ship variables instead of the HHI for insider holdings. The results are available on request. 
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My results further indicate that the insider shareholder base is an important determinant 
of the voting outcomes of the proposals. I show that the voting results of the proposals 
are significantly suppressed by corporate insiders. This result is particularly pronounced 
for the proposals at poorly governed corporations. By using their own voting rights to 
vote against the shareholder proposals, the corporate managers are able to entrench 
themselves because they can attenuate the effectiveness of the proxy proposal process as 
a governance mechanism. 
 The results are important for several parties. First of all, the results show that share-
holders should become active in poorly governed corporations. Even if shareholders ex 
ante know that the proposals are not binding and generally do not receive a majority 
vote, the mere filing of a proposal might induce managers to work harder. I believe that 
the filing of a proposal effectively signals to the market that the corporate managers are 
underperforming. Ultimately, this signal is incentive enough for the corporate managers 
to exert effort. Second, the results also have important implications for corporate manag-
ers. I claim that the sheer filing of a proposal is a nuisance to the managers because they 
are concerned about their reputation. Instead of exposing themselves to negative publici-
ty during AGMs, the managers should invite the proposal sponsors into private negotia-
tions to bargain a withdrawal. 
 These private negotiations offer in my opinion interesting research opportunities. 
There is almost no evidence on private negotiations induced by shareholder proposals. 
One possibility is to analyze the role of the withdrawn shareholder proposals and their 
effectiveness as a corporate governance mechanism. The results of such an analysis 
might show whether the shareholder engagement channel really can bring about changes 
in corporations. The following chapter of this dissertation contains such a deeper analy-
sis of withdrawn proposals. There, I shed more light on withdrawn shareholder proposals 
and their potential to be effective corporate governance devices. 
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Appendix 2.A: Proposal topics and sponsor categories 
Proposal Topics (Content) Topic Examples 
Corporate Governance  
Internal Governance Proposals Separate chairman/CEO introduce confidential voting, repeal 
classified board, limit director tenure, introduce confidential 
voting, award performance-based stock options, award golden 
parachutes, link pay to performance, approve executive compen-
sation, restrict director compensation 
External Governance Proposals Redeem or vote on poison pill, eliminate supermajority provision, 
vote on takeover provisions, restore right to call a special meeting 
Takeover Sell the company, reject merger, spin off division, spin off tobac-
co business 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
Social Proposals Label gene-engineered food, adopt sexual orientation anti-bias 
policy, implement ILO standards and third-party monitoring, 
issue sustainability report, adopt code of conduct for China opera-
tions 
Environmental Proposals Endorse Ceres principles, report on global climate change, report 
on supplier environmental standards, reduce radioactive emis-
sions, develop renewable energy alternatives 
Proposal Sponsors (Identities) Sponsor Examples 
Institutional Investors California Public Employees' Retirement System, New York City 
Pension Funds, Calvert Asset Management Co., Domini Social 
Investments, LongView Funds, Connecticut Retirement Plans & 
Trust Funds, Northstar Asset ,Trillium Asset Management 
Individual Investors Evelyn Davis, Davis family, Gilbert brothers, Rossi family, 
Lucian Bebchuk 
Coordinated Activists Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Medical Mission 
Sisters, Human Life International, Episcopal Church, Rainforest 
Action Network, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
Pro Vita Advisors 
Unions United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Ser-
vice Employees International Union, Plumbers & Pipefitters 
National Pension Fund, Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters 
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Appendix 2.B: Central Variables used in the analysis 
Variable Name Definition and Source 
# Common Shareholders Common shareholder base: defined as the number of common shareholders 
listed in COMPUSTAT in millions (item # 100) 
# Employees Number of employees employed by the firm as listed on COMPUSTAT (#29) 
Institutional HHI Institutional ownership concentration: sum of squared percentages held by 
institutional investors (source: Thomson Reuters 13F) 
Board HHI Insider ownership concentration: sum of squared percentages of ownership of 
corporate insiders (source: RiskMetrics and 10K filings on SEC Edgar) 
Total Assets Balance sheet total assets from COMPUSTAT (item # 6) 
D&O Holdings ($) Dollar value of director and officer holdings at year-end (percentage holdings 
times year-end stock price) 
D&O Holdings (%) % of voting rights held by directors and officers (source: RiskMetrics and 
10K filings from SEC Edgar) 
CEO Holdings ($) Dollar value of CEO holdings at year-end (percentage holdings times year-
end stock price) 
CEO Holdings (%) % of voting rights held by CEO (source: RiskMetrics and 10K filings from 
SEC Edgar) 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio Long-term debt plus debt in current assets to total assets (COMPUSTAT item 
# 9 plus # 34 over # 6) 
Dual Class Status Equals unity if the firm has been incorporated with at least a dual class share 
(source: RiskMetrics) 
Market Capitalization Year-end market capitalization: number of shares outstanding times stock 
price (COMPUSTAT item # 25 times # 199) 
Market-to-Book Market Capitalization over book value of equity (COMPUSTAT item # 60) 
S&P500 Listing Equals unity if the firm belongs to the S&P500 index 
CEO Equity Incentives Resembles the logarithm of the dollar value that the CEO’s wealth increases 
with a 1% change in stock price. Constructed for his or her entire equity 
portfolio (“total”), “option” portfolio, and “stock” portfolio. Please refer to 
Core and Guay (1999, 2002)  
CEO Option Incentives 
CEO Stock incentives 
Scaled WPS Scaled wealth to performance measure from Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier 
(2009) 
Institutional Ownership  Percentage of outstanding common stock held by institutional investors. 
(source: Thomson Reuters 13F) 
Res. Shareholder Base Residual of a regression of # Common Shareholders on financial and firm 
variables (see Table 2.4) 
# 5% Inst. Investors Number of institutional investors that hold at least 5% of outstanding com-
mon stock 
Residual # Inst. Investors Residual of a regression of # Institutional Shareholders on financial and firm 
variables (see Table 2.4) 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Determinants of Withdrawn Shareholder 
Proposals6	
In this chapter, I study more than 12,000 shareholder proposals filed with S&P1500 
companies from 1997–2009 and investigate the determinants of withdrawn shareholder 
proposals. I find that institutional ownership is positively related to the withdrawal’s 
likelihood. In particular, the ownership of long-term, passively investing institutions and 
institutional sponsorship significantly increase the likelihood of withdrawal. My results 
also show a negative relation between the insider ownership and the withdrawal’s likeli-
hood. The effects of the ownership structure on the withdrawal’s likelihood are less 
pronounced for corporate social responsibility proposals. Furthermore, proposals spon-
sored by institutions are also more likely to be withdrawn relative to proposals filed by 
private investors. My empirical evidence points to the importance of withdrawn share-
holder proposals as a corporate governance mechanism. Managers try to protect their 
own power and reputation by preventing filed shareholder proposals from being put to a 
vote during the annual general meeting. They do so by entering into private negotiations 
with the sponsors of the proposals to accomplish a withdrawal. 
 
  
                                                          
6 This chapter is based on Bauer, Moers, and Viehs (2013). I thank Jaap Bos, Jeroen Derwall, Stefanie Klei-
meier, Nils Kok, Paulo Rodrigues, Roland Rott, David Yermack, my discussants Ioannis Ioannou and Raluca 
Roman, and the seminar participants at Maastricht University for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Corporations in the United States are often faced with shareholder engagement that 
strives to change the corporate governance (CG) structures or the corporate behavior. 
One particular form of engagement is the voice engagement through shareholder pro-
posals. The shareholders are allowed to submit proposals that are put to a vote during the 
annual general meeting (AGM).7 However, under special circumstances the submitting 
shareholder (i.e., the proposal sponsor) withdraws his or her proposal prior to the AGM. 
Usually, this withdrawal happens after negotiations between the management and the 
shareholder take place (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). Corporations frequently in-
vite activist shareholders to private negotiations following a shareholder-initiated pro-
posal because managers do not want to put certain proposals to a vote during the AGM. 
The reason is that some proposals might adversely affect the managers’ own interests or 
reputation. Also, the managers could evaluate the shareholder proposals as being not 
beneficial to the corporation and hence enter private negotiations for a proposal’s with-
drawal. As Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) point out, the proposal sponsor voluntarily 
withdraws his or her proposal when the negotiations with the management turn out to be 
successful. However, if the shareholder decides not to withdraw the proposal, it will be 
put to a vote during the AGM eventually.  
 I define a successful negotiation as one in which both parties reach an amicable 
arrangement (settlement) that leads to a proposal’s withdrawal by the proposal sponsor. 
Such a settlement can materialize in several different ways. The most obvious and logi-
cal way is that the management implements the proposal, either completely or partially, 
and thereby satisfies the proposal sponsor so that he or she withdraws the proposal. As 
Landier and Nair (2009) point out, a withdrawal of a shareholder proposal is an indica-
tion of the management’s willingness to implement the requests made in the proposal. 
Another mode is that the management approaches the shareholder by offering symbolic 
changes in the corporation other than those requested in the original proposal. These 
symbolic changes, or “lip service” (Landier and Nair, 2009), are usually less uncomfort-
able for the managers but still satisfy the shareholders sufficiently enough to convince 
them about a proposal’s withdrawal. A different, but more speculative, manner is that the 
corporation can reach a settlement with the shareholder by providing him or her with 
monetary incentives to withdraw the proposal without actually implementing the pro-
posal at all.  
 In this chapter, I investigate the determinants of the likelihood of the proposal’s 
withdrawal. My evidence suggests that approximately 20% of all filed shareholder pro-
posals in the United States are withdrawn during the sample period of 1997–2009. My 
data shows that the proposals filed by institutional shareholders and unions display the 
highest withdrawal rates, whereas the proposals submitted by individual investors show 
                                                          
7 According to Loss and Seligman (2004), shareholders are entitled to submit a shareholder proposal if they 
hold 1 % or $2,000 in market value of the outstanding voting stock for at least one year. 
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the lowest withdrawal rates. Notably, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) proposals 
are withdrawn relatively more often than the CG proposals.  
 Generally, the results of my empirical analyses show that both institutional sponsor-
ship and institutional ownership in the targeted corporations are positively correlated 
with the likelihood of the proposal’s withdrawal. Especially the ownership stakes of 
long-term, passively investing institutions (quasi-indexers) are positively related to the 
likelihood of the proposal’s withdrawal. My results indicate that the insider ownership 
significantly decreases the withdrawal’s likelihood, which is consistent with my empiri-
cal predictions. This result is most pronounced for the CG proposals and is consistent 
with the evidence from Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) and Chidambaran and 
Woidtke (1999). I do not find a significant relation between the insider ownership and 
the likelihood of the CSR proposals’ withdrawal.  
 My findings allude to the fact that the withdrawal’s likelihood is a function of the 
target corporation’s ownership structure and the proposal’s sponsor and content. Fur-
thermore, I show that the proxy proposal process itself is an important corporate govern-
ance mechanism because I observe a high number of filed and withdrawn proposals over 
the entire sample period. Hence, I conclude that managers and shareholders give a lot of 
attention to this governance mechanism.  
 The importance of voice engagement through proxy proposals manifests itself in the 
fact that the shareholders have been filing proposals with US corporations since the mid-
1990s – even though the proposals are not binding on the management. This fact means 
that the shareholders expect to promote corporate changes through the proposals. Also, 
by means of the proposals, they expect to raise awareness among other shareholder 
groups that certain corporations are not managed in the most efficient way. Without 
these expectations, the shareholders would not have spent the time, money, and effort on 
filing the proposals. 
 The academic literature also shows a growing interest in shareholder engagement by 
means of the proposals. However, these studies miss the evidence on withdrawn pro-
posals as a governance mechanism. The literature looks at the voting outcome as a 
measure for the success of the proposal (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000; Gordon and 
Pound, 1993), the role of the proposal as a substitute for other governance mechanisms 
(e.g., Chapter 2 of this dissertation), and the voting behavior of institutional shareholders 
(e.g., Ashraf, Jayaraman and Ryan Jr., 2009; Davis and Kim, 2007). Most of these stud-
ies conclude that the proxy proposal process itself is rather inefficient because the voting 
outcomes of shareholder proposals are on average less than 50%. Even more important is 
the fact that the shareholder proposals are only advisory. The management can still re-
fuse to adopt the recommendations put forward in the proposals, even if the voting out-
come is higher than 50%. Furthermore, several studies investigate the specific subsam-
ples of voted shareholder proposals to draw conclusions about their ability to promote 
corporate changes (e.g., Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, and Yang, 2012; Ertimur, Ferri, and 
Muslu, 2011). I add to this stream of literature by investigating the special class of the 
withdrawn proposals that has largely been neglected in these studies. 
 There are several reasons why withdrawn shareholder proposals are important to 
investigate. First and foremost, what becomes apparent from the aforementioned studies 
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is the fact that the literature on shareholder proposals thus far largely neglects the pres-
ence of private negotiations. Therefore, I conclude that the studies that only take voted 
proposals into account yield biased results, because the important class of withdrawn 
proposals has been disregarded. To my knowledge, only two studies directly address the 
private negotiations and the proposal withdrawals. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 
(1998) investigate the activist strategies of TIAA-CREF, the Teachers Insurance Annuity 
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund, a major institutional investor in the Unit-
ed States. They study the private correspondence between TIAA-CREF and the target 
corporations. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) find that TIAA-CREF successfully 
reached an agreement (i.e., a compromise) with the target companies in 71% of the cases 
– even before a proposal was voted on. In the remaining 29% of the private contacts, the 
target corporation and TIAA-CREF did not reach a compromise and consequently, TI-
AA-CREF’s proposals went to a vote during the AGM. The achievement of an agree-
ment between the shareholder and the target corporation is exactly the process that I am 
going to study in this chapter.  
 Next to Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), there is only one other study that 
focuses explicitly on the withdrawn shareholder proposals, namely Chidambaran and 
Woidtke (1999). Their study is most closely related to mine. They examine the share-
holder proposals and the determinants of their withdrawals in the context of the 1992 
SEC proxy reforms. The authors find that withdrawal’s likelihood decreases with the 
insider ownership. Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) attribute this to the relative negoti-
ation abilities of the sponsors and the managers. When the managers control a larger 
fraction of the corporation’s voting rights, they can more easily resist the shareholder 
proposals and can let them go to a vote accordingly. In contrast to my results, they do 
not establish a significant relation between the withdrawal’s likelihood and institutional 
ownership. 
 A second reason why withdrawn proposals are very important to investigate is that I 
observe that proposal sponsors continue to be frequently invited into private negotiations 
by the management team. This is reflected by the large number of withdrawn proposals 
between 1997 and 2009. Hence, there must be a reason why managers enter into the 
private negotiations with the shareholders rather than letting a proposal go to a vote 
during the AGM. I argue that the managers are more likely to settle with the sharehold-
ers when they want to avoid those proposals that might have adverse effects on the man-
ager’s reputation from being put to a public vote at the AGM. In fact, Landier and Nair 
(2009, p. 36) also describe the withdrawn proposals as being “equivalent to a majority 
vote” because a “withdrawal achieves the shareholders’ purpose.”  
 The implications of this chapter are the following. I shed light on the importance of 
the entire shareholder proposal process by taking into account voted, withdrawn, and 
omitted proposals. My evidence suggests that not only the voted proposals matter in this 
process but the entire engagement process. This process also includes the continuous 
dialogues between the shareholders and the corporations, and hence, also the withdrawn 
proposals that are the result of these private dialogues. Already the mere filing of a pro-
posal provides management with a signal that the shareholders are willing to talk about 
certain concerns they have. Additionally, the managers, as initiators of the private nego-
C H A P T E R  3  
 50 
tiations, could use my results to determine the likelihood that a shareholder will with-
draw his or her proposal. My results recommend that the managers incorporate the in-
formation on the corporation’s ownership structure and the proposal’s content and spon-
sor into the decision on entering into private negotiations. Similarly, my results are also 
of value for the filing shareholders. Given my results, shareholders could anticipate at 
which corporations the managers are more responsive to proposals. More specifically, 
shareholders are able to evaluate under which circumstances a satisfactory compromise 
can most likely be achieved.  
 Although my sample of withdrawn shareholder proposals is very rich, I cannot ob-
serve the entire negotiation process. That is, I only know whether a proposal has been 
withdrawn, omitted, or whether it has been put to a vote. I do not observe if a filed pro-
posal was preceded by informal negotiations before its actual filing. Hence, I can only 
assume that a withdrawn proposal occurred after it was filed, regardless of whether pri-
vate pre-negotiations took place before the actual filing or not.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the theo-
retical foundation for my research and presents the testable hypotheses. In Section 3.3, I 
present the data and the methodology. In Section 3.4, I describe the evolution and nature 
of the withdrawn shareholder proposals from 1997–2009. Section 3.5 presents the results 
of my empirical analyses on the determinants of the proposal withdrawal. Section 3.6 
concludes and discusses the implications of my third chapter.  
3.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
3.2.1  Background information on the shareholder proposal process 
The purpose of the following short synopsis on the proxy proposal process is to empha-
size the importance of voice engagement through shareholder proposals in general, but 
also the importance of withdrawn shareholder proposals in particular. The entire pro-
posal and withdrawal process is complex. For shareholders to be eligible to submit a 
proposal, they have to acquire a stake in the corporation, namely 1% or $2,000 in market 
value of the voting stocks (Loss and Seligman, 2004). After having acquired this stake, a 
shareholder is entitled to submit one proposal to the corporation. However, the submis-
sion of a proposal does not necessarily mean that the proposal is also put to a vote during 
the AGM. Instead, three outcomes are possible. In the first outcome, the managers can 
let the proposals go directly to a vote during the AGM. That is, the shareholder proposal 
is included in the proxy statement and thus appears on the voting agenda of the AGM. 
Another outcome is that the management contacts the SEC in order to verify if all of the 
regulatory reasons for a proposal’s omission are fulfilled. If the SEC agrees, the man-
agement is allowed to omit the proposal, and hence, it does not appear on the voting 
agenda. Thirdly, the managers can invite the sponsoring shareholder into negotiations on 
a proposal withdrawal. This latter outcome occurs when the management does not want 
to put the proposal to a vote. Hence, the managers want to reach a compromise that con-
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vinces the sponsoring shareholder to withdraw the proposal. If no consensus is reached, 
then the sponsor does not withdraw his or her proposal. Consequently, no withdrawal 
leads to an inclusion of the proposal in the proxy statement that results in a vote during 
the AGM.  
 From the aforementioned description of the shareholder proposal process, a degree 
of uncertainty is apparently involved as to what the outcome of a filed proposal will be. 
Despite this uncertainty, shareholders are still using voice engagement through their 
proposals to promote changes in corporations. What are the underlying motivations for 
(institutional) shareholders to adopt voice engagement through proxy proposals? This 
question is of crucial importance because shareholders have the opportunity to approach 
corporations informally and on a private basis before the actual filing of the proposal. 
The shareholders have several different motives to file a proposal.  
 Generally, I argue that (institutional) shareholders use the proxy proposal process to 
signal their willingness to talk to managers, irrespective of whether the filed proposal is 
eventually put to a vote or withdrawn. This public signal is very strong as it also raises 
the awareness of the other shareholders, making managers more likely to invite the spon-
soring shareholders in for private talks.  
 Another motive for filing a proposal are failed private engagement activities. As 
stated before, most engagement—especially by institutional shareholders—takes place 
behind the scenes. As shown by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2013), many institu-
tional investors undertake voice engagement with investee corporations to promote 
changes. Generally, I argue that institutional shareholders engage with investee corpora-
tions privately by continuously writing letters, emails, or making telephone calls to the 
management. This engagement is usually not observable and does not become public 
because the communication between institutional shareholders and corporations is con-
sidered confidential. However, if this private engagement fails, then the shareholders 
view the proposal mechanism as the only remaining means of putting pressure on the 
managers, because this mechanism is public and can be observed by other shareholders 
as well.  
 A related reason for shareholders to file a proposal is that management teams and 
the investor relations departments have time constraints. Consequently, the corporations 
cannot talk to every shareholder who contacts them privately. This time constraint argu-
ment is the reason why some shareholders file proposals right away.  
 Another reason for filing proposals is that the proxy proposal process is a continuous 
procedure with a lot of interaction and collaboration between the shareholders. The pro-
posals that fail to get a majority vote in a given proxy season could be resubmitted in the 
next year. This is, of course, conditional on achieving at least the so-called resubmission 
thresholds specified by the SEC. But even if a proposal does not achieve at least those 
resubmission thresholds, another proponent can file the same or a similar proposal in the 
upcoming proxy season. Hence, shareholders also file proposals because of failed pro-
posals in a previous proxy season. In doing so, shareholders want to increase the aware-
ness of the other shareholders and the managers to signal that they are very concerned 
about particular issues. Thus, the shareholders have several motives for filing proposals. 
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Elaborating on these motives is necessary, as the withdrawal of a proposal is entirely 
conditional on the filing of a proposal. 
3.2.2  The withdrawal process 
Figure 1 displays my theoretical framework that I use to describe the forces that lead to 
the withdrawal of a shareholder proposal.  
 An active but discontent, large shareholder who wants to improve corporate perfor-
mance or change corporate behavior has two options for voice engagement as illustrated 
in Figure 3.1. When exiting (i.e., selling the stake) is not a feasible option to the share-
holder, he or she can either approach the corporation publicly by immediately filing a 
proposal (upper part in Figure 3.1) or approach the corporation privately (lower part of 
Figure 3.1).  
  
 
 
Figure 3.1: The withdrawal process 
This figure presents the underlying theoretical framework I use to describe the withdrawal and engagement
process. The dashed line in the middle of the graph separates the two different options a shareholder has when 
he or she wants to adopt voice engagement to promote changes in the corporations. The upper part of this
figure represents the route when the shareholder immediately starts with the filing of a proposal. The lower part
depicts the voice engagement route that starts with the private engagement activities. The dashed rectangle in
the lower part represents the unobservable part of the engagement process: Private pre-negotiations before a 
filing of a proposal takes place. It is the part that I cannot observe from my data. A detailed explanation of this
process is given in Subsection 3.2.2 of this chapter. 
 
Conditional on the shareholder’s decision to file a proposal, whether the managers enter 
into negotiations on a proposal withdrawal or let the proposal immediately go to a vote 
during the AGM is at their discretion. The upper part of Figure 3.1 shows that when the 
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corporation decides to approach the filing shareholder and to enter into negotiations, the 
withdrawal of the proposal is not a certainty. If no satisfactory compromise for the filing 
shareholder is reached, then he or she most likely does not withdraw the proposal. In this 
case, the proposal is put to a vote during the AGM. Alternatively, if the negotiations are 
successful in the sense that the shareholder is satisfied with the concessions made to him 
or her, then the proposal is withdrawn. However, if the corporation decides not to enter 
into negotiations with the shareholder at all, then the proposal goes into the proxy state-
ment, and a vote is held during the AGM accordingly. 
 The lower part of Figure 3.1 depicts the sequence of events when the shareholder 
follows the second option of voice engagement, namely private negotiations without any 
upfront public filing of a proposal. I conjecture that this voice engagement is likely not 
to be pursued by small, private investors because the continuous private engagement 
with corporations incurs a high degree of time and money. When a shareholder follows 
this engagement, the engagement establishes a private and continuous contact with the 
corporation. This contact can be done by management meetings, telephone calls, or 
emails to address issues that are of concern to the shareholder. In the event that the pri-
vate negotiations “behind the scenes” provide a satisfactory outcome to the shareholder 
(i.e., the management surrenders), no further action is undertaken. Hence, no shareholder 
proposal is filed.  
 However, if the result of the negotiations behind the scenes is not satisfactory to the 
shareholder, he or she can view the filing of a proposal as the last remaining way of 
influencing managerial actions and simultaneously raising the public’s and other share-
holders’ attention. The filing of such a shareholder proposal is perceived differently by 
management than a proposal that is immediately filed without any private contacts. The 
managers carefully evaluate whether a proposal, which is filed subsequent to failed pri-
vate talks, should be put to a vote or whether they should instead re-enter into private 
negotiations to circumvent any negative publicity or reputational damages as a conse-
quence of putting the proposal to a vote. Thus, the potential outcomes of such a proposal 
are the same as in the previous scenario: either management lets the proposal go to a 
vote immediately, or it invites the sponsoring shareholder into private negotiations to 
reach a settlement. In the case that no settlement is reached, the proposal is eventually 
put to a vote. 
 To sum up, withdrawn proposals can have two different causes. First, a filed pro-
posal without any pre-negotiations behind the scenes can be withdrawn after negotia-
tions between the sponsoring shareholder and the management of the target corporation 
(upper part of Figure 3.1). Second, a proposal can be withdrawn that has been filed after 
pre-negotiations behind the scenes have failed (lower part in Figure 3.1). From my data, 
these two types of withdrawn proposals are not distinguishable from each other. Howev-
er, this finding does not change the nature of the withdrawn proposal itself and hence 
does not impair my general conclusions on the observed withdrawals or my contribution 
to the literature. 
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3.2.3 Testable hypotheses 
From the aforementioned description of the withdrawal process and the evidence on 
private negotiations provided by Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) and Chidam-
baran and Woidtke (1999), I can derive my research hypotheses concerning the determi-
nants of the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
 To start with, I conjecture that institutional shareholders play an important role in 
the withdrawal process. The importance of this shareholder group as a governance 
mechanism has also been emphasized in other studies. For example, the literature on 
corporate governance shows that especially large shareholders or institutional investors 
play an important role when it comes to efficient managerial oversight because they have 
more incentives to oversee managerial actions and are able to solve the collective action 
problem (e.g., Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; or Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Spe-
cifically, shareholder engagement as one particular governance mechanism is the most 
efficient if it is conducted by institutional investors such as hedge or pension funds (e.g., 
Wahal, 1996; Smith, 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 
2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; and Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2011). The role of institutional 
investors in the proxy proposal process is also emphasized in John and Klein (1995), 
Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000) and Ertimur, Ferri, 
and Stubben (2010). Furthermore, the research shows that labor unions are important 
proposal sponsors for triggering corporate changes (e.g., Prevost, Rao, and Williams, 
2012) that do not necessarily increase shareholder value (Agrawal, 2012). Therefore, this 
evidence alludes to the fact that engagement by influential shareholders could bring 
about corporate changes. Consequently, corporate managers should carefully evaluate 
which is more efficient letting these shareholder proposals go to a vote or inviting the 
proposal sponsors into private negotiations. 
 Individual shareholders also submit proposals that the management scrutinizes for 
possible private negotiations. However, these proposals are less of a concern to the man-
agement because of the following: The research on voice engagement through share-
holder proposals emphasizes that particularly small, individual shareholders—so-called 
gadfly investors—strive for corporate changes (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000). But, the 
voting outcomes of their proposals are relatively low compared to the voting outcomes 
of the proposals sponsored by institutional investors (e.g., Chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
Therefore, the majority of the proposals by individuals do not spur any corporate chang-
es or even performance improvements because these proposals do not gain the support of 
the important shareholders, such as large institutional investors.  
 Thomas and Martin (1999) provide an explanation for this phenomenon. They claim 
that a lot of successful engagement by individual shareholders cannot be observed, at 
least in the context of executive compensation, because of the collective action problem 
inherent in every publicly held corporation and the shareholder’s “limited capacity to 
monitor” (Thomas and Martin, 1999, p. 1033). The latter point refers to the fact that 
compensation policies are notably very complex. Thus, most individual shareholders 
likely do not understand these complex compensation plans, not to mention whether they 
are able to evaluate if the current pay practices are appropriate or not (Thomas and Mar-
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tin, 1999). Therefore, proposals by individual shareholders with respect to compensation 
are generally not successful. I claim that the same argumentation also holds for other 
topics of shareholder proposals that are filed by individual shareholders, namely CG or 
CSR proposals. Thus, I derive my first hypothesis: 
H3.1: Proposals filed by influential shareholders (i.e., institutional investors or labor 
unions) are more likely to be withdrawn than proposals filed by individual, private 
shareholders. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that the ownership structure plays an important role in de-
termining the withdrawal’s likelihood. In particular, I claim that the institutional share-
holder base correlates positively with the withdrawal’s likelihood. This is so, because it 
is more likely that the management makes the advances to the sponsor when it fears the 
pressure from a larger institutional shareholder base. The managers are pressured by the 
large institutional investors because these shareholders can threaten to sell off their 
stakes, as in the spirit of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) or Edmans (2009). Assuming a 
high degree of collaboration between institutional shareholders, I argue that if the institu-
tional sponsors’ demands are not fulfilled, other institutional investors exert monitoring 
power by the impending sell off of their shares. This threat can be carried out especially 
when no actions are undertaken by the management to implement the requests put for-
ward in the proposal. Consequently, the management fears the adverse effects on the 
equity-based part of their compensation package and hence, make advances to the spon-
sor: 
H3.2: Institutional ownership is positively related to the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
Next to the institutional shareholder base, the ownership stake controlled by the corpo-
rate insiders is also an important determinant of the withdrawal’s likelihood. Chidam-
baran and Woidtke (1999) argue that the ownership stake of the corporate insiders influ-
ences the manager’s level of resistance to corporate changes. In other words, when the 
managers own a larger fraction of the corporation they are in a dominant position be-
cause they feel less pressure from the shareholders (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). 
The reason for this position is the following: When the managers own a larger fraction of 
the voting rights, they are more likely to let the proposals go to a vote. Then, the manag-
ers simply use their own voting rights to vote against the shareholder proposals and 
consequently suppress the voting outcomes of those proposals (see Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation). Hence, I argue that higher insider ownership reduces the withdrawal’s 
likelihood because the managers are more in favor of putting proposals to a vote during 
the AGM: 
H3.3: Insider ownership is negatively correlated to the withdrawal’s likelihood.  
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3.3 Data and empirical strategy 
In this section, I discuss the data sources and the empirical strategy that I adopt to inves-
tigate the determinants of the withdrawals. 
3.3.1 Shareholder proposal data 
The data on shareholder proposals come from RiskMetrics. RiskMetrics tracks the 
AGMs of all of the S&P1500 corporations and records all of the filed shareholder pro-
posals. I examine the time period from 1997 to 2009. After correcting for any duplicates 
in the proposals, the data set comprises 12,474 proposals that address either CG or CSR 
topics. The retrieved data on the filed shareholder proposals provide information on 
whether a proposal was put to a vote, whether it was omitted or whether it was with-
drawn by the sponsor. Furthermore, RiskMetrics provides information on the proposal 
sponsor and the content of the proposals.  
 Consistent with the second chapter of my dissertation, I classify proposals first into 
CG and CSR proposals. In a second step, I group the proposals into subcategories based 
on their topics. A complete list of the proposal topics is provided in Appendix 3.A. I also 
classify sponsoring shareholders into different sponsor classes; namely institutional 
investors, individual investors, coordinated activists, and labor unions (consistent with 
Chapter 2 of my dissertation). Examples for each of those categories can also be found in 
Appendix 3.A of this chapter.  
3.3.2  Accounting data, firm and ownership information 
Next to the proposal data, I rely on the standard sources for accounting and firm-level 
financial data. Accounting information for the sample corporations is retrieved from 
COMPUSTAT. The information on executive compensation and the insider ownership 
comes from COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp, whereas RiskMetrics’ governance files pro-
vide the corporation-level corporate governance measures. The institutional ownership 
information for each corporation is retrieved from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Hold-
ings Master File (13f filings). For the institutional ownership, I construct several varia-
bles: the total end-of-year fraction of shares owned by all institutions as well as the de-
composition into the percentage of shares held by transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer 
institutions, following Bushee (1998). I also calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) for all institutional holdings. 
3.3.3  Empirical method 
To test my research hypotheses regarding the withdrawal’s likelihood, I adopt the fol-
lowing approach. In the empirical analyses, I implement both, firm-level and proposal-
level regressions. The main reason for this is that I want to make sure that my results are 
robust. In the firm-level analysis, I treat every corporation in a given year that displays at 
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least one shareholder proposal as one observation. This treatment means that corpora-
tions with multiple proposals in a given year appear only once in the data set. On the 
other hand, the proposal-level analysis treats every single shareholder proposal as a sin-
gle observation. Hence, the corporations with multiple proposals can appear several 
times in a given proxy season.  
I run logistic regressions for both firm-level and proposal-level analyses of the following 
type: 
 
ܹ݅ݐℎ݀ݎܽݓ݊?௜,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏℎ݅݌)௜,௧ + ߚଶ(ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎ)௜,௧ + ߚଷ(ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ)௜,௧ (3.1) 
 
In the firm-level analysis, the dependent variable equals unity when the corporation 
exhibits at least one withdrawn proposal and zero otherwise. In the proposal-level anal-
yses, the dependent variable equals one if the proposal is withdrawn and zero otherwise. 
The (Ownership) comprises ownership characteristics for corporation i at time t. The 
ownership characteristics contain the insider ownership (measured by the CEO’s owner-
ship) and the institutional ownership. I measure the institutional ownership in several 
ways: My main proxy is the overall and total percentage of stocks held by the institu-
tional investors. 
 Furthermore, I decompose the institutional ownership into Bushee’s (1998) classifi-
cation of ownership.8 Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors along the institu-
tions’ “past investment patterns in the areas of portfolio turnover, diversification, and 
momentum strategy” (Bushee, 1998, p. 310). This classification results in three groups: 
transient investors, dedicated investors, and quasi-indexer investors. Generally, transient 
institutional investors are short-term oriented and follow investment strategies with high 
portfolio turnover rates, whereas dedicated institutions hold large positions in corpora-
tions along with a low portfolio turnover rate (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2001). 
The quasi-indexer institutions, on the other hand, also have a low portfolio turnover rate 
but hold more diversified portfolios. Furthermore, the quasi-indexers follow passive 
investment strategies most of the time that reflect a buy-and-hold investment approach 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2001). 
 Furthermore, (Sponsor) comprises the proposal sponsor controls (comparable to 
those in Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). In the proposal-level analyses, this is a 
dummy variable for every sponsor class: institutional investors, individual investors, 
coordinated activists, and labor unions. Lastly, (Controls) comprises all of the control 
variables that have been proven in the literature to influence a corporation’s exposure to 
shareholder proposals or the withdrawal’s likelihood (e.g., Karpoff, Malatesta, and 
Walkling, 1996; Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). This vector includes the firm size, 
leverage, firm performance and several corporate governance characteristics.  
 Before I analyze the withdrawal process in a multivariate setting, I describe the 
nature and evolution of the withdrawn shareholder proposals. 
                                                          
8 Prof. Bushee’s classification of institutional investors is publicly available at: http://acct3.wharton.-
upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.  
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3.4 The nature and evolution of withdrawn shareholder proposals 
Table 3.1 shows the evolution of filed and withdrawn shareholder proposals from 1997–
2009. From this table it becomes apparent that the degree of shareholder engagement 
increases during the sample period. Especially, the second half displays significantly 
more filed shareholder proposals. The 2007 proxy season shows the largest number of 
submitted proposals at 1,156. The evolution of the withdrawn shareholder proposals 
displays a similar picture. The number of withdrawn proposals is rather stable during the 
first five years of the sample period. It fluctuates between 107 withdrawn proposals in 
1998 and 183 withdrawn proposals in 2000. However, after 2002, the number and frac-
tion of the withdrawn proposals increases. Most of the withdrawn proposals occurred in 
2007 (308 proposals), followed by 279 proposals in 2008. Although the number of filed 
and withdrawn proposals decreases slightly after 2007, the levels of engagement and 
withdrawals remain relatively stable thereafter. Hence, I can conclude from my descrip-
tive analysis that shareholders are still using proposals to engage the corporations. Figure 
3.2 presents these developments and results graphically. 
 
Table 3.1: The evolution of filed and withdrawn proposals 
This table shows the number and percentages of filed and withdrawn proposals over the time period from 
1997–2009. I distinguish between filed proposals that RiskMetrics recorded and those proposals that have been 
subsequently withdrawn by the proposal sponsor. The underlying data set has been corrected for duplicates. 
 Filed Proposals Withdrawn Proposals 
Year # % of total cumul. % # % of total cumul. % 
1997 893 7.2% 7.2% 162 6.3% 6.3% 
1998 831 6.7% 13.8% 107 4.1% 10.4% 
1999 792 6.3% 20.2% 112 4.3% 14.7% 
2000 799 6.4% 26.6% 183 7.1% 21.8% 
2001 745 6.0% 32.5% 122 4.7% 26.5% 
2002 803 6.4% 39.0% 179 6.9% 33.5% 
2003 1,082 8.7% 47.7% 220 8.5% 42.0% 
2004 1,086 8.7% 56.4% 227 8.8% 50.8% 
2005 1,027 8.2% 64.6% 231 8.9% 59.7% 
2006 1,008 8.1% 72.7% 196 7.6% 67.3% 
2007 1,156 9.3% 81.9% 308 11.9% 79.2% 
2008 1,140 9.1% 91.1% 279 10.8% 90.0% 
2009 1,112 8.9% 100.0% 259 10.0% 100.0% 
       
1997-2003 5,945 47.7% - 1,085 42.0% - 
2004-2009 6,529 52.3% - 1,500 58.0% - 
1997-2009 12,474 100.0% - 2,585 100.0% - 
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of withdrawn shareholder proposals 
This figure shows the number of filed (left bar) and withdrawn proposals (right bar), respectively, over time.
The initial sample consists of 12,474 proposals that were filed between 1997 and 2009. Out of this sample of
filed proposals, 2,585 were withdrawn prior to the annual meeting, which constitute approximately 20.7% of
the all filed proposals. 
 
Next, I show in which topical areas shareholder engagement and negotiations take place. 
Table 3.2 presents the details on the nature of the withdrawn proposals over time. Panel 
A shows that more than one-fifth (20.7%) of all of the filed shareholder proposals are 
withdrawn within the proposal process. However, there are cross-sectional differences 
with respect to the content of these proposals.  
 Consistent with Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999), I find that the CSR proposals are 
withdrawn more often than the CG proposals: 16.8% compared to 31.2% respectively. 
This result holds for every single proxy season during the sample period. This finding 
alludes to the fact that the corporations are much more responsive to the CSR related 
proposals than to the CG proposals. A potential explanation for this finding could be that 
the CSR proposals have the potential to create negative publicity with respect to envi-
ronmental and social corporate performance. Thus, the publicity might highlight the 
implementation of specific social and environmental policies by competitors in the same 
industry. Hence, the management teams might be more willing to change social or envi-
ronmental policies and behavior (at least to a certain extent) to settle an agreement with 
the sponsoring shareholder. Another reason for the higher withdrawal rate of the CSR 
proposals might also be the fact that the corporations can more easily disclose changes in 
the CSR domain than in the corporate governance domain through symbolic changes to 
convince the shareholders to withdraw. Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) give a related 
explanation for this finding by attributing the higher withdrawal rate of the proposals 
that address social issues to the lower costs involved for the corporations to implement 
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these recommendations. In a similar vein, the content of CSR proposals could play a role 
as well. The CSR proposals generally address broader topics, and their requests are often 
vague, which makes successful negotiations on proposal withdrawals easier for the man-
agers.  
 To illustrate the evolution of proposal withdrawals, Figure 3.3 plots the percentage 
of withdrawn proposals over time.9 This figure shows that there is always a considerable 
fraction of proposals that are withdrawn. 
 
Figure 3.3: Withdrawn proposals by proposal content 
This figure shows the percentage of proposals that are withdrawn prior to the annual general meeting. I classify
these into crude subcategories of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. 
 
To shed light on the question of whether the withdrawal rates are associated with spon-
sor characteristics, Table 3.3 presents the evolution of the withdrawals over time for the 
different classes of proposal sponsors. Several interesting observations can be made from 
this table. Over the entire sample period, the proposals that were filed by the labor un-
ions display the highest withdrawal rate (34.6%). The institutional investors display the 
second highest withdrawal rate with (33.9%), followed by the coordinated activists 
(27.7%). Strikingly, the proposals submitted by the individual shareholders display by 
far the lowest withdrawal rate (4%). The latter sponsor class also displays the lowest 
withdrawal rates in every year of the sample period. The year 2000 shows a remarkable 
result: Almost 70% of all of the filed shareholder proposals by the labor unions were 
withdrawn in that proxy season. 
 
                                                          
9 Appendix 3.B provides an overview of the finer sub-classifications of proposal topics. 
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Figure 3.4: Withdrawn proposals split up by sponsor 
This figure shows the percentage of proposals that are withdrawn over time. I use the crude sponsor classifica-
tion to split up the sample: institutional investors, individual investors, coordinated activists, and labor unions. 
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that the more influential shareholders put more pres-
sure on the managers through the negotiations. Figure 3.4 graphically depicts the afore-
mentioned results by plotting the fraction of withdrawn proposals over time and split 
into the different sponsor classes.  
 However, one should be careful with the interpretation of these findings, as I do not 
know yet whether the withdrawal rates of the particular shareholder groups are also 
influenced by the topics of the filed proposals. Hence, how far the interaction between 
the sponsor’s identity and the proposal’s content influences the likelihood that a pro-
posal’s withdrawal takes place is not clear. For example, the high withdrawal rates of the 
institutional investors could be driven by the fact that this shareholder group files more 
CSR proposals that exhibit, on average, higher withdrawal rates than the CG proposals. 
Thus, the interaction between the proposal sponsor and the proposal’s content needs to 
be studied as well. 
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Table 3.4 tackles this specific issue in more detail and provides a clearer picture on the 
question of who files and withdraws which kinds of proposals. It displays the proposals 
that are filed and withdrawn by each sponsor group. One sees that, on average, labor 
unions display the highest withdrawal rates for the CG proposals (34.9%), followed by 
institutional investors (24.8%) and coordinated activists (18.4%). The picture changes 
for the CSR proposals: Institutional investors withdraw on average 42.4% of all filed 
CSR proposals, whereas labor unions withdraw 33% of CSR proposals by unions. Indi-
vidual shareholders display the lowest average withdrawal rates for both the CG and the 
CSR proposals (4.0% and 4.4%, respectively).  
 Notably, all shareholder groups withdraw CSR proposals more often than the CG 
proposals, which is consistent with the descriptive results mentioned before.  
 My conclusion is that the descriptive proposal-level analysis shows that the pro-
posals the most likely to be withdrawn are those filed by institutional investors or labor 
unions. Furthermore, the CSR proposals are, on average, more likely to be withdrawn 
than the average corporate governance proposal. Overall, I find that shareholders are still 
filing proposals and entering private negotiations with management, even though man-
agers are not obliged to implement the requests of the shareholder proposals. This obser-
vation points to an important monitoring function for the whole proposal process.  
3.5 The determinants of proposal withdrawal 
In this section, I investigate the determinants of the proposal withdrawals in a multivari-
ate setting. I look at both the proposal and the firm level. The distinction is meant to 
detect whether certain proposal topics are more likely to be withdrawn than others. In the 
proposal-level analysis, I use a logistic regression framework in which the dependent 
variable equals one when the proposal was withdrawn and zero otherwise. The firm-
level analysis also includes a logistic regression for the presence of at least one with-
drawn proposal in a given proxy season. I first turn to the firm-level analyses. 
3.5.1 Firm-level analysis 
In the following analysis, I treat every corporation that gets at least one proposal as a 
single observation, even if it receives multiple proposals. Table 3.5 presents the results 
for the entire sample of withdrawn shareholder proposals regardless of whether a pro-
posal belongs to the CG or the CSR category. I control for firm characteristics, year and 
industry effects in each regression model. I restrict myself to showing only the variables 
of major interest in the regression outputs. 
 In Model 1 of Table 3.5, I control for the institutional ownership level, the HHI of 
institutional ownership, the interaction between institutional ownership and its HHI, the 
number of withdrawn proposals in the previous year t-1, and the number of proposals 
filed by the different shareholder groups. Model 2 of Table 3.5 adds the CEO ownership 
as an independent variable. Lastly, in Model 3 of Table 3.5, I decompose the institutional 
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ownership into the percentage of shares held by the transient, dedicated, and the quasi-
indexer institutions as in Bushee (1998).  
 The results of Model 1 allude to the importance of the ownership structure in the 
withdrawal process. I find that the institutional ownership is positively and significantly 
related to the withdrawal’s likelihood. In Model 1, the coefficient of 1.349 on the institu-
tional ownership variable implies that a one standard deviation increase in the institu-
tional ownership increases the corporation’s odds of displaying one withdrawn share-
holder proposal by 23.7%. I find a similar result in Model 2, even when I add the control 
for the CEO ownership. The significant and positive coefficient on the institutional own-
ership variable can be interpreted as follows: If corporations have a higher share of insti-
tutional ownership, then the management is more likely to make advances to the pro-
posal sponsor irrespective of whether an individual, union, institution or any other inter-
est groups is filing the proposal. The reason for this behavior is because the managers are 
experiencing the exit threat from institutions. As Edmans (2009) and Admati and Pflei-
derer (2009) point out, the institutional investors can discipline managers by threatening 
to sell their stakes, which implies adverse effects for the managers’ compensation. 
Hence, to circumvent institutional shareholders from adopting the Wall Street Walk, the 
managers are more willing to reach a compromise that in the end leads to a withdrawal 
of the proposal when there is high institutional ownership. Overall, the positive relation 
between institutional ownership and the withdrawal’s likelihood supports hypothesis 
H3.2. 
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Table 3.5: Determinants of proposal withdrawal 
This table presents the results of logistic firm-level regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a corpo-
ration displays at least one withdrawn shareholder proposal in a proxy season regardless of the proposal's topic. 
In the different models presented here, I make use of different control variables. The firm characteristic control 
variables are total assets, net-profit-margin, leverage, capital expenditures and the dividend yield. The corpo-
rate governance control vector includes dummy variables for the presence of each of the following governance 
provisions: classified board, dual class stock, poison pill, golden parachute. Further, I control for year and 
industry effects in all models, and all regression models also include a constant. All continuous independent 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%, respectively. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust p-values are in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Institutional Ownership 1.349***
(0.008) 
1.274**
(0.019) 
 
Ownership Dedicated Institutions   0.178 
(0.835) 
Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions   1.685*** 
(0.003) 
Ownership Transient Institutions   0.631 
(0.404) 
CEO Ownership  -4.495*** 
(0.003) 
-4.395*** 
(0.004) 
HHI of Institutional Ownership 6.939 
(0.688) 
8.276 
(0.647) 
8.857 
(0.624) 
Inst. Ownership * HHI inst. Ownership -10.697 
(0.609) 
-11.022 
(0.613) 
-8.933 
(0.672) 
# Withdrawn Proposals t-1 0.119* 
(0.050) 
0.108* 
(0.082) 
0.110* 
(0.078) 
# Proposals filed by Institutions 0.745***
(0.000) 
0.745*** 
(0.000) 
0.750*** 
(0.000) 
# Proposals filed by Individuals -0.104***
(0.009) 
-0.106**
(0.010) 
-0.109*** 
(0.008) 
# Proposals filed by Coordinated 0.448***
(0.000) 
0.433*** 
(0.000) 
0.431*** 
(0.000) 
# Proposals filed by Unions 0.638***
(0.000) 
0.636*** 
(0.000) 
0.636*** 
(0.000) 
    
Firm Characteristics Controls yes yes yes 
Corporate Governance Controls yes yes yes 
    
Number of Observations 3,386 3,221 3,221 
Pseudo R-squared 0.159 0.164 0.165 
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To investigate which institutional investor category is driving the positive relation be-
tween the withdrawal’s likelihood and the institutional ownership, I use the institutional 
investor classification of Bushee (1998) in Model 3 of Table 3.5. There, I decompose the 
institutional ownership into the stakes held by the transient, quasi-indexer, and the dedi-
cated institutions. My results show that the ownership by the quasi-indexer institutions is 
positively (1.685) related to the withdrawal’s likelihood (1% significance level). Eco-
nomically, this relation means that a one standard deviation increase in the quasi-indexer 
stock ownership increases the odds of having at least one withdrawn proposal by 19.5%, 
holding all remaining variables constant. Apparently, the ownership of dedicated and 
transient institutional investors does not affect the withdrawal’s likelihood. Hence, my 
results imply that the long-term oriented and passive institutions drive the positive rela-
tion between the institutional holdings and the withdrawal’s likelihood, that is, corpora-
tions become more responsive to shareholder proposals as soon as more long-term ori-
ented institutions are part of the shareholder base. 
 The results of Models 1-3 of Table 3.5 also show that the concentration level of 
institutional ownership, the HHI of institutional ownership, is not significantly related to 
the likelihood of withdrawal. Therefore, for private negotiations to be successful, a con-
centrated institutional shareholder base is not necessary. It is the size of the stake owned 
by the institutions that influences the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
 Concerning insider ownership, I find a significantly negative relation between CEO 
ownership and the withdrawal’s likelihood in Models 2 and 3. The coefficient is equal to 
(-4.495) in Model 2 and (-4.395) in Model 3, implying that a one standard deviation 
increase in CEO ownership reduces the odds that a corporation exhibits at least one 
withdrawn proposal by 13.5% and 13.2%, respectively. This finding implies that the 
insider ownership reduces the probability of the proposal’s withdrawal. This result is 
consistent with earlier evidence provided by Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999). The 
negative correlation between the insider ownership and the withdrawal’s likelihood 
means that managers are more likely to let proposals go to a vote when their stake in the 
corporation is higher. In this case, managers do not necessarily have to make advances to 
sponsors to achieve a withdrawal. The more voting power the managers possess, the 
more likely it is that the managers resist proposals, and hence, let proposals go to a vote 
during the AGM (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). Consequently, the corporate insid-
ers can then use their own voting rights to vote against these proposals during AGMs 
(see Chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
 In Section 3.2, I discuss the dynamics of the entire withdrawal process. Because 
voice engagement of the shareholders is a continuous process, I argue that the withdraw-
al likelihood of the proposals today can also be influenced by the number of withdrawn 
proposals of the preceding proxy season. If this is true, then the corporations that offer 
shareholders a satisfactory compromise in private negotiations this year are also more 
likely to reach compromises during negotiations in the next year. The empirical results in 
Table 3.5 support this claim: I find a positive relation between the number of withdrawn 
proposals in year t-1 and the withdrawal likelihood of proposals in year t0. For example, 
the results of Model 3 in Table 3.5 imply that one additional withdrawn shareholder 
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proposal in t-1 increases the likelihood that a corporation also displays at least one with-
drawn shareholder proposal in t0 by 11.6%. 
 Models 1-3 also disclose that the extent to which corporations are exposed to en-
gagement of certain shareholders also influences the withdrawal’s likelihood. The num-
ber of proposals filed by individual shareholders significantly reduces the withdrawal’s 
likelihood. Holding all other variables constant, this result implies that one more share-
holder proposal filed by individual shareholders reduces the odds that a corporation 
displays at least one withdrawn proposal by 10.4%. In contrast, the number of proposals 
filed by all other shareholder groups has a positive and significant effect on the with-
drawal’s likelihood. This result stems from the fact that proposals of individual share-
holders are withdrawn less often per se. Stated differently, the more proposals that are 
filed by more influential shareholder groups, the more likely it is that at least one of 
those proposals is withdrawn. I argue that these results are in line with hypothesis H3.1 
that proposals filed by more influential shareholders are more likely to be withdrawn. 
 On an aggregate level, I conclude that my empirical findings are in line with my 
research hypotheses H3.1, H3.2, and H3.3. I find supportive evidence that the proposals 
filed by more influential shareholders (i.e., institutions or labor unions) are more likely 
to be withdrawn in the proposal process. However, this result has to be interpreted with 
caution as I just control for the number of proposals filed by the different shareholder 
groups. My proposal-level analysis shows in more detail which role the proposal’s spon-
sor plays in the withdrawal process. The empirical results also support my second re-
search hypothesis H3.2 because the withdrawal’s likelihood increases with the institu-
tional ownership. This increase implies that managers are feeling pressure from the pow-
erful shareholder groups and are thus more likely to reach an agreement with the spon-
soring shareholders. Further, I also show that the insider ownership is negatively related 
to the withdrawal’s likelihood, which is consistent with my last research hypothesis 
H3.3. For the firm-level analysis, I do not find evidence that transient institutional inves-
tors especially influence the withdrawal’s likelihood. Rather, I find a positive and signif-
icant relation between the ownership stake held by the quasi-indexer institutions and the 
withdrawal’s likelihood.  
 As mentioned, more than half of all of the withdrawn proposals belong to the CG 
category. Therefore, I now investigate whether the aforementioned results are driven by 
this proposal topic. I do so by investigating two subsamples of withdrawn shareholder 
proposals separately, namely CG and CSR proposals. In the following, I first investigate 
the determinants of the CG proposal withdrawals. Table 3.6 presents the results for those 
withdrawals. 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of CG proposal withdrawal 
This table presents the results of logistic firm-level regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a firm 
displays at least one withdrawn corporate governance (CG) proposal, and zero otherwise. I focus only on those 
firms that display at least one filed CG proposal in a given year. In the different models presented here, I make 
use of different control variables. The firm characteristics control variables are total assets, net-profit-margin, 
leverage, capital expenditures and the dividend yield. The CG control vector includes the dummy variables for 
the presence of each of the following governance provisions: classified board, dual class stock, poison pill, 
golden parachute. Further, I control for year and industry effects in all models, and all regression models also 
include a constant. All independent variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%, respectively. The ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust p-values are in parentheses. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Institutional Ownership 1.444** 1.247*  
 (0.032) (0.081)  
Ownership Dedicated Institutions   0.502 
   (0.647) 
Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions   1.634** 
   (0.027) 
Ownership Transient Institutions   0.639 
   (0.508) 
CEO Ownership  -8.322*** -8.249*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI of Institutional Ownership 24.040 29.915 29.781 
 (0.253) (0.171) (0.170) 
Inst. Ownership * HHI Inst. Ownership -29.788 -34.344 -32.457 
 (0.245) (0.195) (0.201) 
# Withdrawn CG Proposals t-1 0.144* 0.136 0.136 
 (0.077) (0.101) (0.101) 
# CG Proposals filed by Institutions 0.718*** 0.727*** 0.728*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# CG Proposals filed by Individuals -0.084* -0.101* -0.104** 
 (0.092) (0.055) (0.047) 
# CG Proposals filed by Coordinated 0.260* 0.253* 0.258* 
 (0.076) (0.088) (0.084) 
# CG Proposals filed by Unions 0.905*** 0.908*** 0.908*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Firm Characteristics Controls yes yes yes 
Corporate Governance Controls yes yes yes 
    
Number Of Observations 2,680 2,558 2,558 
Pseudo R-squared 0.180 0.186 0.187 
 
In general, the results for the CG proposals are remarkably similar to the results for the 
entire sample. The institutional ownership increases the withdrawal likelihood of the CG 
proposals, and the CEO ownership decreases the withdrawal’s likelihood. The economic 
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magnitudes of these effects are slightly stronger than the ones for the entire sample of 
proposals. Holding all other control variables constant in Model 2, a one standard devia-
tion increase in the institutional ownership (CEO ownership) increases (decreases) the 
odds that a corporation displays a withdrawn CG proposal by 21.1% (21.6%). Further-
more, my previous finding that the ownership stake of the quasi-indexer institutions 
drives the significant relation between the institutional ownership and the withdrawal’s 
likelihood still holds for the CG proposals.  
 The number of withdrawn CG proposals during year t-1 is only significantly and 
positively related to corporate governance proposal withdrawal in year t0 in Model 1. In 
the remaining models, there is no significant relation between the number of withdrawn 
CG proposals in year t-1 and year t0. This finding means that the number of past with-
drawn CG proposals is not a good indicator of successful negotiations in the future.  
 Next, I study the withdrawal likelihood of CSR proposals. Table 3.7 displays the 
results of the three different logistic regression models. Compared to the results for the 
overall sample and the subsample of the CG proposals, I find very different results for 
the withdrawal likelihood of CSR proposals. As displayed in the three models in Table 
3.7, the ownership structure does not affect the likelihood that a corporation displays at 
least one withdrawn CSR proposal in a given year. I do not find a positive relation be-
tween any of the institutional ownership variables, nor do I find a significant relation 
between the CEO ownership and the withdrawal’s likelihood. The latter result can be 
interpreted as the corporate insiders being less concerned about the CSR proposals in 
private negotiations. As I have shown in the descriptive proposal-level analyses, the CSR 
proposals display much higher withdrawal rates than the CG proposals. My multivariate 
findings mean that, irrespective of the stake owned by the corporate insiders, the share-
holders withdraw their CSR proposals relatively more often than the CG proposals. This 
finding alludes to the fact that the managers make certain concessions to the sharehold-
ers more easily when faced with a CSR proposal. The reason is that any changes with 
respect to the CSR policies are easier to implement and that managers can expect fewer 
adverse monetary consequences.  
 In contrast to my previous findings for the CG proposals, the results in Table 3.7 
emphasize the influence of the past year’s number of withdrawn CSR proposals. I find a 
positive and significant relation between the number of withdrawn CSR proposals in t-1 
and the likelihood of their withdrawals in year t0. This result is consistently positive and 
significant in all three models of Table 3.7. The economic magnitude of this effect is 
comparable for each model. One more withdrawn CSR proposal in t-1 increases the odds 
of having at least one withdrawn CSR proposal in t0 by 28.2% (Model 1), 27.3% (Model 
2), and 27.2% (Model 3) respectively. It implies that the corporations that make conces-
sions to sponsoring shareholders in a given year are also more likely to exhibit with-
drawn CSR proposals in the following year. 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of CSR proposal withdrawal 
This table presents the results of logistic firm-level regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a firm 
displays at least one withdrawn corporate social responsibility (CSR) proposal, and zero otherwise. I focus 
only on those firms that display at least one filed CSR proposal in a given year. In the different models pre-
sented here, I make use of different control variables. The firm characteristics control variables are total assets, 
net-profit-margin, leverage, capital expenditures and the dividend yield. The corporate governance (CG) 
control vector includes the dummy variables for the presence of each of the following governance provisions: 
classified board, dual class stock, poison pill, golden parachute. Further, I control for year and industry effects 
in all models and all regression models also include a constant. All independent variables are winsorized at 1 
and 99%, respectively. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respec-
tively. Robust p-values are in parentheses. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Institutional Ownership 0.793 0.730  
 (0.258) (0.338)  
Ownership Dedicated Institutions   0.277 
   (0.817) 
Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions   1.176 
   (0.163) 
Ownership Transient Institutions   0.628 
   (0.574) 
CEO Ownership  -1.886 -1.755 
  (0.345) (0.381) 
HHI of Institutional Ownership -8.078 -6.840 0.053 
 (0.775) (0.819) (0.999) 
Inst. Ownership * HHI inst. Ownership 14.337 13.733 6.371 
 (0.668) (0.698) (0.860) 
# Withdrawn CSR Proposals t-1 0.248** 0.241** 0.241** 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.039) 
# CSR Proposals filed by Institutions 0.924*** 0.908*** 0.917*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# CSR Proposals filed by Individuals -0.174 -0.169 -0.164 
 (0.182) (0.201) (0.215) 
# CSR Proposals filed by Coordinated 0.341*** 0.325*** 0.328*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# CSR Proposals filed by Unions 0.154 0.154 0.156 
 (0.573) (0.573) (0.567) 
    
Firm Characteristics Controls yes yes yes 
Corporate Governance Controls yes yes yes 
    
Number of Observations 1,603 1,523 1,523 
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 0.085 0.086 
 
Moreover, the empirical results of Models 1 to 3 of Table 3.7 indicate that only the num-
ber of proposals filed by the coordinated activists and the institutional investors signifi-
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cantly increase the likelihood of having at least one withdrawn CSR proposal. Hence, the 
coordinated activists have a significant influence on the withdrawal likelihood of CSR 
proposals. 
 I find supporting evidence for my hypotheses H3.1, H3.2, and H3.3. I infer from my 
firm-level analyses that both the institutional and the insider ownership are the major 
determinants for the proposal withdrawals. This finding implies that a more powerful 
shareholder base in terms of institutional shareholders strengthens the bargaining posi-
tion of the proposal sponsors, which eventually leads to a higher likelihood of proposal 
withdrawal. But, the insider and institutional ownerships both do not affect the with-
drawal likelihood of CSR proposals. For the CSR proposal’s withdrawal likelihood, a 
major determinant represents the number of the past year’s withdrawn CSR proposals. 
3.5.2 Proposal-level analysis 
I now turn to the proposal-level analyses. Here, I treat every proposal as a single obser-
vation. The results are in Tables 3.8 to 3.10. Table 3.8 presents the different models for 
the withdrawal’s likelihood for any shareholder proposal irrespective of the proposal’s 
topic. I add the same explanatory variables as in the firm-level analysis. In addition, I 
control for the effects of the interactions between my institutional ownership proxies and 
the proposal sponsorship on the withdrawal’s likelihood. This is possible for the pro-
posal-level analysis only, because I can then control for the fact that certain individual 
proposals are filed by certain shareholders.  
 Compared to the firm-level analysis, the addition of these control variables slightly 
changes the results. The results of all four models in Table 3.8 allude to the importance 
of the institutional ownership as one of the major drivers of the proposal’s withdrawal 
likelihood. On an aggregate level, Model 1 discloses that the institutional ownership is 
still positively and significantly related to the withdrawal’s likelihood for any kind of 
shareholder proposals. In economic terms, the coefficient of (0.855) on Institutional 
ownership implies that a one standard deviation increase in the institutional ownership 
increases the odds that a proposal gets withdrawn by 13.5%, all else constant. 
 In Model 2, I add a control variable for the interaction between the institutional 
sponsorship and the institutional ownership. The reason for the inclusion of this interac-
tion term is that a proposal filed by an institutional investor with a corporation that is 
characterized by a relatively large institutional ownership share might be even more 
likely to be withdrawn because the sponsoring shareholder is supported by a large insti-
tutional shareholder base. Further, private talks among the different institutions might 
have gone on prior to the actual filing of the proposal. Hence, the managers might be 
aware of the multiplicative power of these proposals and are thus more likely to make 
concessions to the shareholders. My empirical results support this idea. The interaction 
term turns out significant and positive that means the withdrawal’s likelihood increases 
when the institutional ownership is high and the proposal’s sponsor is an institutional 
investor. Consequently, the addition of this control variable takes up all of the significant 
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effect from the institutional ownership itself, which implies that the presence of an insti-
tutional sponsor is crucial to affect and to increase the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
 
Table 3.8: Determinants of proposal withdrawal (proposal-level) 
This table presents proposal-level logistic regressions where the dependent variable equals one if the proposal 
is withdrawn and zero otherwise. No distinction is made between the CG and the CSR proposals. All models 
control for firm’s financial and governance characteristics. The firm characteristics control variables are total 
assets, net-profit-margin, leverage, capital expenditures and the dividend yield. The CG control vector includes 
the dummy variables for the presence of each of the following governance provisions: classified board, dual 
class stock, poison pill, golden parachute. Further, I control for year and industry effects in all models, and all 
regression models also include a constant. All independent variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%, respectively. 
The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust p-values 
are in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Institutional Ownership 0.855** 0.497   
 (0.032) (0.230)   
Institutional Sponsor * Institutional Ownership  1.360***   
  (0.003)   
Ownership Dedicated Institutions   0.595 0.944 
   (0.368) (0.212) 
Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions   1.300*** 0.766 
   (0.004) (0.123) 
Ownership Transient Institutions   0.336 -0.387 
   (0.584) (0.588) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Dedicated  
Institutions 
   -0.489 
    (0.641) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Quasi-Indexer  
Institutions 
   1.949*** 
    (0.004) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Transient Institutions    2.192** 
    (0.024) 
CEO Ownership -4.251*** -4.167*** -4.151*** -4.104*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
# Withdrawn Proposals T-1 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.033 
 (0.316) (0.301) (0.329) (0.315) 
HHI of Institutional Ownership 4.779 9.803 5.980 12.074 
 (0.746) (0.511) (0.694) (0.431) 
Inst. Ownership * HHI Inst. Ownership -5.771 -11.588 -7.442 -14.783 
 (0.740) (0.510) (0.670) (0.402) 
Institutional Sponsor? 2.090*** 1.110*** 2.093*** 0.932** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.013) 
Coordinated Activist Sponsor? 1.545*** 1.549*** 1.547*** 1.552*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Sponsor? 2.419*** 2.442*** 2.419*** 2.445*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 3.8 continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CG Proposal? 0.456 0.440 0.455 0.437 
 (0.118) (0.130) (0.119) (0.132) 
CSR Proposal? 1.092*** 1.079*** 1.092*** 1.075*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Characteristics Controls yes yes yes yes 
Corporate Governance Controls yes yes yes yes 
     
Number of Observations 7,903 7,903 7,903 7,903 
Pseudo R-squared 0.148 0.149 0.148 0.150 
 
In Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.8, I break down the aggregate institutional ownership 
measure into the three subcategories: transient, quasi-indexer, and dedicated institutions. 
The results of Model 3 show that the positive and significant effect of the institutional 
ownership on the withdrawal’s likelihood in Model 1 is entirely driven by the stake held 
by the quasi-indexer institutions. This result is consistent with the results from my firm-
level analysis and points to the importance of the long-term, passively investing institu-
tions as corporate monitors. In Model 4, I also control for the interaction effects between 
the ownership of each of the three classes of institutions and the institutional sponsor-
ship. I find that the interaction between the ownership stake of the quasi-indexer institu-
tions and the institutional sponsorship significantly increases the chances of a withdraw-
al. Furthermore, I also find a positive relation between the withdrawal’s likelihood and 
the interaction between the institutional sponsorship and the ownership stake of the tran-
sient institutions. This finding implies that the ownership of the short-term oriented, 
institutional investors can also lead to a higher likelihood of withdrawal if the proposal 
sponsor is an institutional investor. 
 In all four models of Table 3.8, I control for the same firm, proposal, and sponsor 
characteristics. Concerning sponsor characteristics, I find that all of the sponsor control 
variables are positive and significant. These results hold for any of the four models in 
Table 3.8 and imply that the proposals filed by these shareholder groups are, on average, 
more likely to be withdrawn than the proposals filed by individual shareholders (the 
category of sponsors which is the base case in these regressions). My findings therefore 
support hypothesis H3.1. Furthermore, I also find that the CSR proposals are significant-
ly more likely to be withdrawn than the CG proposals, which is consistent with my de-
scriptive results discussed earlier in this chapter. I do not find a significant relation be-
tween the number of past withdrawn proposals and the current likelihood of withdrawal. 
This result is different from my results in the firm-level analysis in which I find a signif-
icant and positive relation between the past withdrawn proposals and the current with-
drawal’s likelihood. 
 Lastly, I find supportive evidence for research hypothesis H3.3. The CEO ownership 
reduces the likelihood that a proposal is withdrawn, even after controlling for the institu-
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tional ownership, the proposal’s topic, and the sponsor. This is consistent with the firm-
level analysis and means that the corporate insiders are more likely to let the proposals 
go to a vote when they own a relatively large stake of their own corporation.  
 I continue with performing the same analysis for the two subsamples of shareholder 
proposals. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 replicate the models of the previous table for the two 
subsamples of the CG and the CSR proposals.  
 Compared to the firm-level analysis of the CG proposal withdrawals, Model 1 in 
Table 3.9 clearly shows that the effect of the institutional ownership on the withdrawal’s 
likelihood disappears when I take the proposal-level approach. In Model 2, however, the 
interaction term between the institutional sponsor and the ownership remains positive 
and significant, which implies that the institutional ownership in combination with the 
institutional sponsorship still positively affects the withdrawal likelihood of the CG 
proposals. Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.9 again control for the subclasses of institutional 
investors. I find that the withdrawal likelihood of the CG proposals is positively affected 
by only the interaction between the institutional sponsorship and the ownership of the 
transient institutions.  
 In Model 2, I add a control variable for the interaction between the institutional 
sponsorship and the institutional ownership. The reason for the inclusion of this interac-
tion term is that a proposal filed by an institutional investor with a corporation that is 
characterized by a relatively large institutional ownership share might be even more 
likely to be withdrawn because the sponsoring shareholder is supported by a large insti-
tutional shareholder base. Further, private talks among the different institutions might 
have gone on prior to the actual filing of the proposal. Hence, the managers might be 
aware of the multiplicative power of these proposals and are thus more likely to make 
concessions to the shareholders. My empirical results support this idea. The interaction 
term turns out significant and positive that means the withdrawal’s likelihood increases 
when the institutional ownership is high and the proposal’s sponsor is an institutional 
investor. Consequently, the addition of this control variable takes up all of the significant 
effect from the institutional ownership itself, which implies that the presence of an insti-
tutional sponsor is crucial to affect and to increase the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
 In Model 2, I add a control variable for the interaction between the institutional 
sponsorship and the institutional ownership. The reason for the inclusion of this interac-
tion term is that a proposal filed by an institutional investor with a corporation that is 
characterized by a relatively large institutional ownership share might be even more 
likely to be withdrawn because the sponsoring shareholder is supported by a large insti-
tutional shareholder base. Further, private talks among the different institutions might 
have gone on prior to the actual filing of the proposal. Hence, the managers might be 
aware of the multiplicative power of these proposals and are thus more likely to make 
concessions to the shareholders. My empirical results support this idea. The interaction 
term turns out significant and positive that means the withdrawal’s likelihood increases 
when the institutional ownership is high and the proposal’s sponsor is an institutional 
investor. Consequently, the addition of this control variable takes up all of the significant 
effect from the institutional ownership itself, which implies that the presence of an insti-
tutional sponsor is crucial to affect and to increase the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
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Table 3.9: Determinants of CG proposal withdrawal (proposal-level) 
This table presents proposal-level logistic regressions where the dependent variable equals one if a corporate 
governance (CG) proposal is withdrawn and zero otherwise. I only take into account filed CG proposals. All 
models control for the same firm characteristics as the models in Table 3.8 of this chapter. Further, I control for 
year and industry effects in all models, and all regression models also include a constant. All independent 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%, respectively. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust p-values are in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Institutional Ownership 0.504 0.367   
 (0.331) (0.484)   
Institutional Sponsor * Institutional Ownership  1.336*   
  (0.073)   
Ownership Dedicated Institutions   0.490 1.142 
   (0.576) (0.229) 
Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions   0.820 0.656 
   (0.156) (0.284) 
Ownership Transient Institutions   -0.127 -0.902 
   (0.875) (0.308) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Dedicated Institutions    -2.199 
    (0.151) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Quasi-Index. Institutions    1.224 
    (0.256) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Transient Institutions    3.710*** 
    (0.010) 
CEO Ownership -6.805*** -6.701*** -6.766*** -6.746*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Withdrawn Proposals T-1 -0.039 -0.039 -0.040 -0.040 
 (0.514) (0.514) (0.500) (0.499) 
HHI of Institutional Ownership 4.264 10.623 1.705 8.870 
 (0.814) (0.572) (0.927) (0.640) 
Inst. Ownership * HHI Inst. Ownership -4.961 -12.623 -2.966 -11.433 
 (0.818) (0.571) (0.889) (0.604) 
Institutional Sponsor? 2.040*** 1.055* 2.041*** 1.159** 
 (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.050) 
Coordinated Activist Sponsor? 1.337*** 1.338*** 1.342*** 1.342*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Sponsor? 2.481*** 2.493*** 2.482*** 2.497*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Characteristics Controls yes yes yes yes 
Corporate Governance Controls yes yes yes yes 
     
Number of Observations 5,374 5,374 5,374 5,374 
Pseudo R-squared 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.186 
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I also find that for the CG proposals, the CEO ownership is the most important determi-
nant of the proposal withdrawal. My proxy still exhibits a negative and very significant 
coefficient. The results in Model 4 concerning the CEO ownership indicate that a one 
standard deviation increase in the CEO ownership decreases the odds that a CG proposal 
gets withdrawn by 15.5%. My results for the CG proposal withdrawals also show that 
the proposals submitted by institutional shareholders, labor unions, and coordinated 
activists are, on average, more likely to be withdrawn than the proposals of the individu-
al investors that represent the base case in this analysis. Lastly, the likelihood that the 
CG proposals get withdrawn in the current year is not influenced by the number of with-
drawn CG proposals over the last year. 
 The subsample of CSR proposals displays the following determinants of withdrawal. 
The results of the four models in Table 3.10 allude to the importance of the institutional 
ownership and the sponsor characteristics in the context of the withdrawal likelihood of 
the CSR proposals. I find that the institutional ownership on an aggregate level signifi-
cantly increases the withdrawal likelihood of the CSR proposals (at the 10% level). Fur-
thermore, the interaction between the institutional sponsorship and ownership in Model 2 
is positive and significant at the 5% level, which implies that the CSR proposals are 
more likely to be withdrawn only if the institutional ownership is high and an institu-
tional investor is the proposal sponsor.  
 The breakdown into the transient, quasi-indexer, and dedicated institutional inves-
tors (Models 3 and 4) shows that the ownership stake of the quasi-indexer institutions as 
well as the interaction between their ownership and the institutional sponsorship are 
significantly and positively related to the withdrawal likelihood of the CSR proposals. 
This result is important as I do not find a significant relation between the stake of the 
quasi-indexers and the withdrawal likelihood of the CSR proposals at the firm level. 
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Table 3.10: Determinants of CSR proposal withdrawal (prop. level) 
This table presents proposal-level logistic regressions where the dependent variable equals one if a corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) proposal is withdrawn and zero otherwise. I only take into account filed CSR 
proposals. All models control for the same firm characteristics as the models in Table 3.8 of this chapter. 
Further, I control for year and industry effects in all models, and all regression models also include a constant. 
All independent variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%, respectively. The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust p-values are in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Institutional Ownership 1.087* 0.328   
 (0.095) (0.644)   
Institutional Sponsor * Institutional Ownership  1.646**   
  (0.016)   
Ownership Dedicated Institutions   0.692 0.585 
   (0.504) (0.661) 
Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions   1.740** 0.555 
   (0.016) (0.530) 
Ownership Transient Institutions   0.835 0.079 
   (0.405) (0.952) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Dedicated Institutions    0.528 
    (0.746) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Quasi-Indexer Institutions    2.539** 
    (0.013) 
Inst. Sponsor * Ownership Transient Institutions    1.400 
    (0.365) 
CEO Ownership -0.737 -0.522 -0.571 -0.315 
 (0.707) (0.787) (0.772) (0.872) 
# Withdrawn Proposals T-1 0.151** 0.151** 0.152** 0.153** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) 
HHI of Institutional Ownership 4.559 11.094 13.457 18.305 
 (0.867) (0.683) (0.641) (0.524) 
Inst. Ownership * HHI Inst. Ownership -1.315 -8.483 -11.694 -17.299 
 (0.967) (0.787) (0.719) (0.595) 
Institutional Sponsor? 2.459*** 1.329** 2.455*** 1.083* 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.058) 
Coordinated Activist Sponsor? 1.823*** 1.865*** 1.815*** 1.866*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Sponsor? 1.740*** 1.803*** 1.730*** 1.803*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Characteristics Controls yes yes yes yes 
Corporate Governance Controls yes yes yes yes 
     
Number of Observations 2,375 2,375 2,375 2,375 
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.092 0.091 0.094 
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Furthermore, the insider ownership does not affect the likelihood of a CSR proposal 
withdrawal as in the firm-level analysis; hence I do not find supportive evidence for 
H3.3 – at least for the subsample of the CSR proposals. In contrast to the CG proposals, I 
find a significant and positive relation between the number of the past year’s withdrawn 
CSR proposals and the current year’s withdrawal likelihood of the CSR proposals. This 
result implies that the filing and negotiating of the CSR proposals is indeed a continuous 
process that is likely to influence the future negotiations of the managers with the share-
holders on CSR issues. 
 Again, in each of the four models, the sponsorship control variables consistently 
exhibit the same signs. The proposals of the institutional shareholders, labor unions and 
the coordinated activists are, on average, more likely to be withdrawn than the proposals 
filed by individual retail investors.  
3.6 The power of withdrawn shareholder proposals 
Thus far, I have looked at the major drivers behind the proposal withdrawals. I now turn 
to the question of how much the withdrawn shareholder proposals are actually a measure 
of successful shareholder engagement. Therefore, I first investigate in this section 
whether the withdrawn shareholder proposals are those proposals that also theoretically 
receive a very high voting outcome. Second, I look at the corporate changes caused by 
the voted and withdrawn shareholder proposals to evaluate my hypothesis that the with-
drawn proposals are the strongest type of shareholder proposals.  
 For this kind of analysis, I rely on the shareholder proposals that deal with the com-
pensation packages of the corporate executives because I can directly measure and quan-
tify the changes in these packages after the proposal. I then undertake a propensity score 
matching approach based on my proposal-level analysis in Table 3.8. Essentially, I 
match every compensation proposal that is withdrawn with a compensation proposal that 
goes to a vote based on the firm characteristics, using the predicted withdrawal likeli-
hoods of the analysis in Table 3.8. As one sees from Appendix 3.B, I have 487 with-
drawn compensation proposals in my sample. Out of these, I am able to match 299 with-
drawn compensation proposals with 299 corresponding voted compensation proposals.  
 In the first part of this indicative analysis, I investigate how the predicted withdrawal 
likelihoods correlate with the realized voting outcomes of the voted compensation pro-
posals. In results not tabulated, I find that both are correlated at 20.6%. This result is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, I conclude that the managers actually 
convince the shareholders to withdraw those proposals for which they indeed expect a 
high voting outcome in the first place. Consequently, the information content of the 
withdrawn proposals should not be underestimated. Many proposals that theoretically 
might get a high—and thus for the management adverse—voting result during the AGM 
are withdrawn beforehand after private negotiations between the managers and the spon-
soring shareholder. 
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To investigate the effects that the withdrawn shareholder proposals have on corporations 
compared to voted proposals, I undertake an analysis of the treatment (withdrawn com-
pensation proposals) group and the control group (voted compensation proposals). In 
Table 3.11, I tabulate the results from a comparison of the different compensation pack-
age characteristics of the CEOs one year after the compensation proposal is withdrawn 
or voted on respectively. I compare the absolute dollar change in the total compensation, 
the absolute dollar change in the bonus payments, the percentage change in the bonus, as 
well as the percentage change in the salary level between the two groups. Panel A dis-
plays the analysis for the entire sample, irrespective of the voting outcomes of the voted 
shareholder proposals. I find that there are no significant differences in the changes of 
the different compensation characteristics between the voted and the withdrawn pro-
posals. Specifically, Panel A indicates that the average change in total compensation and 
bonuses is negative for the withdrawn proposals, but this difference is not significantly 
different from the average change that I find for the voted compensation proposals. One 
explanation for this finding is the fact that I include the entire sample of voted compen-
sation proposals in this analysis. This inclusion implies that I use those compensation 
proposals that display a very high voting outcome, but also those that have a very low 
voting outcome. If at all, the changes might be triggered by those voted proposals that 
get a higher voting result during the AGM, and not by the proposals that get few votes.  
 To account for this, I split the matched sample into matches that contain the voted 
compensation proposals that got fewer and more votes than the median matched com-
pensation proposal. Panel B of Table 3.11 presents my findings for the subsample of 
matches with only the voted proposals that received below median voting outcomes. I 
find that CEO compensation packages change substantially after the withdrawn compen-
sation proposals. The absolute change in total compensation and bonus payments as well 
as the percentage change in bonuses is negative for the withdrawn proposals. In contrast, 
I find that the average change is positive for the voted compensation proposals. I find 
that the changes in the total compensation, bonus payments, and the percentage change 
in salary are significantly different for the two groups when I test for the alternative 
hypothesis that the difference in changes in certain compensation characteristics is larger 
than zero (voted minus withdrawn). Hence, I conclude that the withdrawn compensation 
proposals generally reduce compensation levels for CEOs, while those compensation 
proposals that go to a vote and gather relatively few votes increase the compensation 
levels. The differences in the changes between the two groups are significant for a one-
sided t-test for three out of the four compensation package characteristics. 
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I repeat the exactly same analysis for those matches containing the voted compensation 
proposals that got more votes than the median compensation proposal. The results are 
displayed in Panel C of Table 3.11. On average, the withdrawn compensation proposals 
slightly increase the compensation levels (total and bonus payments). I also find a posi-
tive (negative) average percentage change in the salary levels (bonus levels). On the 
other hand, the average change for the voted compensation proposals is negative for 
three out of the four compensation package characteristics. Hence, the compensation 
proposals that manage to gather many votes during the AGM can have suppressing ef-
fects on the compensation levels. None of the differences is significantly larger than 
zero.  
 Overall, I conclude the following from the results presented in this section. By 
matching the voted and withdrawn compensation proposals based on the specific corpo-
rate and proposal characteristics as well as on the expected withdrawal likelihood, I first 
find that there is a significant correlation between the expected withdrawal likelihood 
and the realized voting outcomes of the matched proposals. Hence, managers withdraw 
those proposals for which they correctly anticipate a high voting outcome during the 
AGM. Further, when limiting the analysis to the compensation proposals that are less 
successful than the median compensation proposal, I show that the withdrawn compen-
sation proposals have a suppressing effect on the compensation levels whereas the below 
median voted proposals have, on average, a positive effect on the compensation levels. 
Thus, I claim that most of the time the withdrawn proposals represent a corporate 
change. 
3.7 Concluding comments and discussion 
In the United States, shareholders frequently engage with corporations through the filing 
of proxy proposals. The shareholder proposals strive for changes in corporate behavior 
and performance. My results indicate that a lot of these filed shareholder proposals are 
withdrawn by the proposal sponsor because of successful private negotiations with the 
management before the AGM. 
 In this chapter, I study the determinants of the withdrawn shareholder proposals. 
Researching withdrawn shareholder proposals is important because the literature on 
voice engagement through the shareholder proposals generally lacks evidence on the 
withdrawn proposals. There are only two studies that explicitly study private negotia-
tions and proposal withdrawals, namely Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999), and Car-
leton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998).  
 I hypothesize that the withdrawal’s likelihood is a function of the sponsor’s identity, 
the proposal’s content, and the target corporation’s ownership structure. I claim that the 
proposals filed by more influential shareholders (i.e., institutional investors or labor 
unions) are more likely to be withdrawn than the proposals handed in by the private 
shareholders. Furthermore, I conjecture that the withdrawal’s likelihood increases with 
the institutional ownership because the managers are more likely to make advances to 
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the sponsoring shareholder when a large institutional shareholder base is present. Lastly, 
I presume that the insider holdings negatively affect the withdrawal’s likelihood.  
 My results can be summarized as follows: I find that the level of filed and with-
drawn proposals is higher during the second half of the sample period. The shareholders 
are frequently invited into private negotiations as represented by the large number of 
withdrawn proposals during the latter years of the sample period. Moreover, I find that 
the CSR proposals are more often withdrawn than the CG proposals. In my eyes, these 
descriptive results already show the importance of the filed and withdrawn proposals as 
a corporate governance device available to shareholders.  
 My multivariate results disclose the following: First, the proposals filed by the labor 
unions and the institutional shareholders are more likely to be withdrawn than proposals 
filed by private, individual investors. These results hold for both the firm-level and pro-
posal-level analyses and are consistent with my empirical predictions that the proposals 
filed by more influential shareholders are more likely to be withdrawn. Second, I find 
that the withdrawal’s likelihood is a function of the institutional and the insider owner-
ships. My firm-level results for the entire sample of proposals indicate that the with-
drawal’s likelihood increases with the institutional ownership, and decreases with the 
insider ownership. This result also holds for the subsample of CG proposals. I also find 
that the positive relation between the withdrawal’s likelihood and the institutional own-
ership is driven by long-term oriented, passively investing institutions, that is, quasi-
indexer institutions. 
 My proposal-level multivariate results for the entire sample and the subsample of 
CG proposals shows that the positive effect of institutional ownership on the withdraw-
al’s likelihood is most pronounced if the proposal sponsor is an institutional investor. It 
is furthermore important to point out that my results show that the insider ownership is 
not significantly related to the withdrawal likelihood of the CSR proposals, neither at the 
firm-level nor at the proposal-level analyses. 
 The implications of my third chapter are manifold for the investment community, 
corporate managers, and academics. I document that the entire proxy proposal process is 
an important corporate governance mechanism. It is not just the voting process during 
the AGM itself that matters; it is the entire negotiation process preceding the AGM. 
Withdrawn proposals are the outcome of this private negotiation process. I observe a 
high number of proposal withdrawals every proxy season. This means, and my results 
support this claim, that managers care about specific proposals and that they want to 
prevent specific proposals from going to a vote during the AGM.  
 My results are of value to managers and shareholders. Managers, on the one hand, 
can take my results into account when they are faced with a shareholder proposal. 
Should they enter into negotiations with the shareholders or let the proposal go to a vote? 
How likely is it that the sponsoring shareholder is going to withdraw the proposal? Giv-
en my results, managers can take into account the information on the firm’s ownership 
structure, the proposal’s content, and the sponsor’s identity to answer these and related 
questions. Shareholders, on the other hand, can consider my results as well. My findings 
give an indication of which corporation might be more responsive to the shareholders. 
Hence, the shareholders could anticipate before the actual filing of the proposal how 
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likely it is that they might get invited into private negotiations by the management of the 
target corporation.  
 I provide some new evidence on the entire proxy proposal process. I shed light on 
the private negotiations that take place after a shareholder has filed a proposal. What is 
left for the future research are the real private negotiations that take place behind the 
scenes before any public filing of a proposal occurs. Studying these could show how 
shareholders, in particular institutional investors, continuously interact with corpora-
tions. Only by also investigating this kind of engagement can one conclude how success-
ful the engagement activities of shareholders are. Such an analysis of the private en-
gagements is undertaken in the following chapter of my dissertation.  
 
  
W I T H D R A W N  S H A R E H O L D E R  P R O P O S A L S  
 87
Appendix 3.A: Proposal topics and sponsor categories 
Proposal Topics (Content) Topic Examples 
Corporate Governance  
Compensation Award performance-based stock options, award golden para-
chutes, link pay to performance, approve executive compensation, 
restrict compensation 
External Governance Redeem or vote on poison pill, eliminate supermajority provision, 
vote on takeover provisions, restore right to call a special meeting 
Internal Governance Separate chairman/CEO, introduce confidential voting, repeal 
classified board, limit director tenure, introduce confidential 
voting 
Takeover Sell the corporation, reject merger, spin off division, spin off 
tobacco business 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
Social Label gene-engineered food, adopt sexual orientation anti-bias 
policy, implement ILO standards and third-party monitoring, 
issue sustainability report, adopt code of conduct for China opera-
tions 
Environmental Endorse Ceres principles, report on global climate change, report 
on supplier environmental standards, reduce radioactive emis-
sions, develop renewable energy alternatives 
Proposal Sponsors (Identities) Sponsor Examples 
Institutional Investors California Public Employees' Retirement System, New York City 
Pension Funds, Calvert Asset Management Co., Domini Social 
Investments, LongView Funds, Connecticut Retirement Plans & 
Trust Funds, Northstar Asset 
Individual Investors Evelyn Davis, Davis family, Gilbert brothers, Rossi family, 
Lucian Bebchuk 
Coordinated Activists Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Medical Mission 
Sisters, Human Life International, Episcopal Church, Rainforest 
Action Network, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
Pro Vita Advisors 
Unions United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Ser-
vice Employees International Union, Plumbers & Pipefitters 
National Pension Fund, Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters 
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Appendix 3.B: All filed and withdrawn shareholder proposals 
This table presents the number of filed shareholder proposals split up into the different proposal topics. Note 
that I include all of the shareholder proposals for which the information on the proposal topic is available. The 
second column presents the number of all of the filed shareholder proposals for each topic. In the third column, 
I list the total number of the withdrawn proposals for each category. The last column includes the percentage 
fraction of the proposals that are withdrawn for each proposal topic. 
Panel A: Crude Classification    
Topic # Filed # Withdrawn Withdrawn % 
Corporate Governance 8,664 1,454 16.8% 
Corporate Social Responsibility 3,530 1,103 31.2% 
Other 280 28 10.0% 
Total 12,474 2,585 20.7% 
 
Panel B: Detailed Classification    
Topic # Filed # Withdrawn Withdrawn % 
Corporate Governance 8,664 1,454 16.8% 
 Compensation 2,637 487 18.5% 
  Amend Compensation 535 116 21.7% 
  Approve Compensation 782 138 17.6% 
  Compensation Committee 31 10 32.3% 
  Disclosure and Reporting Proposals 301 58 19.3% 
  Increase Compensation 243 60 24.7% 
  Restrict Compensation 685 82 12.0% 
  Miscellaneous 60 23 38.3% 
 External 1,093 110 10.1% 
  Other External 236 16 6.8% 
  Poison Pill 591 58 9.8% 
  Reincorporation 50 11 22.0% 
  Supermajority Provision 216 25 11.6% 
 Internal 4,602 831 18.1% 
  Board 1,884 228 12.1% 
  Voting 1,112 266 23.9% 
  Other Internal 1,606 337 21.0% 
 Takeover 332 26 7.8% 
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Panel B: Detailed Classification    
Topic # Filed # Withdrawn Withdrawn % 
Corporate Social Responsibility 3,530 1,103 31.2% 
 Environmental 872 257 29.5% 
  Animal 150 28 18.7% 
  Ceres 128 63 49.2% 
  Arctic Drilling 18 2 11.1% 
  Forest 12 3 25.0% 
  Other Environmental 107 28 26.2% 
  Pollution 72 12 16.7% 
  Nuclear Power 52 0 0.0% 
  Climate Change 333 121 36.3% 
 Social 2,658 846 31.8% 
  Health 419 133 31.7% 
  Other Social 959 262 27.3% 
  Country Specific 109 18 16.5% 
  Human Rights 103 17 16.5% 
  Labor Standards 252 67 26.6% 
  Non-Discrimination 538 241 44.8% 
  Tobacco 116 26 22.4% 
  Diversity 162 82 50.6% 
Other 280 28 10.0% 
Total (all proposals) 12,474 2,585 20.7% 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Geography of Shareholder Engagement: 
Evidence from a Large British Institutional 
Investor10	
In this chapter, I study the global shareholder engagement activities of a large UK-based 
asset manager from 2006 to 2011. Using proprietary data on these activities, I find that 
“behind the scenes” shareholder engagements are frequently used to change corporate 
behavior. I show that geography is an important determinant for the occurrence of such 
engagements: UK corporations receive significantly more engagements than their for-
eign counterparts. This finding gives rise to a “home bias” in shareholder engagement. I 
also find that the extent of the successful shareholder engagements is significantly higher 
for US corporations than for domestic UK corporations. 
  
                                                          
10 This chapter is based on Bauer, Clark, and Viehs (2013). I thank seminar participants at Maastricht Universi-
ty, and I acknowledge the data and support provided by a large UK institutional investor. Frank Moers de-
serves special gratitude as his comments considerably improved this chapter. I am also grateful to Valentin 
Peter for excellent research assistance. Major parts of this chapter were completed while I attended the Oxford 
University School of Geography and the Environment as a visiting scholar. 
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4.1  Introduction 
Institutional investors frequently use engagement tactics to influence and change the 
corporations they are invested in. In particular, many institutions strive for changes in 
the corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies to ensure the sustain-
ability of investee corporations. Often, these institutional investors engage with the in-
vestee corporations on a private basis through management meetings or email corre-
spondence to achieve their goals. In this chapter, I study the shareholder engagement 
activities of one institutional investor, namely a large UK-based asset manager. 
 This conventional asset manager offers engagement services to institutional clients. 
The engagement services comprise active voting at AGMs and direct engagement with 
investee corporations through management meetings, telephone calls, emails, letters, and 
corporate visits with the aim of changing the ESG policies.11 Hence, I also call this asset 
manager an “engagement agent.” As of September 2012, the engagement agent was 
hired by 25 institutional investors with diversified investment portfolios whose com-
bined assets under management were equal to US$ 82.8 billion. 
 Every year since 2006, the engagement agent, together with its institutional clients, 
sets up a so-called “priority list” of corporations. For these corporations, both the en-
gagement agent and the institutional clients view immediate engagement action regard-
ing ESG policies as necessary. Hence, I analyze all of the engagement agent’s activities 
in 397 unique “priority” corporations located in 37 different countries from 2006–2011. 
 By studying this proprietary engagement data set, I aim to show the key determi-
nants of the global engagement activities and their success. Although I am only provid-
ing a snapshot of a single European asset manager, I am able to give the answers to three 
important research questions. Which corporations does the institutional investor engage 
with and how does geography drive the intensity of such engagements? Second, are the 
factors that drive these private engagements similar to those in the public engagement 
literature, for example, shareholder proposals? And third, does geography drive the suc-
cess of these engagement activities? 
 The recent literature on corporate governance (CG) illustrates the growing im-
portance of the shareholder engagement by institutional investors (e.g., McCahery, Saut-
ner, and Starks, 2013). The underlying engagement data of my engagement agent has 
also been used in two other studies on shareholder engagement in slightly modified ver-
sions. First, Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013) study the shareholder engagement activities 
at 613 US corporations from 1999–2009 and find an annual abnormal stock price reac-
tion of 4.4% for the corporations where the institutional investor successfully achieved 
change. These authors provide the first evidence that the shareholder engagement activi-
                                                          
11 Throughout this chapter, I do use the term shareholder engagement to describe all actions undertaken by 
shareholder to change corporate behavior. I distinguish between private and public shareholder engagement: 
Private shareholder engagements are private dialogues and direct interventions from shareholders at investee 
corporations and they are not observable. Public shareholder engagements are, for example, shareholder pro-
posals, which are observable by others.  
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ties of the institutional investor are value-enhancing. Second, the fifth chapter of my 
dissertation analyzes all 1,894 US corporations that are in the investment portfolio of the 
engagement agent and its institutional clients. There, I investigates the shareholder en-
gagement activities of the engagement agent in the context of shareholder proposals to 
show whether the corporations are more or less likely to honor the engagements when 
several different forms of engagement are simultaneously present. I find that the corpo-
rations are significantly more likely to honor the engagements of any kind as soon as 
they receive both types of engagement (shareholder proposals from any shareholder and 
corporate engagements from the engagement agent) simultaneously. 
 The sample of corporations that I investigate in this chapter is smaller than the un-
derlying samples of Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013) and Chapter 5 because I exclusive-
ly focus on a global sample of engaged priority corporations between 2006 and 2011. 
This focus implies that I use those corporations for which the engagement agent and its 
institutional clients classify the engagement’s necessity as the highest. I start by present-
ing an overview of the global engagement activities that shows in which countries the 
priority corporations domicile and also shows the evolution of the shareholder engage-
ments during the sample period from 2006–2011. I then continue with an empirical in-
vestigation of the determinants of the intensity of the engagements. In particular, I study 
the effect of the geographical factors on the intensity of the engagements that a priority 
corporation experiences. In this analysis, I do not only look at the geographical location 
of the priority corporations, but I also investigate whether the legal regime of incorpora-
tion influences the engagement intensity. The empirical finance literature shows that 
geographic factors (e.g., Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi, 2012) as well as 
legal regimes have a substantial effect on the governance structures of corporations as 
well as on their financing policies (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 
1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000a, 2000b). My analysis 
adds to this literature by revealing whether geography also matters to the global share-
holder engagements of the engagement agent. Lastly, I examine the determinants of the 
engagement success. Specifically, I study the effect of geography on the engagement 
success along with several other target firm characteristics, as in the spirit of Dimson, 
Karakas, and Li (2013). 
 My findings can be summarized as follows: I find that the engagement agent very 
actively engages with priority corporations over the investigated time period. Overall, I 
document that the agent raises 6,837 objectives in 397 unique priority corporations from 
37 countries. Furthermore, the data reveal that the engagements entail 592 instances in 
which the investee corporations changed their behavior according to the requests of the 
agent, which represent successful engagements (also called milestones). Approximately 
40% of all of the stated objectives deal with corporate governance issues, followed by 
social and environmental issues (28 and 32%, respectively). I further detect a clustering 
of corporations in the Anglo-Saxon countries: Out of the 397 priority corporations, 84 
T H E  G E O G R A P H Y  O F  S H A R E H O L D E R  E N G A G E M E N T  
 95
domicile in the United Kingdom, and 75 domicile in the United States.12 Throughout this 
chapter, I use the term objectives for the engagement activities of the engagement agent.  
The empirical results of my chapter allude to a home bias in the agent’s engagement 
decision: the corporations from the United Kingdom get significantly more objectives 
than their foreign counterparts. I argue that the proximity to the target corporations and 
better knowledge of the regulatory environment in the home market drive my results 
because information asymmetries are relatively lower for the proximate corporations. In 
addition, I find that the larger corporations get relatively more objectives than their 
smaller counterparts. Importantly, I also find a positive relation between the number of 
the past engagements and the number of the current engagements. Hence, my results 
indicate that the engagement intensity is driven by the established relationship between 
the engagement agent and its investee corporations. A closer collaboration on particular 
issues raises the number of the objectives that a particular corporation receives in the 
future. Consistent with the literature on public shareholder engagement tools, I find that 
the poorly performing corporations are more frequently targeted with private engage-
ments. 
 Regarding the determinants of the successful engagements, I find that, on average, 
relative to the corporations originating in the United Kingdom, the corporations in the 
United States and Continental Europe have significantly more successful engagements. 
This finding, even though counterintuitive at first sight, is consistent with my previous 
findings on a home bias in the engagement intensity. The engagement agent targets and 
selects more carefully those corporations abroad for which the expected success likeli-
hood is most likely the highest. Additionally, when I limit the analyses to only successful 
social engagements, I find that the corporations in Japan and the United Kingdom dis-
play significantly more successes than the corporations originating in all of the other 
countries.  
 Shareholder engagement is not a new phenomenon. The literature focuses on share-
holder proposals (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000)13, class-action lawsuits (e.g., Romano, 
1991)14, and the Wall Street Walk (e.g., Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009) as 
the most important engagement tools available to shareholders. Further, the literature 
also finds that institutional investors are important corporate monitors because they have 
more power and incentives to monitor the corporation and also to promote changes due 
to their large stakes in the corporation (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). The evidence also suggests that particular groups of the institutional 
                                                          
12 Note that the 75 priority US corporations are most likely also part of the sample of corporations used in 
Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013). However, the difference between the 613 US corporations used in their 
analysis and the 75 US corporations in my sample (= 538 corporations) is due to the fact that none of their 
additional 538 corporations ever appear on the priority list between 2006 and 2011. 
13 Other interesting studies on shareholder proposals are Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996); Gillan and 
Starks (2007); Ferri and Sandino (2009); Buchanan, Netter, Poulsen, and Yang, 2012; Ertimur, Ferri, and 
Stubben (2010); Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011); Bauer, Braun, and Viehs (2012); Bauer, Moers, and Viehs 
(2013). 
14 Other exemplary studies include Bauer and Braun (2010) and Gande and Lewis (2009). 
C H A P T E R  4  
 96 
investors can promote change at corporations and positive shareholder value effects. The 
literature mentions pension funds (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) and hedge funds 
(Klein and Zur, 2009) as important institutional activist investors.15 
 Another paper discussing shareholder engagement by institutional investors is 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2013). Using survey evidence, they find that the institu-
tional investors use several engagement tactics to change the corporations with respect to 
their ESG structures. Among the most often adopted engagement tools are the private 
dialogues and the direct management meetings (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2013), 
which are the means of engagement that I investigate in this chapter. 
 The literature on private engagements by institutional investors is relatively scarce. I 
argue in Chapter 3 that these private engagements might be an even more powerful way 
of engaging the corporations in the United States than public engagements, like share-
holder proposals. The reason for this argument is that I find that about 20% of all of the 
shareholder proposals are withdrawn by the lead sponsoring shareholder after the private 
negotiations with the management of the target corporation. Carleton, Nelson, and 
Weisbach (1998) provide similar arguments after investigating the successes of the TI-
AA-CREF’s private negotiations with its investee corporations. Likewise, Becht, Franks, 
Mayer, and Rossi (2009) study the private engagement activities of the Hermes UK 
Focus Fund and conclude that its engagement activities create shareholder value, which 
also translates into the superior performance of the entire fund. As mentioned before, in 
a study which is closely related to mine, Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013) use similar 
engagement information from the same engagement service provider as I do in this chap-
ter. By analyzing a U.S. sample of corporations they conclude that successful engage-
ments translate into a 4.4% annual abnormal return. Given this evidence, corporate en-
gagements by institutional investors can benefit shareholders. 
 I contribute to this stream of literature on shareholder engagement along two main 
lines. First of all, I am the first to study the global engagement activities of one particular 
institutional investor. The literature on shareholder engagement mainly focuses on An-
glo-Saxon countries, for example, the United States and the United Kingdom. To the 
best of my knowledge, there is no evidence on shareholder engagement at the interna-
tional level. My data set allows me to study whether the geographic factors also influ-
ence an institutional shareholder’s decision to engage with a corporation. Second, anoth-
er significant contribution of my chapter is that I investigate all of the engagement activi-
ties in all three of the ESG dimensions of this engaging institution. The literature on 
(public) shareholder engagement focuses on the corporate governance engagements most 
of the time. Hence, my results provide additional evidence on the question of whether 
the shareholder engagement on corporate governance issues is driven by the same de-
terminants as the engagements on the social and environmental issues. 
                                                          
15 There is a plethora of literature on shareholder engagement from pension funds and hedge funds. Smith 
(1996) and Wahal (1996) are seminal examples of pension fund engagement in the United States. Further, 
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) as well as Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2012) and Klein and Zur (2009) are 
further famous examples on hedge fund engagement. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I present the theo-
retical background for the chapter and the corresponding hypotheses I test. In Section 
4.3, I present my data set and the empirical methods used. In Section 4.4, I show my 
empirical results. Section 4.5 summarizes the chapter and provides concluding remarks. 
4.2  Theoretical considerations and hypotheses development 
I study the engagement activities of one large UK-based asset manager that provides 
engagement services to institutional clients as an engagement agent. This agent engages 
investee corporations on behalf of institutional clients and for its own investment portfo-
lio. The institutional clients originate mainly from Europe and generally hold large, 
diversified investment portfolios. However, the relevant portfolio corporations in which 
the agent and its clients are invested in are spread around the world. A significant portion 
of the clients’ as well as the agent’s portfolio corporations are located in jurisdictions 
other than the Anglo-Saxon market. Therefore, these corporations are exposed to differ-
ent government regulations with respect to ESG matters. The difference in regulations 
raises many questions as regards to which corporations are being targeted with which 
kinds of ESG issues and which standards and expectations are applied concerning the 
investee corporations’ adopted ESG standards.  
 The fact that geography and proximity matter in the context of corporate finance, 
corporate governance, and investments is well-established in the literature.16 The re-
search finds that retail and institutional investors tend to invest in the corporations that 
are familiar to them (Huberman, 2001). The investment literature also shows that institu-
tional investors tend to invest in the stocks and the corporations that are in close prox-
imity to them (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). Further, the literature shows that these 
local, or home, investments also provide the investors with significant abnormal returns 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). In addition, both Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and 
Bodnaruk (2009) find that households are quite prone to investing in local stocks. My 
chapter is related to this stream of literature in the sense that I am investigating whether 
such a home bias also exists for shareholder engagements by institutional investors. This 
is an important question to all investors who want to engage with the corporations 
through an engagement agent that is situated in a particular geographical region. 
 More recently, the literature provides evidence that the proximity affects the govern-
ance role of the institutional investors. For example, Baik, Kang and Kim (2010) study 
local institutional investors and test whether they have informational advantages over the 
non-local institutional investors. The authors’ results confirm this claim because they 
find that the local institutional ownership is positively related to the performance of 
future stock prices. Likewise, Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) find 
that the corporations with more local institutional ownership are on average more profit-
                                                          
16 There is also literature on the effects of the proximity of the banks to their lenders that I leave out of the 
discussion for brevity. See, for example, Petersen and Rajan (2002) as well as Mian (2006). 
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able and have better quality governance than their counterparts with non-local owner-
ship. Furthermore, the authors also find that the local institutions tend to file more share-
holder proposals than the non-local institutions (Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-
Ruenzi, 2012). Hence, the local institutional investors are presumably more effective in 
monitoring the corporate actions and policies because their close proximity helps them to 
overcome information asymmetries. Thus, local institutional investors exploit their in-
formational advantage and become effective corporate monitors. 
 This entire stream of literature amplifies the fact that the geographic location of the 
corporations and the actual distance to their important shareholders matters in the con-
text of corporate finance and governance. Hence, I claim that geography is also a ma-
jor—if not the most important—determinant of the intensity of the shareholder engage-
ment by this particular engagement agent. Therefore, my first research hypothesis is the 
following: 
H4.1: The corporations from more distant markets (e.g., Japan and United States) re-
ceive significantly fewer objectives relative to the corporations domiciling in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. 
The accounting and investment literature emphasizes that the portfolios of large pension 
funds, insurance companies, and asset managers often hold many different corporate 
stocks in diversified portfolios that sometimes mimic a particular stock market index 
(e.g., Bushee, 1998). Consequently, these institutional investors often hold the biggest 
corporations from the different capital markets. These corporations are the most liquid 
and also the most visible corporations. The evidence on institutional investing suggests 
that the corporations with greater visibility have more institutional investors as share-
holders (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004). Furthermore, the research shows that 
when corporations hire investor relation firms to enhance their visibility, they can attract 
institutional investors, even to smaller corporations (Bushee and Miller, 2012). The fact 
that institutional investors tend to invest more in the stocks of large corporations implies 
that the intensity of their engagements also increases for these corporations. 
H4.2: The larger corporations receive significantly more objectives than their smaller 
counterparts. 
Regarding the determinants of successful engagements I argue in the following way. I 
conjecture that the success of engagement activities is mainly driven by geography. A 
UK-based institutional investor might not have the knowledge about corporations in very 
remotely located regions or countries and also not about the national standards regarding 
certain corporate policies. These facts could make the shareholder engagement less ef-
fective. Hence, higher information asymmetries between remotely located corporations 
and foreign institutional investors make their shareholder engagement less likely to be 
successful. 
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H4.3: Corporations from more distant markets (e.g., Japan and United States) display 
significantly lower milestones-per-objectives ratios relative to the corporations domi-
ciling in the United Kingdom. 
I test these research hypotheses in the empirical part of this chapter in order to draw 
conclusions about the role of geography in the context of the engagement activities of an 
UK-based institutional investor. 
4.3  Sample description and methods 
In this section, I present the four components of my analyses. First, I introduce the en-
gagement agent. I then continue in a second step with a description of the details of the 
engagement data. Third, I present my data sources for firm characteristics and the infor-
mation on geography. Fourth, I outline the methods used to test my research hypotheses. 
4.3.1  The engagement agent and the priority list of corporations 
The main data source for this chapter is the proprietary engagement data from the UK-
based engagement agent. The agent is a conventional asset manager that is also active in 
shareholder engagement. The assets of its total client base represent US$154 billion. The 
main activities of this engagement agent comprise the management of its clients’ funds 
as well as engaging with investee corporations on behalf of its 25 engagement clients 
that represent a combined asset base of US$82.8 billion. In particular, the engagement 
agent engages in ESG areas of the investee corporations.  
 Every year since 2006, this engagement agent sets up a priority list of corporations 
for which engagement in ESG areas is of the highest importance to both the agent and its 
corresponding engagement clients. The clients generally communicate upfront on which 
portfolio corporations they have specific ESG concerns for. The actual decision about 
specific engagements at particular corporations is then solely at the discretion of the 
engagement agent. That is, the ultimate engagement decision is undertaken by the re-
sponsible investment and engagement team of the asset manager. 
 I base my sample on all of the priority corporations that appeared on the list between 
2006 and the first quarter of 2011. Over this time period, I identify 397 unique corpora-
tions from 37 different countries. For all of the 397 priority corporations in my sample, I 
collect information on all of their engagement activities between 2006 and 2011. As the 
construction of the priority list is a continuous process, the composition of the list 
changes yearly. That is, some corporations drop out, new corporations are included, and 
some corporations remain on the list for several years. Sometimes, the corporations that 
drop out are subsequently added back. Hence, the number of corporations varies over 
time. I include every corporation that is on a priority list in a given year in my sample, 
leading to 993 firm-year observations. 
 As part of the engagement agent’s process, there is also a continuous yearly back-
reporting to the client base. Every year, the clients of the engagement product receive a 
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detailed report on all of the engagements undertaken along with their milestones. Be-
cause these reports are in part based on the same engagement information that I use in 
this chapter, I can verify that the information on the priority corporations is trustworthy. 
Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013) make a similar point concerning the reliability of the 
data from the same asset manager. 
4.3.2  The engagement data 
Given the proprietary engagement data for all of the priority corporations from 2006–
2011, I manually construct my data set. After reading all of the communication material, 
I first code the data in such a way that I am able to set up the panel of priority corpora-
tions. The engagement information for my sample of corporations is very detailed. For 
every corporation, I receive the full record of communication material over the time 
period from 1999–Q1/2011. These records comprise detailed information and descrip-
tions of the nature of the engagements, the topics and objectives that were discussed with 
a particular investee corporation, and records about the successful engagement activities. 
This information comes from all of the telephone calls, emails, letters, and management 
meetings and the like.  
 For every engagement activity, the engagement agent indicates which topics were 
addressed and discussed with the target corporations. For example, if the engagement 
agent discusses the compensation structure of corporation X with the management team 
and explicitly asks for a change in the compensation policies, the engagement agent 
specifies in its engagement data that during this particular management meeting the issue 
of corporate governance, and in particular, executive compensation was discussed. In the 
following, the issues that the institutional investor has discussed with investee corpora-
tions are also called objectives.17 
 The objectives that the engagement agent raises at investee corporations can fall into 
nine different categories: (1) corporate governance, (2) sustainability management and 
reporting, (3) business ethics, (4) human rights, (5) labor standards, (6) public health, (7) 
environmental management, (8) ecosystem services, and (9) climate change. A full list 
of the topics are in Appendix 4.A of this chapter18. The engagement agent’s internal 
reporting system has changed over time. This evolution means that the aforementioned 
nine categories are only valid after 2005. Before 2005, the agent classified the themes 
into governance (old), environment (old), social (old), and sector specific (as displayed 
in the lower right part of Appendix 4.A). In case that I still identified old classifications 
and to avoid erroneous classifications of the objectives, I subsume all of the old themes 
and all of the corresponding new themes into my newly constructed and consistent ob-
jective classifications: governance (new), environment (new), social (new), and sector 
                                                          
17 In the remainder of this chapter I use the terms objectives and issues interchangeably. 
18 Every topic has also subcategories, which make an even more detailed classification of engagement activities 
possible. A full list of all possible objectives topics and corresponding sub-categories is given in Appendix 4.A 
of this chapter. 
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specific (new). Governance (new) consists of (1) corporate governance, (2) sustainability 
management and reporting, and governance (old). The social (new) category consists of 
(3) business ethics, (4) human rights, (5) labor standards, (6) public health, and social 
(old). The new environment category consists of (7) environmental management, (8) 
ecosystem services, (9) climate change, and environment (old). These new classifica-
tions make separate investigations of E, S, and G engagement types possible, which has 
not been done before in the literature. 
 Next to the information on the objectives discussed with a corporation, the engage-
ment agent also provides information on the success of its engagements. More specifi-
cally, the agent records so-called Milestones when a specific engagement activity in a 
particular topical area leads to a change at an investee corporation. These milestones are 
directly linked to the topics of the objectives and thus allow me to link the objectives to 
the agent’s corresponding engagement successes. Here, I follow Dimson, Karakas, and 
Li (2013) and assume that this information on successful engagements is reliable and 
trustworthy because it is the same information that the engagement agent supplies its 
clients.  
 Then, I calculate the yearly number of objectives raised in each of the aforemen-
tioned subject areas as well as the corresponding number of milestones for every sample 
corporation. I read all of the engagement information for every corporation separately 
and manually and then compile it into one panel of corporations. Overall, several corpo-
rations appear multiple times leading to a full data set of 993 firm-year observations with 
a total of 6,837 objectives and 592 milestones. 
4.3.3  Firm-level characteristics and geographic information 
To answer my main research questions, I need to control for firm characteristics and 
geographic variables that influence either the engagement actions by the shareholders or 
the corporate financing decisions in general. 
 Regarding the geographical background of the corporations, I assign one of the five 
following geographical regions or countries to each of my sample corporations by means 
of indicator variables: United States, Continental Europe, United Kingdom, Japan, and 
All other countries. I retrieve the information on the country of origin from Thomson 
Reuters’ Worldscope.  
 All of the remaining firm-level information also comes from Worldscope. I control 
for various firm characteristics that play a role in corporate governance and/or share-
holder engagements according to the literature. I am especially interested in the investee 
corporation’s size, leverage, valuation, financial performance, and ownership structure. 
These factors are important determinants of the engagement decisions of institutional 
investors, especially hedge funds (e.g., Klein and Zur, 2009; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas, 2008).  
 My measure for the firm size is the natural logarithm of the (Total assets). I believe 
that firm size is also an appropriate measure for visibility because the largest corpora-
tions are also included in the country’s major stock market indices and thus are more 
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visible to foreign institutional investors. The literature documents empirically that insti-
tutional investors prefer to invest in larger corporations in an international context (e.g., 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008). 
Further, I construct a measure for an investee corporation’s Leverage by scaling the total 
debt by the total assets. I also control for whether the sample corporations are paying 
dividends by adding an indicator variable that equals one if the corporation pays out 
dividends to common shareholders and zero otherwise (Dividend payer?). Next to these 
variables, I also use a performance variable, one-year sales growth (1yr sales growth), to 
investigate the effect of the past performance on the engagement agent’s decision to 
engage with the portfolio corporations. The literature shows that the past performance 
significantly influences the likelihood that the corporations will receive shareholder 
proposals (e.g., Chapter 2).  
 To control for the ownership structure of the corporations, I use the percentage of 
closely held shares of the corporate insiders, other corporations, and pension funds 
(Closely held shares (%))19 because the literature finds that the ownership of corporate 
insiders and also institutional investors is an important determinant of successful private 
negotiations (see Chapter 3). Lastly, the valuation measure for the sample corporations is 
Tobin’s Q. I follow Ferreira and Matos (2008) and calculate Tobin’s Q as the total assets 
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity over the total assets.  
 Because a country’s investor protection level also plays a role in the corporate gov-
ernance quality (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; 2000a, 
2000b), I also control for the investors’ rights at the country level. To do so, I use the 
revised anti-director rights index developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008).20 This index is based on the original index developed by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and has been updated by Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). In general, this index represents the quality 
of minority shareholder protection in a country and is based on six different dimensions. 
Every dimension is represented by an indicator variable that equals one if the protection 
mechanism is in place and zero otherwise. The sum of all six dimensions for each coun-
try comprises then the revised version of the anti-director rights index and can range 
from zero to six in which the higher values indicate better minority shareholder protec-
tion.21 
 Lastly, I also take into account the information on all of the past engagement activi-
ties. That is, I control for the number of objectives in the past year as well as for the 
                                                          
19 Worldscope defines % of closely held shares as the ratio of the number of closely held shares over the num-
ber of common shares outstanding. The number of closely held shares includes all “shares held by officers, 
directors, and their immediate families, shares held in trust, shares of the company held by any other corpora-
tions, shares held by pension/benefit plans, and shares held by individuals who hold 5 % or more of the out-
standing shares.”  
20 The anti-director rights index is publicly available on Professor La Porta’s website: http://mba.tuck.-
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html. 
21 For more details on the construction of the revised anti-director rights index see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008, p. 453-456). 
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number of milestones achieved at a given corporation. I conjecture that the level of past 
objectives has an influence on the current intensity of the engagements and their corre-
sponding successes. This influence is important because the private engagements cru-
cially depend on confidential and trustful relationships between the institutional share-
holder and the investee corporation. 
Appendix 4.B outlines all of the variables and their underlying calculations and defini-
tions. 
4.3.4  Methods 
To analyze the intensity of the shareholder engagements, I look at the number of objec-
tives at the sample corporations. Even though I focus on the priority list of corporations, 
they do not always display objectives. Consequently, several cases exist in which the 
priority corporations do not display any engagement activities in the year during which 
they are on the list. I adopt a Tobit regression approach to shed light on the intensity of 
the shareholder engagements. The main Tobit regression model has the following form: 
 
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐݏ௜,௧	
= ߙ + ߚଵ(ܩ݁݋݃ݎܽ݌ℎ݅ܿ	݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊)௜ + ߚଶ(ܲܽݏݐ ݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ ܿℎܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ)௜,௧ିଵ
+	ߚଷ(ܨ݅ݎ݉ − ܽ݊݀	ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܿℎܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ)௜,௧ିଵ + ߚସ(ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ)௜,௧ିଵ 
(4.1) 
 
where the Number of engagements is equal to the absolute number of objectives at cor-
poration i in year t. The dependent variable is subsample specific. That is, for the analy-
sis of the entire sample the variable equals one if any kind of objective has been raised 
with the corporation, whereas for the sub-samples of ESG engagements, the variable is 
equal one if at least one objective exists in these subsamples. The Geographic location is 
a dummy variable that controls for a corporation’s domicile. In the following empirical 
analysis, I treat the United Kingdom as the base category.  
 The Past engagement characteristics is a vector of past engagement variables (i.e., 
the number of objectives received last year and the number of milestones a corporation 
displays last year), Firm- and country characteristics is a vector of firm characteristics 
(i.e., corporation size, leverage, dividend payer indicator, past 1-year sales growth, 
percentage of closely held shares, and Tobin’s Q), as well as the country-level character-
istics (revised anti-director rights index). Lastly, the Controls is a vector of variables 
that control for year and industry effects. All of the explanatory variables (except for the 
geographical location variables) on the right-hand-side of the equation are measured at 
year t-1, and all of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
reduce the effects of outliers. 
 In a second step, I research the determinants of the likelihood of successful engage-
ments: milestones. To do so, I adopt a Tobit regression framework of the following kind: 
 
C H A P T E R  4  
 104 
#	ܯ݈݅݁ݏݐ݋݊݁ݏ௜,௧
#	ܱܾ݆݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ ݎܽ݅ݏ݁݀௜,௧
= ߙ + ߚଵ(Geographic	location)௜, + ߚଶ(ܲܽݏݐ ݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ ܿℎܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ)௜,௧ିଵ
+	ߚଷ(ܨ݅ݎ݉ − ܽ݊݀	ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܿℎܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ)௜,௧ିଵ + ߚସ(ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ)௜,௧ିଵ
(4.2) 
 
The dependent variable in this Tobit specification is the ratio of the total number of 
milestones achieved and the total number of objectives raised in any topic area. This 
gives a clean measure of success because I put the absolute number of milestones in 
relation to the number of objectives raised. All of the other explanatory variable vectors 
are defined as before. 
 An investigation of the absolute number of milestones (by a count model or a lo-
gistic analysis) could yield biased results as the number of milestones is ultimately driv-
en by the number of objectives. Thus, it is important to note that I solely focus on the 
corporations that actually were targeted. I do so, to reduce the effect of a potential selec-
tion bias in my data. Therefore, I calculate the real probability of successful shareholder 
engagements. For example, a corporation that displays no objectives in 2007 is not in-
cluded in the analyses, whereas a corporation with objectives in 2008 but no milestones 
in that particular year is assigned a zero for the value of the dependent variable. 
 Next, I present the empirical results of my analyses. I start with a presentation of the 
summary statistics on the sample of corporations. 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1  Summary statistics 
I start with a description of the temporal evolution and geographical dimension of the 
priority list.  
4.4.1.1 What does the priority list look like? 
Table 4.1 depicts the major summary statistics of the priority list. Panel A of Table 4.1 
shows the temporal evolution of the priority list. One sees that the list starts in 2006 with 
186 different corporations. This number of corporations develops over time; it reaches 
its peak in 2008 with 214 corporations and its all-time low in 2010 with 112 corpora-
tions. In 2011, the list comprises 132 corporations. There is also quite some variation in 
the list composition as indicated by the number of corporations that are added and 
dropped every year. In 2007, more corporations were added than dropped. This trend 
changes afterwards; from 2008 to 2010, there were always more corporations dropped 
than added. This trend alludes to high turnover within the priority lists. The last column 
of Panel A also emphasizes the fact that there is a substantial part of the added corpora-
tions that is completely new to the list.  
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Table 4.1: Priority list statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics on the composition of the priority list under investigation. The second 
column displays the number of corporations present on the yearly priority list. In the third column, I present the 
number of corporations that are added to the list in that year. The fourth column shows the number of corpora-
tions which are dropped at the end of that year (i.e., these corporations do not appear on the priority list one 
year later). Lastly, column five shows the number of corporations that appear for the first time on the priority 
list in that year. 
Panel A: Temporal Priority List Evolution   
Year # Firms # added # dropped # firms first time 
priority list 
2006 186 - 88 186 
2007 165 67 3 67 
2008 214 52 93 43 
2009 184 63 99 52 
2010 112 27 36 18 
2011 132 56 - 31 
Panel B: Geographical Distribution of Firms   
  # Unique Firms % of total # Firm-years % of total 
United States 75 18.9% 211 21.2% 
United Kingdom 84 21.2% 240 24.2% 
Continental Europe 108 27.2% 285 28.7% 
Japan 23 5.8% 39 3.9% 
All Other Countries 107 27.0% 218 22.0% 
 
Panel B of Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics of the geographical composition of 
the priority list. A substantial amount of the corporations originate from Continental 
Europe (108) and all other countries (107). Furthermore, 84 and 75 corporations origi-
nate from the United Kingdom and the United States respectively. From these figures, a 
direct home bias in the shareholder engagements is not visible. However, the last two 
columns of Panel B show a more interesting picture. There, I display the number of firm-
years (column 3) and the percentage share of firm-years in the different geographical 
regions (column 4). I observe that the corporations from Continental Europe are most 
often included in the sample (285 firm-year observations or 28.7% of all firm-years), 
followed by corporations from the United Kingdom (240, 24.2%), and all other countries 
(218). The data also show that on average the corporations from the United Kingdom are 
included in the priority lists 2.86 times, corporations from the United States 2.81 times, 
and the Continental European corporations 2.64 times. This finding points to the fact that 
the UK corporations seem to be the targets of the objectives by the engagement agent 
more often than, for example, the corporations originating from Continental Europe, 
Japan, and all other countries.  
4.4.1.2 The temporal and topical scope of engagements and successes 
The engagement intensity and success are time dependent as well. Table 4.2 provides 
some evidence on the temporal evolution of the engagements and successes by sub-
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topics. Panel A depicts the evolution of the engagements over time. I find that the en-
gagement agent raised 6,837 objectives during the sample period at all 397 corporations. 
On a firm-year basis, this means 6.885 objectives per corporation in a given year. My 
results also show that the highest number of absolute objectives occurs in 2009, but the 
highest average number of objectives per corporation appears in 2010 with 12.69 objec-
tives per corporation. 
 The following three main columns depict the same statistics for the different sub-
samples of ESG engagements. I see that the engagement agent is mostly active in the 
field of corporate governance with a total of 2,771 objectives, followed by social objec-
tives (2,162) and environmental (1,902). However, this result is mostly driven by the 
years 2006 and 2007 in which the vast majority of objectives fell into the category of 
corporate governance. Starting in 2008, this picture changes. In 2008, 571 objectives 
were raised in the social field, followed by governance (567) and environmental objec-
tives (388).  
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In the following year, 2009, the governance objectives were overtaken by the environ-
mental objectives (683 vs. 651). In the last complete year of my sample, 2010, the social 
topics attracted the most attention with 576 objectives, followed by governance (499) 
and environmental (346). I conclude from this trend that the engagement agent is not 
only engaging with corporations on corporate governance objectives. Rather the opposite 
is true, the engagement agent becomes active in social and environmental topics. This 
finding alludes to the growing importance of the sustainable environmental and social 
corporate practices to the institutional shareholders.  
 Panel B of Table 4.2 presents the temporal evolution of the milestones for the entire 
sample and the three topic subsamples. Over time, the engagement agent becomes more 
and more effective in promoting change at investee corporations. The third and fourth 
column of Panel B present statistics on the entire sample. I find that the highest absolute 
number of milestones were achieved in 2008 and 2009 with 128 and 155 milestones 
respectively. On a per-firm basis, the engagement agent on average achieved almost one 
milestone per priority corporation in 2009 and 2010 (0.842 and 0.911 respectively). In 
total, the engagement agent achieved 592 milestones at 397 unique corporations (1.5 
milestones per corporation on average) that equals 0.596 milestones per firm-year. Re-
garding the three subsamples, I find that in general, the corporate governance engage-
ments are the most successful over the entire sample period (307 milestones). Every 
year, corporate governance milestones occur more frequently than the environmental and 
the social milestones. The only exception occurs in the year 2009 in which 67 environ-
mental milestones were achieved with 62 governance and 26 social milestones.  
 In Panel C of Table 4.2, I set Panel A (objectives) and Panel B (milestones) in rela-
tion to each other. I do so to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of corporate en-
gagement by the engagement agent. Panel C presents the milestones-per-objectives ratio, 
which is the number of milestones divided by the number of objectives raised. Hence, 
this ratio gives the percentage of successful engagements. Note that this measure is very 
conservatively chosen. It does not account for the fact that multiple objectives in a par-
ticular topic area have to be raised to achieve a milestone. A lot of engagements take 
place on a continuous basis, including writing multiple letters or emails about the same 
topic. I do not pick up this repetitive aspect of the private engagements with the mile-
stones-per-objectives ratio. 
 Panel C indicates that the overall milestones-per-objectives ratio is 8.7%. The high-
est ratio is achieved in 2006 with 12.3%.22 Looking at a different subsample, I find that 
the milestones-per-objectives ratio is always the highest for corporate governance issues. 
One exception is 2009 during which the environmental milestones were more often 
achieved in relative terms (9.8% vs. 9.5% for governance issues). Notably, in 2008–
2010, the social objectives display the lowest milestones-per-objectives ratio. Overall, I 
conclude that the engagement agent is successful in promoting change at the portfolio 
                                                          
22 I do neglect the highest ratio in 2011 because I do not have the engagement information for the entire calen-
dar year. 
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corporations. On average, it is most successful in the governance domain of ESG, fol-
lowed by environmental and social issues. 
4.4.1.3 The geographical dispersion of engagements and milestones 
I now turn to the summary statistics on the engagements by taking into account the geo-
graphical location of the target corporations. Table 4.3 presents the corresponding statis-
tics. Panel A of Table 4.3 shows that the highest number of objectives appear at UK 
corporations (2,159), followed by the US corporations and the Continental European 
corporations (1,783 and 1,650 respectively). However, as already noted in Table 4.1, the 
number of firm-years for the UK corporations is also the highest. To account for this 
finding, I scale the number of objectives by the number of firm-years for every geo-
graphical region/country. The result is displayed in column four of Panel A. The objec-
tives per firm-year are the highest for the UK corporations with on average nine objec-
tives per firm-year. The US corporations display a similar average with 8.45 objectives 
per firm-year. The corporations originating from Continental Europe, all other countries, 
and Japan display substantially less objectives per firm-year: 5.79, 5.12, and 3.31 respec-
tively. These results point to the fact that the UK corporations receive proportionally 
more objectives than the corporations originating from any other geographical region.  
 A similar picture arises for the successful engagements. The absolute number of 
milestones is the highest for the corporations from the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Continental Europe. Accounting for the frequency of the occurrences of these 
corporations in the priority lists, I find that the US corporations have the highest mile-
stone number per firm-year with 0.82. The UK corporations have on average 0.8 mile-
stones per firm-year. Again, the corporations from all other countries have much fewer 
milestones on average. It is important to note that the Japanese corporations have the 
highest milestones-per-objectives ratio (13.2%), followed by the US corporations 
(9.6%), and the Continental European corporations (9.3%). The fact that the UK corpo-
rations have a milestones-per-objectives ratio of just 8.8% and that they also get targeted 
more frequently implies that the UK corporations are more prone to engagements. But, it 
also implies that the engagement agent is not able to successfully engage with these 
corporations on average even though the frequency of the engagements is higher.  
 Panel B of Table 4.3 displays the same statistics for the three subcategories of en-
gagement. Generally, the same patterns emerge as in Panel A. I find that the UK corpo-
rations are the most prone to ESG objectives. Further, I find that the engagement agent 
successfully engages on corporate governance issues at the Japanese and the US corpora-
tions, which have milestones-per-objectives ratios of 15.8% and 14.3% respectively. The 
environmental engagements are the most successful in the Continental European corpo-
rations (11.2%), while the social objectives are mostly honored by the Japanese corpora-
tions (12.5%). On the contrary, the US and the UK corporations have similar milestones-
per-objectives ratios with respect to the environmental engagements (7.9 and 7.3% re-
spectively). I also find that the US corporations are apparently not likely to honor the 
agent’s social engagements. 
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Overall, the picture that emerges from these descriptive analyses of the engagement 
patterns emphasizes the fact that there is quite a bit of engagement activity going on 
from the side of the engagement agent. I observe increasing engagement activity in the 
fields of the environmental and the social issues. Nonetheless, corporate governance 
issues dominate the engagement spectrum of the engagement agent. I also find that the 
UK corporations display the most objectives on a firm-year basis followed by the US 
corporations. The US corporations have on average the highest number of successful 
engagements. I find some variation in these statistics when I split the sample up into the 
different engagement topics of corporate governance, environmental, and social issues. 
4.4.2 Empirical analyses 
In this section, I investigate the determinants of the engagements empirically. To do so, I 
first present the descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analyses. Table 4.4 
presents the most important statistics. This table shows that every observation displays 
on average 6.89 objectives and 0.6 milestones. Furthermore, the average corporation in 
my sample has US$ 262,921 million in total assets (median value of US$ 43,494 mil-
lion). On average, the leverage ratio for my observations is equal to 23.6%, the past one-
year sales growth is equal to 13%, and the percentage of closely held shares is 22.9%. 
The average Tobin’s Q in my sample is 1.67, and 91% of the corporations pay dividends. 
I investigate next how these statistics relate empirically to the frequency of the engage-
ments by the engagement agent. 
4.4.2.1 The determinants of engagement intensity 
In the following, I present my empirical results regarding the determinants of the intensi-
ty of the engagement activities. Table 4.5 presents the main findings of this analysis. 
Table 4.5 presents four different Tobit regression models taking into account the entire 
sample of observations. In every model, the dependent variable is the absolute number of 
objectives that a corporation receives in a given year, irrespective of the topic that is 
addressed. In Model 1 of Table 4.5, I only regress the geographical variables on the 
number of objectives. The results of Model 1 show that all four regions have a signifi-
cantly negative impact on the predicted number of objectives a corporation receives. 
That is, the corporations originating from these four regions receive significantly fewer 
objectives than the UK corporations (the base case in this analysis). To illustrate the 
economic differences in the engagement intensity, I present the predicted number of 
engagements based on the relevant fitted empirical model. Model 1 predicts that a UK 
corporation receives 6.77 objectives while a US corporation hypothetically gets 4.53 
objectives. Hence, corporations originating from the United States receive on average 
2.24 less objectives in a given year than a UK corporation. An average Continental Eu-
ropean corporation receives just 1.54 objectives, as predicted by this empirical model. 
Given these results, I find supportive evidence for my first research hypothesis, H4.1: the 
UK corporations receive significantly more objectives than the non-UK corporations. 
However, I so far do not control for any other firm characteristics that might influence 
the engagement intensity. This is now done in Model 2. 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analyses. The main data source 
for firm-level financial variables is Worldscope. The information on the number of objectives as well as on the 
number of milestones comes directly from the institutional investor. Continuous variables have been winso-
rized at 1% and 99%. 
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. 
United States 993 0.212 0.000 0.409 
Continental Europe 993 0.287 0.000 0.453 
Japan 993 0.039 0.000 0.194 
Rest of World 993 0.220 0.000 0.414 
UK 993 0.242 0.000 0.428 
# Objectives 993 6.885 4.000 9.570 
# Milestones 993 0.596 0.000 1.012 
Revised Anti-Director Rights Index 991 3.892 4.000 1.042 
Total Assets ($ mil.) 983 262,921.10 43,493.62 572,123.50 
Log (1+Total Assets) 983 10.669 10.680 2.009 
Total Debt / Total Assets (%) 983 0.236 0.225 0.145 
Dividend payer dummy 983 0.910 1.000 0.286 
Past 1-year sales growth (%) 982 0.130 0.098 0.247 
Closely held shares (%) 942 0.229 0.133 0.257 
Tobin's Q 982 1.666 1.334 1.092 
 
In Model 2, I additionally control for firm characteristics. The addition of these variables 
does not materially change the results for the geographical control variables. I now find 
even stronger results in favor of my home bias hypothesis, H4.1: non-UK corporations 
receive significantly fewer objectives than the UK corporations that implies that the 
engagement agent is much more active at the UK corporations. My model predicts that 
on average a UK corporation on the priority list receives 6.96 objectives while a US or 
Continental European corporation displays a predicted number of objectives: 2.59, and 
0.32 respectively. Furthermore, in absolute terms, an average Japanese corporation gets 
9.62 objectives less in a particular year than a UK corporation. Overall, these results 
allude to a home bias in the engagement intensity. 
 Regarding the firm characteristics influencing the intensity of the engagement, I find 
that the larger corporations receive significantly more objectives than the smaller corpo-
rations. This is supporting evidence in favor of my second research hypothesis, H4.2. 
Two explanations are possible for this result. First, the larger and more visible corpora-
tions are simply more often included in the institutional clients’ portfolios and hence, are 
also more likely to be frequently targeted. Secondly, the larger and more visible corpora-
tions are possibly more responsive to the shareholder engagements. Thus, the engage-
ment agent focuses its engagement activities on these corporations because the expected 
likelihood of engagement success also drives the investor’s engagement decision. 
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Table 4.5: Determinants of engagement intensity 
This table shows the four different Tobit models. In each of those models, the dependent variable is the total 
number of objectives a corporation receives from the engagement agent. All independent variables are meas-
ured at t-1, one year before the engagement takes place. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level respectively. In all models, I control for time and industry effects. Standard errors are robust and 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust P-values are 
presented below the coefficients in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
United States -2.241* -4.371*** -2.123 -0.896 
 (0.072) (0.000) (0.191) (0.573) 
Continental Europe -5.234*** -6.632*** -4.871*** -2.523* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.062) 
Japan -7.693*** -9.616*** -8.988*** -5.252** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
All Other Countries -7.954*** -5.258*** -4.225*** -1.464 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.281) 
# Objectives t-1    0.337*** 
    (0.000) 
# Milestones t-1    0.844** 
    (0.013) 
# Years on priority list    0.295 
    (0.499) 
Anti-director rights index   1.155** 0.589 
   (0.042) (0.304) 
Firm size  2.488*** 2.573*** 1.505*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -4.227* -4.431* -2.726 
  (0.074) (0.061) (0.231) 
Dividend payer?  1.259 1.027 0.944 
  (0.374) (0.470) (0.462) 
1yr sales growth  -3.077** -3.194** -2.443** 
  (0.019) (0.016) (0.048) 
Closely held shares (%)  -3.986** -3.542* -3.357* 
  (0.038) (0.063) (0.082) 
Tobin's Q  0.283 0.323 0.207 
  (0.237) (0.179) (0.384) 
Constant -25.578*** -50.563*** -57.568*** -50.701*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Observations 939 882 882 882 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.082 0.100 0.101 0.119 
 
My results also indicate that leverage is negatively related to the presence of the en-
gagements, implying that highly levered corporations receive significantly fewer en-
gagement objectives. This result is consistent with Jensen (1986) who argues that lever-
age can act as a corporate governance device in restricting managers from making un-
T H E  G E O G R A P H Y  O F  S H A R E H O L D E R  E N G A G E M E N T  
 115
profitable investments. Consistent with the evidence on engagement through shareholder 
proposals (see, e.g., Chapter 2), I find that the less profitable corporations are more often 
the target of the engagements by the engagement agent. The negative and significant 
coefficient on the 1yr sales growth variable means that the more profitable corporations 
receive fewer objectives than the less profitable corporations (or corporations with a 
negative sales growth over the previous year). I also document a negative and significant 
relation between the percentage of closely held shares and the engagement intensity. 
This result implies that the corporations that have a more concentrated shareholder base 
of corporate insiders, other corporations, and pension plans receive significantly fewer 
objectives than the corporations with a more dispersed ownership structure. I argue that 
more ownership in the hands of the corporate insiders and the pension plans make the 
other institutional investors less likely to engage with such corporations. The reasoning 
is that there might already be some engagement going on from other investors on similar 
topics that makes the engagement agent’s additional engagement redundant. This expla-
nation is very similar to the well-known free-riding problem in corporate finance as 
established by Grossman and Hart (1980). 
 In the remaining models of Table 4.5, I also control for the country-level governance 
quality and the past engagement activities at investee corporations to establish a clear 
relation between the geography and the engagement intensity. In particular, Model 3 
controls for the revised version of the anti-director rights index as constructed by 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). As Model 3 shows, the index 
itself is positively and significantly related to the engagement intensity. It suggests that 
the engagement intensity is significantly higher in the countries where the minority 
shareholders are better protected. The inclusion of this country-level variable changes 
my previous geographic results slightly. Still, the corporations from the non-UK coun-
tries receive significantly fewer objectives than the UK corporations. However, the coef-
ficient on the US dummy variable becomes nonsignificant, yet still negative. Hence, my 
main conclusion about a home bias still holds. 
 In Model 4, I also control for the past engagement activities of the engagement agent 
at investee corporations as well as for the number of years a corporation was on the pri-
ority list before the engagement took place. Essentially, all of the signs of the coeffi-
cients from Model 3 remain the same. However, the average size US corporations and 
the average size corporations originating from all other countries receive insignificantly 
fewer objectives than the average UK corporation.  
 My remaining results suggest that the past engagement activities at the corporations 
increase the number of objectives an investee corporation receives in the current period. 
For example, assuming that an investee corporation gets ten more objectives in period t-
1, this increases the number of objectives in period t0 by 3.37. Similarly, if a corporation 
displays one more milestone in the past period t-1, then it receives 0.844 more objectives 
in the current period t0. These results allude to the evolution of a relationship between 
the engagement agent and its investee corporations. The more objectives and milestones 
a particular priority list corporation has in a particular year, the higher the engagement 
intensity in the subsequent year. The number of years on the priority list prior to the 
engagement does not influence the engagement intensity. 
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 The results with respect to the firm characteristics remain largely unaffected by the 
inclusion of the anti-director rights index and the past engagement activities in Models 3 
and 4.  
 Overall, the results of Table 4.5 indicate a home bias in the engagement intensity. 
The UK corporations receive significantly more objectives than the corporations from 
the United States, Japan, Continental Europe, and all other countries. My results support 
hypotheses H4.1, and H4.2.  
4.4.2.2 Is the size effect persistent across countries and regions? 
In the analysis so far, I hypothesize that the larger corporations receive significantly 
more objectives than the smaller corporations. The coefficient on my firm size variable 
is positive and significant as Table 4.5 shows. However, this coefficient represents the 
average effect of firm size on the engagement intensity. I cannot judge whether this 
effect also holds for different sub-regions and countries as well. Therefore, Table 4.6 
provides some more statistics on the size of my sample corporations within different 
regions and countries. Panel A of Table 4.6 presents some summary statistics on the 
distribution of firm sizes in different countries and regions. The median firm sizes for the 
different regions and countries are quite similar. The median Continental European cor-
poration is the largest among all five different regions, followed by the Japanese, US, 
and the UK corporations. I also find that the sample of the UK corporations has the wid-
est spread between the smallest and the largest corporations, which indicates that the 
engagement agent targets a very wide spectrum of UK corporations. In contrast, the 
spread between the largest and smallest corporations in the other regions is much small-
er.  
 Panel B presents the average number of objectives for the corporations in the differ-
ent size quantiles. Panel B of Table 4.6 discloses that there is a size effect present in all 
five regions and countries except for Japan. I find that the difference in the average 
number of objectives between the largest and the smallest size quantiles is significant at 
the 1% level in the United Kingdom and the United States and at the 10% level in Conti-
nental Europe and at the 5% level in all other countries in the sample. For the United 
Kingdom and the United States, I even find that the second and fourth size quantiles 
receive on average significantly more objectives than the first and third quartiles. I con-
clude that firm size is an important driver of the engagement intensity.23 
  
                                                          
23 I do find similar results for the effect of corporate size on the engagement intensity in Tobit regressions for 
the five geographic subsamples by regressing the total number of objectives on those control variables included 
in Model 4 of Table 4.5. Similarly, the results do not materially differ when I add an ordinal variable ranging 
from 1-5 for each size quintile per geographical region as the independent size variable. The size effect remains 
significant and positive implying that larger corporations receive substantially more engagements despite the 
different distributions of the size variable in different geographical regions.  
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4.4.2.3 The determinants of engagement intensity in ESG topics 
The results of the analysis in Table 4.5 hold for the entire sample of the engagements. 
Do the same geographical patterns hold for the three subsamples of corporate govern-
ance, environmental, and social engagements as well? To answer this question, I under-
take the same analysis for these three subsamples. Table 4.7 presents the results. In 
Model 1 of Table 4.7, I study the intensity of corporate governance engagements, while 
in Models 2 and 3 I investigate social and environmental engagements respectively.24 
For the number of corporate governance objectives, I find similar results as for the entire 
sample. Relative to the UK corporations, the Continental European and the Japanese 
corporations receive significantly fewer objectives. Looking at the results for the social 
objectives, I find nonsignificant influences for the geographical locations of the target 
corporations on the engagement intensity.  
 This finding could imply that the social standards are of equal importance at all of 
the corporations irrespective of the corporation’s country or region of origin. The im-
plementation of certain social policies is therefore not necessarily driven by the geo-
graphic locations of the corporations. Another explanation could be that national regula-
tions regarding social policies might not be that much stronger than the national stand-
ards on governance and environmental standards. 
 With respect to environmental objectives, I find that the Japanese corporations re-
ceive significantly fewer objectives than the UK corporations. Additionally, the results 
suggest that the larger corporations receive significantly more objectives of any kind 
than their smaller counterparts. 
 Taken together, these findings reinforce my previous finding of a home bias in the 
engagements. However, the results for the entire sample are much stronger in statistical 
and economic terms. These results seem to be driven especially by corporate governance 
and environmental engagements, as Table 4.7 suggests. 
 
  
                                                          
24 The analyses conducted in Table 4.7 use exactly the same models as in Table 4.5. I replace the two variables 
total number of objectives and milestones in t-1 with the total number of objectives/milestones for every sub-
category of engagements. Furthermore, as robustness, I also control in unreported results for the simultaneous 
presence of ESG engagements. The results do not substantially differ. 
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Table 4.7: Determinants of engagement intensity per theme 
This table shows three different Tobit models. In Model 1, the dependent variable is equal to the number of 
corporate governance (CG) objectives a corporation receives in a given year, in Model 2 the dependent varia-
ble is the total number of social objectives, and in Model 3 the dependent variable is the number of environ-
mental objectives. All independent variables are measured at t-1, one year before the engagement takes place. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels respectively. In all models, I control for time 
and industry effects. Standard errors are robust and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. 
  Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
 Governance Social Environmental 
United States -0.096 -0.130 -0.600 
 (0.904) (0.877) (0.438) 
Continental Europe -1.797** -0.623 -0.656 
 (0.010) (0.383) (0.305) 
Japan -1.887* -1.518 -3.655*** 
 (0.058) (0.197) (0.002) 
All Other Countries -0.621 -0.452 -0.766 
 (0.366) (0.555) (0.252) 
# Objectives (per topic) t-1 0.367*** 0.355*** 0.289*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
# Milestones (per topic) t-1 0.820*** 1.187** 0.840* 
 (0.008) (0.026) (0.099) 
# Years on priority list 0.238 0.472* -0.147 
 (0.258) (0.066) (0.479) 
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.202 0.288 0.481* 
 (0.457) (0.301) (0.079) 
Firm Size 0.811*** 0.573*** 0.671*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.556 -1.602 -1.842 
 (0.658) (0.286) (0.114) 
Dividend Payer? 0.423 1.000 -0.310 
 (0.537) (0.157) (0.655) 
1yr Sales Growth -1.022* -0.168 -1.714** 
 (0.083) (0.826) (0.016) 
Closely held Shares (%) -0.538 -1.543 -1.315 
 (0.557) (0.139) (0.185) 
Tobin's Q 0.019 0.219 -0.025 
 (0.891) (0.112) (0.869) 
Constant -25.645*** -30.076*** -21.237*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Number of Observations 882 882 882 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.137 0.140 0.139 
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4.4.2.4 Is geography or legal jurisdiction the underlying driver of engagement 
intensity? 
The corporate finance literature shows that the jurisdiction of the incorporation matters 
when it comes to corporate financing decisions and corporate governance structures. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) draw an important distinction be-
tween the common-law and the civil-law countries. The authors show that the corpora-
tions from common-law countries are generally exposed to better investor protection. In 
order to rule out the possibility that the effect of the geographical locations of the priori-
ty corporations on the engagement intensity is driven by the legal jurisdiction, and hence 
the target corporation’s exposure level to investor protection, I conduct a robustness 
check. This analysis draws on the models specified in the previous section. Now, I re-
place the geographical locations of the target corporations with a binary variable indicat-
ing whether the corporation originates from a common- or civil-law country. I focus only 
on all of the non-UK corporations to get the unbiased effect of the legal jurisdiction on 
the engagement intensity. Table 4.8 presents the results of this exercise. 
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Table 4.8: Additional analysis: Legal jurisdiction 
This table shows the results of one Tobit model. The dependent variable is the 
absolute number of objectives a corporation receives. All independent variables 
are measured at t-1, one year before the engagement takes place. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels respectively. I control for in-
dustry and year effects. The models displayed here just take corporations into 
account that originate from countries other than the UK. Standard errors are ro-
bust and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. P-values are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable: Number of Objectives 
Civil-Law Country -1.074 
 (0.198) 
# Objectives t-1 0.250*** 
 (0.001) 
# Milestones t-1 0.790** 
 (0.041) 
# Years on Priority List 0.921** 
 (0.038) 
Anti-Director Right Index 0.798 
 (0.154) 
Firm Size 1.153*** 
 (0.001) 
Leverage -3.853 
 (0.171) 
Dividend Payer? 0.418 
 (0.787) 
1yr Sales Growth -3.360* 
 (0.077) 
Closely held Shares (%) -5.115** 
 (0.012) 
Tobin's Q 0.287 
 (0.236) 
Constant -44.473*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Number of Observations 632 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.118 
 
The results suggest that the legal jurisdiction of a priority corporation’s home country 
does not have a significant influence on the engagement intensity. I argue that this result 
implies that it is a priority corporation’s geographical location that matters for the en-
gagement intensity and not the legal jurisdiction of the corporation’s home country.  
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4.4.2.5 Determinants of engagement success 
Having established the relation between geography and the occurrence of the engage-
ments, I now turn to the analysis of the determinants of the successful engagements. In 
essence, I want to answer the question on whether geography also influences the success 
of the engagements (hypothesis H4.3). 
 To do so, I undertake the same analyses as before, that is, the empirical structure of 
my regression models remains the same except for the dependent variable. In all of the 
analyses that follow, the dependent variable is the milestones-per-objectives ratio. Table 
4.9 presents the main findings of this analysis in four models. Model 1 focuses on the 
entire sample, Model 2 on corporate governance milestones, Model 3 on the social mile-
stones, and Model 4 on the environmental milestones. Note that I focus only on firm-
years in which the corporations were actually targeted. Hence, I just include the observa-
tions conditional on having at least one objective. Therefore, the number of observations 
is lower than in Tables 4.5 and 4.7. 
 What becomes apparent from the four different models is that geography is also an 
important determinant of the engagement success. For example, Model 1 shows that an 
average US corporation has a 12.4 percentage points higher milestones-per-objectives 
ratio than the average UK corporation. Similarly, a Continental European corporation 
has a 2 percentage points higher milestones-per-objectives ratio than an average UK 
corporation. The corporations originating from all other countries have a 17.4 percentage 
points lower success ratio. These results imply that even though the foreign corporations 
get relatively fewer engagements than the UK corporations, the engagement activities of 
the engagement agent are somewhat more successful in the United States and Continen-
tal Europe than in the United Kingdom. I conclude that this effect is mostly attributable 
to the home bias effect documented in the engagement intensity. Thus, the engagement 
agent very carefully selects foreign target corporations for which the expected likelihood 
of success is the highest. 
 In Model 2 of Table 4.9, I focus on corporate governance engagement successes. 
The results are very similar to those of the entire sample. A US corporation has a 47.8 
percentage point higher success ratio than a UK corporation when it comes to corporate 
governance engagements. Similarly, the Continental European and Japanese corpora-
tions have 21.6 and 6.5 percentage points higher success ratios than the UK corporations. 
Again, the corporations from all other countries have a lower success rate than the UK 
corporations exposed to corporate governance engagements. 
 Regarding social engagements (Model 3 of Table 4.9), my results show that the 
Japanese corporations on average have the highest milestones-per-objectives ratio. More 
specifically, these corporations display on average a 14.6 percentage points higher suc-
cess ratio than the UK corporations. In contrast, the US corporations, the Continental 
European corporations, as well as the corporations originating from all other countries in 
the sample have significantly lower milestones-per-objectives ratios. 
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Table 4.9: Determinants of engagement success 
This table presents for different Tobit models. The dependent variable is the ratio of milestones to the number 
of objectives raised at a given corporation in a given year. Model 1 studies all engagement themes, while the 
dependent variable varies from Model 2 to Model 4 according to the engagement theme under investigation 
(governance, social, or environmental). All independent variables are measured at t-1, one year before the 
engagement takes place. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels respectively. In all 
models, I control for time and industry effects. Standard errors are robust and ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are presented below the coefficients in 
parentheses. 
  Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
 Entire sample Governance Social Environmental 
United States 0.124*** 0.478*** -0.468*** 0.260*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Continental Europe 0.020** 0.216*** -0.372*** 0.374*** 
 (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Japan 0.007 0.065** 0.146*** 0.172*** 
 (0.587) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
All Other Countries -0.174*** -0.299*** -0.737*** 0.080*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
# Objectives (per topic) t-1 0.004*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Milestones (per topic) t-1 0.008** 0.022** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
# Years on Priority List 0.014*** -0.013 0.130*** 0.062*** 
 (0.001) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) 
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.039*** 0.132*** -0.073*** 0.156*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.003*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.045*** 
 (0.009) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.090*** 0.173** 0.318*** -0.026 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.004) (0.772) 
Dividend Payer? 0.152*** 0.266*** 0.051 0.317*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) 
1yr Sales Growth -0.012 0.151*** -0.016 -0.004 
 (0.448) (0.000) (0.695) (0.934) 
Closely held Shares (%) 0.030 0.092* 0.254*** 0.097* 
 (0.201) (0.071) (0.000) (0.090) 
Tobin's Q 0.005 0.025*** 0.000 0.047*** 
 (0.165) (0.001) (0.998) (0.000) 
Constant -2.786*** -4.837*** -4.122*** -6.365*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Number of Observations 621 526 443 443 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.092 0.103 0.117 0.088 
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Lastly, the results of Model 4 indicate that the corporations that domicile in another 
country other than the United Kingdom have significantly higher success ratios with 
respect to environmental engagements. In particular, the corporations from the Continen-
tal European area display on average a 37.4 percentage points higher milestones-per-
objectives ratio relative to the UK corporations. Hence, one could argue that the UK 
corporations are the least responsive corporations in the sample, or that the engagement 
agent is the least successful in changing corporate environmental policies at the UK 
corporations.  
 My results also show that the engagement success is driven by the number of the 
objectives the corporation received over the last period, the number of milestones 
achieved in the previous year (except for social milestones), and the number of times a 
corporation has appeared on the priority list (except corporate governance). This finding 
supports my argument that the successful shareholder engagements by the engagement 
agent heavily depend on the relationship that the agent established with the target corpo-
ration in the past: continuous engagements lead to milestones. 
 I also find that firm size increases the success ratios of the social and the environ-
mental engagements but not for the governance engagements. Further, leverage has a 
positive impact on the success of the governance and the social engagements, but not on 
the environmental engagements. In addition, my results emphasize the importance of the 
past performance for the success of the governance engagements: well-performing cor-
porations have higher success ratios with regards to governance engagements, but not to 
the other two subcategories of engagement. The engagement success is also positively 
related to the percentage of closely held shares. The success ratios of any kind of en-
gagement topic are higher when the percentage of closely held shares is also high. Last-
ly, it is important to mention that Tobin’s Q is positively related to the success ratios of 
the governance and the environmental engagements. 
 Overall, I conclude from the analyses of the successful engagements that the geo-
graphic location of the priority corporations is also an important determinant of the en-
gagement success. I find that the results for the entire sample of the engagements are 
mainly driven by corporate governance engagements. On average, when the corporations 
originate from the United States, Continental Europe, or Japan, then these originations 
have a significant and positive effect on the milestones-per-objectives ratio for corporate 
governance engagements. The same conclusion can be drawn for environmental en-
gagements.  
4.5 Summary and concluding comments 
Nowadays, shareholder engagement is seen as a viable corporate governance mechanism 
by many institutional investors. They view engagement as a means to influence corpo-
rate behavior and policies with respect to ESG objectives. In this chapter, I study the 
global engagement activities of a large UK asset manager. On behalf of several institu-
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tional clients, the asset manager engages directly with the portfolio corporations via 
emails, telephone calls, personal management meetings, and letter writing.  
 I investigate 397 priority corporations from 37 different countries over the period of 
2006–2011. My main findings show a geographical pattern in the intensity of the en-
gagement activities. The corporations incorporated in the United Kingdom receive sig-
nificantly more objectives than the corporations originating from other countries. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H4.1. The results suggest that there is a home bias in en-
gagements. Moreover, my results indicate that the larger corporations receive signifi-
cantly more objectives relative to their smaller counterparts that is consistent with hy-
pothesis H4.2. 
 Throughout my empirical analysis, I also find that the engagement relationship be-
tween the engagement agent and its portfolio corporations is a significant driver of the 
engagements’ presence. More specifically, the number of past engagements significantly 
increases the number of objectives that the same corporation receives in the future. This 
finding alludes to the fact that the engagement business is also driven by long-term rela-
tionship building between the corporations and their major institutional shareholders. 
 Regarding the determinants of the successful engagements, I show that the extent of 
the engagement success is also influenced by geographic factors. On average, the US as 
well as the Continental European corporations have significantly higher success rates 
than their UK counterparts. These rates also hold for the subsample of governance mile-
stones. In contrast, the Japanese corporations on average display significantly higher 
social success ratios than the corporations from any other geographical region. I also 
establish the finding that the Continental European corporations have the highest success 
ratios regarding environmental engagements, followed by the US and Japanese corpora-
tions. Hence, I conclude that my results do not support hypothesis H4.3. Rather the con-
trary is true: the corporations originating from the United States and Continental Europe 
have higher success ratios (especially within governance and environmental engage-
ments) than their UK counterparts. An explanation for this important finding could be 
the fact that the engagement agent is targeting in particular those foreign corporations for 
which the necessity of engagement is also the highest and those that therefore have the 
highest potential to change. Hence, the engagement agent applies greater scrutiny to 
select the foreign engagement targets for which it expects the highest payoff in terms of 
change. An alternative explanation could be that the corporations from the United King-
dom have tight nationwide regulation with respect to the governance and the environ-
mental standards in which the potential for change is also limited. 
 Taken together, my chapter reinforces the argument put forward in the literature that 
the institutional investors are important players in shareholder engagement. Furthermore, 
my results strengthen the argument of McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2013) and 
Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2013) who argue that institutional investors often use private 
dialogues as a means of engagement. The implications emerging from this chapter for 
institutional investors and also corporations are manifold. First, given my results I argue 
that private corporate engagements by institutional investors are an important and effec-
tive engagement tool that can promote changes in corporate behavior pertaining to ESG 
issues. My exemplary results for one particular UK-based institutional investor show that 
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it is persistently engaging with the portfolio corporations and that these private dialogues 
also lead to changes at the target corporations. Second, the investors who outsource their 
engagement activities should be aware of the apparent home bias in shareholder en-
gagement of the engagement agent. By delegating engagement activities to foreign asset 
managers, institutions should be aware of the fact that the engagement agent might also 
be prone to a home bias as documented in the investment literature (see, e.g., Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Huberman, 2001). For engagement activities, this predilection means 
that they might be more likely to take place at corporations from the agent’s home coun-
try because of its familiarity with local regulations and laws is the highest for those cor-
porations. 
 Third, effectively, I study in this chapter the delegated engagement activities of 
several institutional investors. That is, I also shed light on the joint engagement activities 
of the institutional investors that is so far not yet documented in the corporate govern-
ance literature. By pooling the investment portfolios of several clients together, more 
pressure is created vis-à-vis the target corporations that makes them more likely to 
change according to the requests of the institutional shareholder. This is also reflected in 
the high success ratio of the engagement agent’s objectives. 
 However, my conclusions of course only hold for this particular engagement agent 
and also most likely for other UK-based asset managers as well. This might be a direc-
tion for future research on shareholder engagement. Doing a similar study in a different 
jurisdiction, that is, investigating a US-based engagement agent might show how well 
my results relate to another financial market. Additional research on shareholder en-
gagements through the study of multiple engagement agents might add to the discussion 
on how successful institutional shareholders can influence corporations. 
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Appendix 4.A – Full list of objective topics (with subcategories) 
(1) Corporate Governance  (7) Environmental Management  
Audit and Control  Environmental (Other)  
Board Structure  Environmental Standards  
Governance (Other)  Pollution Control  
Remuneration  Product Opportunities  
Shareholder rights  Supply Chain Environment  
 Supply Chain Environmental Standards  
(2) Sustainability Management and Reporting  Waste and Recycling  
Disclosure and reporting   
Governance of Sustainability issues  (8) Ecosystem Services  
Stakeholder Engagement  Access to Land  
Sustainability (Other)  Biodiversity Management  
UNGC Compliance  Ecosystem (Other)  
 Water  
(3) Business Ethics   
Bribery and Corruption  (9) Climate Change  
Ethics (Other)  Biofuels  
Political Influence  Climate Change (Other)  
Responsible Marketing  Climate change strategy  
Whistleblowing Systems  Emissions Management and Reporting  
 Strategy  
(4) Human Rights   
Community relations  Environment (Old)  
Human Rights (Other)  Biodiversity  
Privacy and Free Expression  Climate Change  
Security   
Weak Governance Zones  Governance (Old)  
 Bribery and Corruption  
(5) Labor Standards  Corporate Governance  
Diversity  Environmental Management Reporting  
Health and Safety  Transparency and Performance  
ILO Core Conventions   
Labor Standards (Other)  Sector Specific (Old)  
Supply Chain Labor Standards  Banking  
 ICT  
(6) Public Health  Pharmaceuticals  
Access to Medicines   
HIV/AIDs  Social (Old)  
Nutrition  HIV/AIDS  
Product Safety  Human Rights  
Public Health (Other)  Labor Standards  
Tobacco    
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Appendix 4.B – Variable definitions 
Variable Variable definition and calculation 
United States Indicator variable that equals one if corporation i originates from the 
United States. 
Continental Europe Indicator variable that equals one if corporation i originates from Conti-
nental Europe. 
United Kingdom Indicator variable that equals one if corporation i originates from the 
United Kingdom. 
Japan Indicator variable that equals one if corporation i originates from Japan. 
Civil-law country Indicator variable that equals one if corporation i originates from a civil-
law tradition country and zero otherwise. 
# Objectives t-1 Number of objectives corporation i received in year t-1. This variable 
measures the overall number of objectives for the entire sample; for the 
subsample analyses this variable measures the number of objectives in a 
particular topic subsample. 
# Milestones t-1 Number of milestones corporation i displays in year t-1. This variable 
measures the overall number of milestones for the entire sample; for the 
subsample analyses this variable measures the number of milestones in a 
particular topic subsample. 
Anti-director rights index Revised version of the anti-director rights index ranging from 0 to 6. 
Higher values indicate more investor protection. Source: Djankov et al. 
(2008). 
Firm size Firm size of portfolio corporation i measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets (Worldscope item TotalAssets). 
Leverage Leverage ratio of investee corporation i calculated as total debt 
(Worldscope item TotalDebt) over total assets (Worldscope item To-
talAssets). 
Dividend payer? Indicator variable that equals one if the portfolio corporation is paying out 
dividends and zero otherwise.  
1yr sales growth Past year's sales growth of portfolio corporation i (Worldscope item 
Sales1YrGrowth). 
Closely held shares (%) Percentage of shares held closely by insiders in a particular portfolio 
corporation (Worldscope item CloselyHeldSharesPct). 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q of corporation i. Calculated as in Ferreira and Matos (2008) as 
total assets (Worldscope item TotalAssets) plus market value of equity 
(Worldscope item CommonSharesOutstanding x Worldscope item Price-
Close) minus book value of equity (Worldscope item TotalCommonEqui-
ty) all over total assets (Worldscope item TotalAssets). 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Market for Public and Private 
Shareholder Engagement25	
In this chapter, I examine the evolution of the private and the public shareholder en-
gagements at US corporations from 1999–2011. I also study the determinants of the 
occurrence and the success of both of these engagements. By means of a proprietary 
engagement database of a UK engagement agent and public data on shareholder pro-
posals, I find that corporations are most likely to become an engagement target when 
they have been targeted with public and private shareholder engagements in the past. 
Furthermore, my results indicate that the existence of the private and the public engage-
ments is a significant driver of a corporation’s honoring likelihood. Corporations are 
significantly more likely to honor public shareholder engagements if they have a good 
reputation for honoring public engagements. Taken together, my findings have important 
implications for shareholders, managers, and researchers. 
  
                                                          
25 This paper is based on Bauer, Bos, Derwall, and Viehs (2013). I thank Frank Moers and seminar participants 
at Maastricht University for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Valentin Peter for excel-
lent research assistance. Special thanks are directed to the Institutional Investor who provided the data on 
private engagements.  
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5.1  Introduction  
In this chapter, I study the evolution of the private and the public shareholder engage-
ments and the determinants of their occurrences and their corresponding successes. I also 
investigate the effect of their presence on the probability that the corporations will honor 
these engagements. The ultimate aim of this empirical chapter is to provide the first 
indicative evidence on the dynamics of the shareholder engagement process and the 
interplay between the private and the public domains of engagement. 
 Corporations are often faced with activist shareholders who engage them to achieve 
changes in their corporate governance structures, as well as their corporate environmen-
tal and social policies. Institutional investors especially are often among those activist 
shareholders who closely monitor corporate actions. The corporate governance literature 
shows that the shareholder engagement often takes place through public means; for ex-
ample, shareholder proposals (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri, and 
Muslu, 2011; Chapters 2 and 3), just-vote-no campaigns (e.g., Del Guercio, Seery, and 
Woidtke, 2008), or class-action lawsuits (Romano, 1991). However, the more recent 
studies provide clear evidence that the shareholder engagement also takes place through 
private means such as private dialogues between the corporations and their institutional 
shareholders (see, e.g., McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2013 for survey evidence). In 
contrast to a public engagement, a private shareholder engagement usually takes place 
bilaterally between the shareholder and the corporation. Importantly, this behind the 
scenes private engagement remains confidential and is not observable by other market 
participants. Empirically, Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) provide evidence that 
private dialogues are an effective mechanism in promoting change at the corporations. 
The fact that private shareholder engagement is growing in importance is also demon-
strated by the increasing academic research that investigates this type of engagement 
(e.g., Chapter 4; Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 2013). 
 In contrast to these studies on shareholder engagement, which generally investigate 
either the public or the private shareholder engagements separately, I adopt a more holis-
tic, but probably still incomplete, approach towards shareholder engagement by investi-
gating both the public and the private engagement means at the same time.  
 To do so, I rely on data for both the private and the public shareholder engagements. 
My proxies for the public shareholder engagements are the shareholder proposals filed at 
the corporations. The data comes from the RiskMetrics’ shareholder proposal database 
that comprises the information on all of the shareholder proposals at all of the S&P1500 
corporations and that I already used in Chapters 2 and 3. My private engagement data 
comes from a UK-based asset manager who provides engagement services to institution-
al clients (the engagement agent). The proprietary private engagement data comprises all 
of the private engagements undertaken with portfolio corporations. Similar versions of 
this data have already been used in other empirical studies on shareholder engagement 
(e.g., Chapter 4; Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 2013). 
 The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, I depict the evolution of both the private 
and the public shareholder engagements to see how they develop over time with respect 
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to their occurrences, frequencies, and successes. Second, I provide evidence on the dy-
namics underlying the shareholder engagement process by studying the likelihood of 
being targeted by either or both of the two engagements. Therein, I emphasize the inter-
action and simultaneous occurrence of the private and the public engagements. Third, I 
show how the presence of both influences the honoring likelihood of the targeted corpo-
rations.  
 My results indicate that the shareholder engagement is a dynamic process and that it 
has both private and public facets. I find that an increasing number of corporations are 
being targeted by the private engagements. Likewise, the number of corporations receiv-
ing the public engagements also rises over my sample period. However, fewer corpora-
tions get the private engagements than the public engagements. My analyses indicate 
that the public engagements are generally more successful than the private engagements.  
 The empirical results of this chapter show that the presence of both the private and 
the public engagements in the previous year significantly increase the odds that the same 
corporation becomes an engagement target in the current year as well. This relation 
holds for any kind of engagement as well as for the simultaneous presence of both. I also 
show what effect the corporation’s past honoring behavior has on the targeting probabil-
ity in the current year. To do so, I construct engagement reputation variables that control 
for the extent to which corporations honored their past shareholder engagements (public 
and/or private). These variables are constructed by scaling the number of successful 
engagements by the number of engagements undertaken (either private or public en-
gagements). For private engagements, the engagement reputation is calculated by divid-
ing the number of successful private engagements by the number of privately undertaken 
engagements. Similarly, I calculate the public engagement reputation by dividing my 
proxy for successful public engagements—withdrawn shareholder proposals—by the 
number of filed shareholder proposals. My results show that a corporation’s engagement 
reputation is negatively related to a corporation’s targeting likelihood. 
 With respect to the success of the shareholder engagement, I find that the overall 
honoring probability is the highest for the corporations that are exposed to both the pub-
lic and the private engagements in the same year in which the successful engagement 
occurred. Furthermore, my results disclose that the presence of the past public engage-
ments significantly reduces the probability of success for the current public engagement. 
Additionally, I show that a corporation’s public engagement reputation is positively 
related to the engagement success, that is, the corporations that honored the public en-
gagements in the past are also more likely to display successful public engagements in 
the current year as well. Another important finding is that the concurrent public (private) 
engagements are not significantly related to the honoring likelihood of private (public) 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements.  
 These findings have important implications for shareholders, corporations, and re-
searchers. Even though my results are based on a very exemplary private engagement 
data set from a large institutional investor, I conclude that there are important interde-
pendencies between the public and the private shareholder engagements. Institutional 
investors who want to engage with corporations should be aware of these effects when 
making their engagement decisions. Furthermore, I posit that the shareholder engage-
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ment should be investigated by taking all kinds of engagements into account. The litera-
ture studies the public and the private engagements separately most of the time, without 
taking into account that the engagement can also take place via different routes. 
 Of course, one has to be careful inferring generalizations from my conclusions. I 
combine a snapshot of private engagement data from just one institutional investor with 
data on a form of public engagement, shareholder proposals, that could essentially be 
filed by any shareholder. In other words, this private engagement data from a single 
institutional investor serves as a proxy for the private facet of the engagement process 
because other institutional investors presumably undertake similar endeavors to promote 
changes in investee corporations. Hence, I make the following two assumptions. First, I 
assume that the engagement activities of the large UK-based institutional investor at a 
particular corporation are a decent proxy for the engagement activities undertaken by all 
of the other institutional investors at the same corporation. Second, I presume that the 
engagements of the institutional investor on a particular topic like corporate environmen-
tal, social, or governance issues, approximate well the engagements undertaken by other 
institutional investors on the same topics at the same corporation. These two assump-
tions are of a realistic nature because the large institutional investors are highly connect-
ed to each other through important and huge networks, like the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN) or the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). These in-
vestors exchange information on particularly important issues, and maybe even corpora-
tions. Hence, these networks could trigger implicit collaborative engagements at certain 
corporations on particular issues.  
 I contribute to the literature on shareholder engagement along the following lines. 
By investigating the private and the public shareholder engagements at the same time, I 
am the first to study the full shareholder engagement spectrum. I also contribute to the 
literature by studying the relatedness between the two engagement routes. Generally, the 
literature treats the private and the public engagements as two separate monitoring tools 
available to the shareholders. However, this view neglects the important interconnected-
ness of both engagements.  
 There is a plethora of literature that stresses the importance of public shareholder 
engagement as a corporate governance mechanism. Among the most commonly studied 
public engagement tools are the shareholder proposals (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000; 
Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996), class-action lawsuits (e.g., Romano, 1991), 
hedge fund engagement (e.g., Klein and Zur, 2009; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 
2008; Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2011), and the proxy voting by institutional investors (e.g., 
Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke, 2008; Yermack, 2010). Most of these studies investi-
gate why the corporations become engaged with either of the tools mentioned, and how 
successful the shareholder engagement is. All of them have in common that they investi-
gate the public engagements leaving aside the private engagements that continuously 
take place between the large institutional investors and the corporations.  
 A public shareholder engagement is fully observable and can create a lot of negative 
publicity against the corporations when shareholders raise critical issues such as execu-
tive compensation policies. However, today, most of the shareholder engagement is 
going on behind the scenes and is therefore not observable by the market. McCahery, 
P U B L I C  A N D  P R I V A T E  S H A R E H O L D E R  E N G A G E M E N T  
C H A P T E R  5  
 134 
Sautner, and Starks (2013) find that the institutional investors in the Netherlands and the 
United States use many different tools to exert pressure on corporations. These tools 
range from walking the Wall Street Walk, the shareholder proposals at annual general 
meetings (AGMs), discussions with management teams, or public criticism (McCahery, 
Sautner, and Starks, 2013). The authors’ survey results show that the institutional inves-
tors are most of the time not only relying on one single engagement tool but use several 
public and private tools simultaneously. The private dialogues with management teams 
and boards especially are often used as private engagement tools.  
 Similarly, I argue in Chapter 4 that the institutional investors often privately engage 
with the corporations by means of their private dialogues, management meetings, tele-
phone calls, or their emails. Only after these private negotiations fail or do not lead to 
satisfactory outcomes for the shareholders is the public engagement route undertaken as 
a last resort engagement tool (see, e.g., Chapter 3). Likewise, Dimson, Karakas, and Li 
(2013) investigate the private negotiations and rely on a similar though smaller data set 
from the same UK-based asset manager that I use in this chapter. Dimson, Karakas, and 
Li (2013) find that the private shareholder engagement is successful. The earlier findings 
of Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) indicate that the private negotiations often 
take place between the institutional investors and the corporations. Carleton, Nelson, and 
Weisbach (1998) conclude that 70% of the issues that the TIAA-CREF raises at the 
investee corporations are settled before an actual vote at the AGM, which indicates a 
relatively high success rate for the private negotiations. Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 
(2009) also provide empirical evidence on private engagement activities of the UK Fo-
cus Fund. Similar to my approach, the authors also investigate the private engagements, 
which are presumed to be unobservable by other market participants. Overall, Becht, 
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) show that given its engagement in the corporations and 
the disclosure of the fund’s stake acquisition in certain corporations, the fund significant-
ly outperforms specific benchmarks. Hence, the authors conclude that the shareholder 
engagement is effectively creating shareholder value. However, the investment and en-
gagement approaches of my asset manager differ from those observed by Becht, Franks, 
Mayer, and Rossi (2009) in the sense that my asset manager engages on behalf of several 
institutional clients. Furthermore, the authors only look at the private engagements and 
the market’s reaction towards this type of engagement without taking into account the 
presence of any public shareholder engagement. I fill this gap and investigate both the 
private and the public facets of the shareholder engagements at the same time. I do so by 
studying the effects of the presence of both engagements, their interaction, as well as the 
corporation’s engagement reputation on the likelihood that corporations will honor (i.e., 
settle the shareholders’ concerns) the engagements of any kind. 
 Given the evidence on both the public and the private shareholder engagements, I 
conjecture that the private negotiations can be an effective corporate governance and 
engagement tool because the private dialogues always occur in the shadow of the poten-
tial public engagements, which could potentially create much more adverse effects for 
managers and corporations.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 continues with a de-
scription of the data and their statistics. In Section 5.3, I present my empirical model and 
its results; and in Section 5.4, I conclude. 
5.2  Data and summary statistics 
5.2.1  Data description 
My database on shareholder engagement consists of two parts. The first part of my en-
gagement data consists of the information on all privately undertaken engagement activi-
ties of one large UK-based asset manager. This asset manager, as described in Chapter 4, 
can be considered as a conventional asset manager that also provides shareholder en-
gagement services to institutional clients. The institutional clients can buy this engage-
ment service and in doing so outsource all of their private engagement activities to this 
single asset manager. Therefore, on behalf of several other institutional investors, the 
asset manager is directly engaging with its own and its clients’ portfolio corporations. 
Hence, the asset manager can be called an engagement agent. 
 The foundation for my private engagement data set are all of the US-listed corpora-
tions that are either part of the engagement agent’s own portfolio or part of any of its 
clients’ portfolios. For 1,894 corporations, I am able to retrieve the entire record of the 
private engagement data between 1999 and 2011. The engagement data for these corpo-
rations contain information on the number of contacts between the engagement agent 
and the portfolio corporations, the number of issues discussed with the portfolio corpora-
tions (objectives), and the number of successful engagements (milestones) for each of 
these sample corporations. The milestones are engagements that lead to change at the 
corporations due to the engagement agent’s objectives. Hence, the milestones are my 
proxy for private engagement success. The milestones and the corresponding changes 
are directly observed and recorded by the asset manager and subsequently reported to its 
clients. Moreover, I know which topics were discussed in the private dialogues between 
the engagement agent and the target corporations. Specifically, I know if the engagement 
agent discussed corporate governance (CG) or CSR issues with the portfolio corpora-
tions.  
 In the next step, I match all 1,894 private engagement corporations (which represent 
24,622 firm-year observations) with data on the public shareholder engagements. These 
data come from RiskMetrics and comprises all of the shareholder proposals for all of the 
corporations in the S&P1500. For every corporation, I calculate the number of proposals 
received in a given year, along with a breakdown into corporate governance and CSR 
proposals. Consistent with Chapter 3, I use the withdrawn shareholder proposals as my 
proxy for successful proposals. The withdrawn shareholder proposals represent a meas-
ure for success because they reflect the management implementing the shareholders’ 
requests as specified in the proposal according to Landier and Nair (2009). More precise-
ly, the withdrawn proposals occur through the sponsoring shareholder after the private 
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negotiations with the management take place. During these negotiations, a satisfactory 
compromise is reached resulting in the withdrawal of the filed proposal. Hence, the 
withdrawn proposals are my measure for successful public shareholder engagements (see 
also Chapter 3). 
 In the data set construction, I also take into account any changes with regards to the 
index composition of the S&P1500. That is, for every year between 1999 and 2011, I 
check whether a corporation becomes a member of the S&P1500 or whether a particular 
corporation drops from the index. This accounting means that not all of the corporations 
in my final data set are an index member for the entire sample period. Overall, I have 
12,549 firm-year observations that represent index member-years and are thus included 
in the final sample. 
 For the empirical analyses that follow, I construct two reputation measures based on 
the private and the public engagement information given by the corporations’ past re-
sponses to shareholder engagements. The Reputation private is calculated by dividing 
the number of successful private engagements in t-1 by the number of total objectives 
raised at a particular corporation. Likewise, my public engagement reputation measure 
(reputation public) is constructed by taking the ratio of withdrawn shareholder proposals 
and the total number of filed shareholder proposals. That is, the lower values for each of 
the two reputation measures indicate a lower responsiveness of the corporations to any 
specific kind of engagement route, whereas a high value indicates a relatively high re-
sponsiveness to the shareholder engagement. 
 The public and private engagement data set is then matched with the financial and 
the accounting information. I retrieve the accounting information from Thomson Reu-
ters’ Worldscope, and this information comprises the data on a firm’s cash position, size, 
leverage, profitability (ROE), percentage of closely held shares, and Tobin’s Q.26 I con-
trol for these variables because the literature shows them to be influential in the context 
of shareholder engagement (see, e.g., Chapter 4). Especially a corporation’s cash posi-
tion is of huge interest to me, because the implementation of certain shareholder requests 
in the private and the public engagements is costly. The literature shows that less finan-
cially constrained corporations spend more on corporate goodness (Hong, Kubik, and 
Scheinkmann, 2012). I argue that this spending also holds true for the implementation of 
the CSR and corporate governance changes specified in the private and the public share-
holder engagements. Hence, in the main model, I also control for the financial soundness 
of the sample corporations. Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics on the final data 
set. 
 Table 5.1 shows that the median sample corporation has total assets of US$ 2,981 
million, 21.2% debt in the capital structure, and a cash-to-assets ratio of 7.2%. Further-
more, 10.6% of the median corporations’ outstanding shares are held by corporate insid-
ers and other pension funds. The median sample corporation displays a sales growth of 
8.2% over the last year and has a Tobin’s Q of 1.4. The engagement variables show that 
almost 29% of the sample corporations had at least one public engagement activity in the 
                                                          
26 I calculate Tobin’s Q as in Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
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previous year (i.e., display at least one filed shareholder proposal). They also show that 
12% of the sample corporations display at least one private engagement over the past 
year. The average public and private reputations of the sample corporations are 7.7% and 
1.1% respectively. The evolution of the private and the public engagements is discussed 
in the following section. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analyses. I report the number 
of observations, mean values, median values and standard deviations for all variables. If not stated otherwise, 
the variables are measured at time t0. 
Variable #obs Mean Median St. Dev. 
Firm Characteristics     
Firm Size (Log Total Assets) 12,501 8.159 8.000 1.580 
Leverage 12,432 0.226 0.212 0.176 
Cash/Total Assets 12,498 0.133 0.072 0.153 
% Closely Held Shares 11,662 0.135 0.106 0.146 
1yr Sales Growth 11,839 0.110 0.082 0.221 
Dividend Payout Per Share 12,479 0.266 0.113 0.621 
Tobin’s Q 12,368 1.818 1.386 1.389 
Engagement Variables     
Public Engagement Dummy t-1 11,217 0.289 0 0.453 
Private Engagement Dummy t-1 11,839 0.120 0 0.324 
Public Engagement Reputation t-1 11,217 0.077 0 0.237 
Private Engagement Reputation t-1 11,839 0.011 0 0.102 
5.2.2 How did public and private engagements evolve over time? 
In Table 5.2, I present the statistics on the evolution of the private and the public share-
holder engagements. One clearly observes that the number of observations steadily in-
creases over the sample period. The reason for this increase is that the engagement agent 
over time targets more and more corporations that are constituents of the S&P1500. 
Overall, I have 12,549 firm-year observations in my final sample. The results also show 
that the number of observations with private engagements is in all years lower than the 
number of observations with public engagements. This result leads to the fact that over-
all, I have 1,630 observations with private engagements and 3,617 observations with 
public engagements in my sample. Interestingly, I find that 1,132 observations display 
both types of engagements and that a significant portion of the observations has neither 
of the engagements. These findings suggest that the number of corporations exposed to 
the private and public shareholder engagements is still relatively small: Out of 1,500 
potential target corporations every year, just a small fraction receives either or both types 
of engagements.  
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Table 5.2: Sample overview 
This table presents a sample overview. The number of observations is equal to the number of corporations in 
the sample within a particular year. The third column displays the number of observations where private en-
gagements took place, column four the number of observations where public engagements occurred, while 
column five presents the number of observations where both engagement types took place simultaneously. The 
last column specifies the number of observations where no engagement at all took place. 
Year Obs # of Obs with Private 
Engagements 
# of Obs with Public 
Engagements 
# of Obs with both 
Engagements 
# of Obs with no 
Engagements 
1999 710 7 149 7 561 
2000 771 17 191 14 577 
2001 807 49 202 42 598 
2002 837 60 224 45 598 
2003 859 92 262 72 577 
2004 888 295 315 202 480 
2005 933 136 284 104 617 
2006 976 130 301 87 632 
2007 1,056 142 329 102 687 
2008 1,123 109 346 89 757 
2009 1,160 140 360 101 761 
2010 1,191 227 307 115 772 
2011 1,238 226 347 152 817 
Grand total 12,549 1,630 3,617 1,132 8,434 
 
In Table 5.3, I provide more detailed statistics on the number of engagements in every 
year and I split up the sample into two different engagement themes: Corporate govern-
ance and corporate social responsibility. Panel A of Table 5.3 presents the number of 
observations with private and public engagements in a particular year as well as the 
absolute number of the private and the public engagements corresponding to those ob-
servations. I find that the average number of the private engagements is quite volatile 
over time. Until 2005, the average count of the engagements increased to more than five 
per observation. Then, it decreased to 2.6 and then increased again until 2009 where the 
average number reached its all-time high of 7.2 engagements per private engagement 
observation. For the entire sample period, I find an average of 4.4 engagements per ob-
servation. Contrarily, this number is just 2.5 for the public engagements implying that 
the average number of shareholder proposals per corporation is much lower than the 
average number of private engagements. I detect a similar picture for every single year 
after 2001: The yearly average number of public engagements is lower than the average 
number of private engagements. 
 Panels B and C provide the same statistics for the two subsamples of the corporate 
governance and the CSR engagements. The results of Panel B suggest that on a yearly 
basis, much fewer corporations are targeted with private corporate governance engage-
ments than with public governance engagements. This is not surprising because I study 
the engagement activities of just one institutional investor, whereas the public engage-
ments can arise from the entire shareholder base. I also find that the variation in the 
number of corporations exposed to the private governance engagements is much wider 
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than for the public engagements. Looking at the number of governance engagements per 
observations, I find that the average number of private corporate governance engage-
ments is 2.6 whereas the average for the public engagements is 2.2. Hence, I conclude 
that the engagement agent targets on average fewer corporations but with higher intensi-
ty.  
 
Table 5.3: Temporal evolution of private and public engagements 
This table presents the average numbers of private and public engagements for the entire sample, and for the 
two subsamples of CSR and CG engagements. 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  # Obs w/ 
Private En-
gagements 
# Private 
Engagements 
Private En-
gagements per 
Obs 
# Obs w/ Public
Engagements 
# Public En-
gagements 
Public En-
gagements per 
Obs 
1999 7 7 1.0 149 341 2.3 
2000 17 37 2.2 191 495 2.6 
2001 49 119 2.4 202 491 2.4 
2002 60 265 4.4 224 546 2.4 
2003 92 511 5.6 262 763 2.9 
2004 295 773 2.6 315 823 2.6 
2005 136 639 4.7 284 809 2.8 
2006 130 515 4.0 301 776 2.6 
2007 142 441 3.1 329 882 2.7 
2008 109 507 4.7 346 919 2.7 
2009 140 1,002 7.2 360 897 2.5 
2010 227 1,237 5.4 307 728 2.4 
2011 226 1,089 4.8 347 721 2.1 
Grand total 1,630 7,142 4.4 3,617 9,191 2.5 
Panel B: Corporate Governance (CG) Engagements 
  # Obs w/ 
Private CG 
Engagements 
# Private CG 
Engagements 
Private CG 
Engagements 
per Obs 
# Obs w/ Public 
CG Engage-
ments 
# Public CG 
Engagements 
Public CG 
Engagements 
per Obs 
1999 0 0 - 116 219 1.9 
2000 11 19 1.7 139 328 2.4 
2001 14 22 1.6 145 312 2.2 
2002 42 139 3.3 165 338 2.0 
2003 74 236 3.2 218 542 2.5 
2004 284 478 1.7 271 601 2.2 
2005 129 362 2.8 224 553 2.5 
2006 118 325 2.8 242 515 2.1 
2007 94 245 2.6 260 609 2.3 
2008 95 251 2.6 279 600 2.2 
2009 95 382 4.0 285 624 2.2 
2010 188 462 2.5 236 510 2.2 
2011 98 344 3.5 280 516 1.8 
Grand total 1,242 3,265 2.6 2,860 6,267 2.2 
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Table 5.3 continued 
Panel C: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Engagements 
  # Obs w/ 
Private CSR 
Engagements 
# Private CSR 
Engagements 
Private CSR 
Engagements 
per Obs 
# Obs w/ Public 
CSR Engage-
ments 
# Public CSR 
Engagements 
Public CSR 
Engagements 
per Obs 
1999 7 7 1.0 74 113 1.5 
2000 10 18 1.8 101 148 1.5 
2001 43 97 2.3 109 170 1.6 
2002 38 126 3.3 127 205 1.6 
2003 38 192 5.1 122 205 1.7 
2004 61 210 3.4 138 217 1.6 
2005 61 238 3.9 145 249 1.7 
2006 61 190 3.1 148 257 1.7 
2007 93 196 2.1 156 239 1.5 
2008 61 256 4.2 175 288 1.6 
2009 121 620 5.1 173 251 1.5 
2010 205 775 3.8 144 208 1.4 
2011 199 745 3.7 146 196 1.3 
Grand total 998 3,670 3.7 1,758 2,746 1.6 
 
A similar picture emerges for the CSR engagements (Panel C of Table 5.3). First, I note 
that the number of observations with CSR engagements in general is much smaller than 
for corporate governance engagements. This relation holds true for both the private and 
the public engagements. I observe that the private CSR engagements are very frequently 
conducted by the engagement agent in the latter three years of the sample period. The 
number of corporations with private CSR engagements from 2009 to 2011 is even higher 
than the number of corporations that are exposed to corporate governance engagements 
(Panel B). On average, I find 3.7 private CSR engagements per observation and 1.6 
public CSR engagements. Again, this result shows that the engagement agent targets a 
selected group of corporations with high intensity engagements. Given that the engage-
ment agent is exposed to resource constraints in terms of time and money, this result 
makes reasonable sense. 
5.2.3 How successful are the two engagement means? 
The most intriguing question of course is how successful the two different engagement 
mechanisms actually are. Table 5.4 provides the descriptive evidence on this question. 
Recall that a milestone is a private engagement success and that a withdrawn shareholder 
proposal represents a successful public engagement. To come up with a success measure, 
I calculate a success ratio by dividing the number of successful engagements by the 
number of the private and the public engagements. Panel A of Table 5.4 shows the suc-
cess statistics for the entire sample of the engagements. For the entire sample, I find that 
with the exception of 2005 and 2008, the public engagements have higher success ratios. 
 141
Consequently, the average success ratio is also much higher for the public engagements: 
22.3% versus 11.5% successes for the private engagements. As was the case for the 
number of private engagements, I also find a very high volatility in the number of private 
engagement success, that is, milestones. In the first years of the sample period, the pri-
vate engagements were not that successful. Then, the absolute number of milestones 
steadily increased until the all-time high in 2005 with 146 milestones and a success ratio 
of 22.8%. Subsequently, the success ratio remains at reasonably high levels, ranging 
between 5.1 to 28.6% in 2008. In contrast, the absolute number of public engagement 
successes and the corresponding success ratios exhibit a much less volatile evolution: 
The public success ratio varied between 13.5% in 1999 and 27.4% in 2007. Similar to 
the success of the private engagements, the year 2008 was also very successful for the 
public shareholder engagements: 26.1% successes. Generally, the public success ratios 
manifest similar levels to the ones reported in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 5.4: Evolution of engagement success 
This table presents statistics on the success of the engagements, split up into private and public engagements as 
well as CG and CSR engagements. I also present the success ratios for every engagement category that is the 
ratio of number of successful engagements to the number of engagements. 
Panel A: Entire Sample   
Year # of Private 
Engagements 
# of Private 
Successes 
Private Suc-
cess Ratio 
# Public Engage-
ments 
# of Public 
Successes 
Public Success 
Ratio 
1999 7 0 0.0% 341 46 13.5% 
2000 37 0 0.0% 495 119 24.0% 
2001 119 4 3.4% 491 84 17.1% 
2002 265 33 12.5% 546 120 22.0% 
2003 511 39 7.6% 763 159 20.8% 
2004 773 58 7.5% 823 179 21.7% 
2005 639 146 22.8% 809 183 22.6% 
2006 515 78 15.1% 776 153 19.7% 
2007 441 93 21.1% 882 242 27.4% 
2008 507 145 28.6% 919 240 26.1% 
2009 1,002 85 8.5% 897 226 25.2% 
2010 1,237 63 5.1% 728 144 19.8% 
2011 1,089 78 7.2% 721 155 21.5% 
Total 7,142 822 11.5% 9,191 2,050 22.3% 
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Table 5.4 continued 
Panel B: Corporate Governance (CG) Engagements   
Year # of Private CG 
Engagements 
# of Private CG 
Successes 
Private CG 
Success Ratio
# Public CG 
Engagements 
# of Public CG 
Successes 
Public CG 
Success Ratio 
1999 0 0 - 219 18 8.2% 
2000 19 0 0.0% 328 84 25.6% 
2001 22 3 13.6% 312 40 12.8% 
2002 139 21 15.1% 338 51 15.1% 
2003 236 23 9.7% 542 82 15.1% 
2004 478 31 6.5% 601 122 20.3% 
2005 362 106 29.3% 553 100 18.1% 
2006 325 63 19.4% 515 76 14.8% 
2007 245 80 32.7% 609 173 28.4% 
2008 251 68 27.1% 600 140 23.3% 
2009 382 63 16.5% 624 119 19.1% 
2010 462 38 8.2% 510 61 12.0% 
2011 344 27 7.8% 516 75 14.5% 
Total 3,265 523 16.0% 6,267 1,141 18.2% 
 
Panel C: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Engagements 
Year # of Private CSR 
Engagements 
# of Private 
CSR Successes 
Private CSR 
Success Ratio
# Public CSR 
Engagements 
# of Public CSR 
Successes  
Public CSR 
Success Ratio 
1999 7 0 0.0% 113 26 23.0% 
2000 18 0 0.0% 148 33 22.3% 
2001 97 1 1.0% 170 44 25.9% 
2002 126 12 9.5% 205 69 33.7% 
2003 192 10 5.2% 205 75 36.6% 
2004 210 18 8.6% 217 57 26.3% 
2005 238 30 12.6% 249 80 32.1% 
2006 190 15 7.9% 257 77 30.0% 
2007 196 13 6.6% 239 68 28.5% 
2008 256 77 30.1% 288 96 33.3% 
2009 620 22 3.5% 251 102 40.6% 
2010 775 25 3.2% 208 82 39.4% 
2011 745 51 6.8% 196 76 38.8% 
Total 3,670 274 7.5% 2,746 885 32.2% 
 
I conclude from this descriptive evidence that the public shareholder engagement is more 
successful on average. However, one has to keep in mind several characteristics of the 
private engagement process that might explain its lower success ratio and also its higher 
intensity. First, I document the engagement activities of just one single institutional 
investor. On the other hand, the public engagements originate from the entire sharehold-
er base. Second, the private engagements differ substantially in their nature from the 
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public shareholder engagements. The engagement agent is continuously involved in 
discussions and meetings with the portfolio corporations, which my data reflects. All of 
the meetings and discussions are treated as a single engagement activity, even though the 
agent might be discussing a specific issue for the second or even the third time with the 
target corporation’s management. Hence, the private engagement success ratio might be 
understated.  
 Panels B and C of Table 5.4 present the same statistics for corporate governance and 
the CSR engagements. Overall, I can conclude the same main message: The public cor-
porate governance and CSR engagements are more successful than the private engage-
ments. However, the difference in the success ratios is smaller for the corporate govern-
ance engagements (16.0% vs. 18.2%) than for the CSR engagements (7.5% vs. 32.2%). I 
also find substantial cross-sectional differences within the engagement types. My results 
indicate that the public CSR engagements are on average much more successful than the 
public corporate governance engagements (32.2% vs. 18.2%). However, for private 
engagements, I find the opposite: the corporate governance engagements are much more 
successful than the CSR engagements (7.5% vs. 16%). 
 To sum up the descriptive evidence on the successes of the private and the public 
engagements, I find that both engagements are relatively successful. Even when I take 
into account all of the potential concerns about the private engagement data, I am still 
confident that an average success ratio of 11.5% for the private engagements still reflects 
very effective shareholder engagement by the engagement agent.  
5.3 Empirical analysis and results 
5.3.1 Empirical setups 
My empirical analyses consist of two main parts. First, I study the determinants of the 
occurrences of shareholder engagements. And second, I investigate the likelihood that 
corporations will honor the shareholder engagements. 
 For the first part of the analyses, I regress several engagement variables that control 
for the presence of the private and the public engagements on four different dependent 
variables that are all indicator variables. These four dependent variables equal to one if 
(1) a corporation gets targeted with any kind of engagement, (2) a corporation gets tar-
geted with a private engagement, (3) a corporation gets targeted with a public engage-
ment, and (4) a corporation receives both types of engagements in a given year. I use 
logistic regression models to study the targeting likelihood: 
ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ݁݀	ݕ݁ݏ	݋ݎ	݊݋	(0	݋ݎ	1)௜,௧
= 	ߚ଴ + ߚଵ(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ)௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଶ(ܴ݁݌ݑݐܽݐ݅݋݊ ݌ݑܾ݈݅ܿ)௜,௧ିଵ
+	ߚଷ(ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ	݀ݑ݉݉ݕ)௜,௧ିଵ +	ߚସ(ܴ݁݌ݑݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݌ݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁)௜,௧ିଵ
+ ߚହ(ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ)௜,௧ିଵ + ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܿℎܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜,௧ିଵ
+ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܽ݊݀ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ
(5.1) 
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where the Public engagement dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if the cor-
poration displays at least one shareholder proposal in t-1. Similarly, the Private engage-
ment dummy equals one if the sample corporation displays at least one private engage-
ment activity in year t-1. I also control for the effect of the two reputation measures on 
the honoring likelihood: Reputation private and Reputation public, defined as before. 
Additionally, I add an interaction term between the two kinds of engagement variables 
(Private*Public engagement) in the empirical model. Lastly, in all of my empirical mod-
els that follow, I control for the corporate characteristics and the industry and year ef-
fects. 
 The second part of my empirical analysis is concerned with the likelihood that cor-
porations will honor their shareholder engagements. To investigate the determinants of a 
corporation’s honoring decision, I again rely on a logistic regression model in which the 
dependent variable is one of seven different dependent variables on honoring (to be 
specified later on): 
 
ܪ݋݊݋ݎ݅݊݃	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐݏ	ݕ݁ݏ	݋ݎ	݊݋ (0 ݋ݎ 1)௜,௧
= 	ߚ଴ + ߚଵ(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ	݀ݑ݉݉ݕ)௜,௧ + ߚଶ(ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ)௜,௧ିଵ
+	ߚଷ(ܴ݁݌ݑݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݌ݑܾ݈݅ܿ)௜,௧ିଵ
+	ߚସ(ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ	݀ݑ݉݉ݕ)௜,௧ + 	ߚହ(ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁	݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ	݀ݑ݉݉ݕ)௜,௧ିଵ
+	ߚ଺(ܴ݁݌ݑݐܽݐ݅݋݊	݌ݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁)௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଻(ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ݁݊݃ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ)௜,௧ିଵ
+ ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܿℎܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜,௧ିଵ + ܻ݁ܽݎ ܽ݊݀ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ 
(5.2) 
 
where the right-hand-side variables are defined as before. The dependent variable varies 
with respect to the underlying sample under investigation. I now continue with my em-
pirical results. 
5.3.2 What determines the likelihood of becoming an engagement target? 
5.3.2.1 What are the effects of past engagements and a corporation’s engagement 
reputation? 
In this section, I exclusively focus on the first five independent variables of the empirical 
models. The first model of Table 5.5 presents the results for the corporations that be-
come engaged with any kind of engagement type, that is, the dependent variable equals 
one as soon as a corporation gets either a public or a private engagement or even both in 
a particular year. From the corporation’s perspective, my findings indicate that the pres-
ence of public engagements in the previous year increases the chances of having an en-
gagement in the current year. I also find a positive and negative effect for the past year’s 
private engagement activities. If a corporation gets private engagements in t-1, then the 
likelihood significantly increases that the same corporation also receives engagements in 
t0. The interaction term Private*Public engagement exhibits a significant and negative 
relation with the likelihood of becoming targeted.  
 Concerning my engagement reputation proxies, I find the following. A corporation’s 
public engagement reputation significantly reduces the odds that the corporation be-
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comes targeted with any kind of shareholder engagement in the current year. This result 
implies that the corporations where shareholders have been successfully engaging on any 
kind of topic publicly, exhibit a lower likelihood of becoming an engagement target the 
next year. On the other hand, I find a negative but nonsignificant effect for the private 
engagement reputation.  
 I find very similar effects for the second model in which the dependent variable 
indicates if the corporation gets targeted with the private engagements or not. In other 
words, I am modeling the probability of becoming engaged with the private engage-
ments. The effects of the public and the private engagements in t-1 are still positive and 
significant, even though the coefficient on the public engagement is smaller in its magni-
tude. The remaining engagement variables turn out to be nonsignificant for the targeting 
probability of the private engagements.  
 This conclusion changes in the third model in which the dependent variable now 
indicates if the corporation receives the public shareholder engagements in t0. Again, I 
find positive and significant effects for the presence of the private and the public en-
gagements in t-1. On top of that, my results emphasize the importance of the corpora-
tion’s engagement reputation. Both the private and the public engagement reputation 
variables turn out to be negative and significant, which implies that the odds of becom-
ing targeted with the shareholder proposals reduces when the corporation honors more 
private and public engagements in t-1. 
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Table 5.5: Determinants of targeting 
This table presents the results of four different logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is 
different for each model. All right-hand-side variables are measured at t-1, whereas the dependent variables are 
measured at time t0. Robust p-values are reported below the coefficients in parentheses, and ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variables: Targeted? (0/1) Private Engage-
ment? 
Public Engage-
ment? 
Both Engagement 
Types? 
Public Engagement t-1 2.323*** 0.492*** 2.542*** 1.541*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reputation Public t-1 -1.575*** -0.137 -1.676*** -0.601*** 
 (0.000) (0.310) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Engagement t-1 0.839*** 0.924*** 0.568*** 0.965*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reputation Private t-1 -0.386 0.287 -0.453** 0.264 
 (0.151) (0.225) (0.034) (0.214) 
Private*Public Engagement t-1 -0.367** 0.025 -0.406** -0.156 
 (0.040) (0.889) (0.016) (0.480) 
Firm Size 0.909*** 0.989*** 0.797*** 1.099*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.240 -0.355 0.280 -0.528* 
 (0.202) (0.154) (0.145) (0.092) 
Cash 0.883*** 1.256*** 0.624** 1.339*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
% Closely Held Shares -0.321 -0.307 -0.491** -0.789** 
 (0.142) (0.273) (0.031) (0.028) 
1yr Sales Growth -0.534*** -0.012 -0.475*** 0.219 
 (0.000) (0.945) (0.001) (0.313) 
Dividends per Share 0.153*** 0.067 0.181*** 0.111 
 (0.001) (0.289) (0.000) (0.149) 
Tobin's Q 0.137*** 0.213*** 0.087*** 0.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -8.945*** -10.737*** -8.324*** -12.706*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Industry Controls yes Yes yes yes 
Time Effects? yes Yes yes yes 
     
Number of Observations 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.404 0.378 0.402 0.463 
 
Lastly, I model the probability that the corporation is exposed to both the private and the 
public engagements at the same time. The results are very similar to the first model of 
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Table 5.5, with the exception that the interaction term turns out to no longer be signifi-
cant.  
 Overall, I can conclude that a corporation’s exposure to the private and the public 
engagements in the last year significantly increases the chances that the same corpora-
tion receives any kind of engagement in the next year as well. For the public engage-
ments to take place, it is also important that a corporation does not display a lot of suc-
cessful private engagements in the previous year. Importantly, for the private engage-
ments to take place, the corporation’s private engagement reputation does not influence 
the targeting likelihood. My findings also show that the corporations are much less likely 
to become engagement targets again when they have acquired high public engagement 
reputations.  
5.3.2.2 What are the effects of firm characteristics? 
In this section, I elaborate on the effects that different firm characteristics have on the 
targeting likelihood. Basically, I find very consistent effects for all four models under 
investigation. My results suggest that a firm’s size, cash position and Tobin’s Q signifi-
cantly increases the odds that it becomes engaged with any kind or even both kinds of 
engagements. This increase implies that shareholders target financially sound and large 
corporations more often because they expect that these corporations can afford the im-
plementation of certain shareholder requests. I also find that poorly performing corpora-
tions and the corporations with more closely held shares are less likely to be targeted 
with the public shareholder engagements. It is important to note that several corporate 
characteristics are important for the presence of the public shareholder engagements, but 
not for the private engagements (e.g., closely held shares, past performance, and divi-
dends per share). 
5.3.2.3 What are the economic effects concerning the targeting likelihood? 
To illustrate the effects of the engagement means on the targeting probability, I now 
provide the economic magnitudes of these effects. I explain here in detail one example 
of my calculations and provide one summary table with the results for all four models in 
Table 5.5. I have to stress that these results are all based on hypothetical types of firms. 
That is, all results in italics are in fact hypothetical results because firms cannot have a 
nonzero engagement reputation when there in fact were no engagements in t-1.  
 Based on the assumption that an average sample corporation just displays public 
engagements in t-1 and has a public and a private engagement reputation of zero, then 
the likelihood that this particular corporation becomes targeted with any kind of en-
gagement is equal to 69.5%. In contrast, if the same corporation exhibits private en-
gagements instead of public engagements in t-1, then the targeting likelihood is equal to 
34.1%. Hence, the effect of being exposed to the public engagements on the targeting 
likelihood is much stronger than the effect of the private engagements. This finding is 
not surprising because by construction my proxy for the public shareholder engagement 
(that is, shareholder proposals) occurs more often and also because it arises out of the 
entire shareholder base.  
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I now investigate the same average corporation but now I assume that the corporation 
was exposed to both the public and the private engagements in t-1. The reputation 
measures are still assumed to be equal to zero. Thus, the targeting likelihood becomes 
78.5%. Now, I also take into account the different engagement reputation levels. I as-
sume that the same average corporation with both the private and the public engage-
ments in t-1, and that this corporation has a public and a private engagement reputation 
of one. In other words, I study a corporation that was exposed to both engagements in 
the past year and honored all of its shareholder engagements as well. Thus, the probabil-
ity that the same corporation becomes an engagement target in the current year is equal 
to 34%. Hence, because of their negative effects, the inclusion of the interaction term 
between private and public engagements, and the two reputation measures cancel out the 
effect of the public engagements in t-1. A summary with all of the targeting probabilities 
for all of the four models in Table 5.5 is provided in Table 5.6. 
 Panel A of Table 5.6 presents the predicted probabilities for the targeting likelihood 
concerning any kind of engagement. It summarizes the example calculations of the sec-
tion before. One clearly sees that those corporations exhibit the highest predicted target-
ing likelihood which are exposed to the public engagements in t-1. If the corporation’s 
public and private engagement reputation is also very low, and it also displays the pri-
vate engagements in t-1; then the targeting likelihood becomes the highest. This is very 
useful information for corporations who want to prepare for potential shareholder en-
gagements. Panels B-D of Table 5.6 present the predicted targeting likelihoods for the 
three remaining models in Table 5.5. The overall picture that emerges is that a necessary 
pre-condition for a very high likelihood of becoming targeted with either private, public, 
or even both engagements is that the corporation must display the public engagements in 
t-1. 
 I conclude from this section that the likelihood of becoming targeted with any kind 
of shareholder engagement is highest for the corporations that are exposed to both mech-
anisms in the past but that have low engagement reputations in the first place. 
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Table 5.6: Predicted targeting probabilities 
This table presents the predicted targeting probabilities for the four legit models presented in Table 5.5. Panel 
A calculates the probabilities for the first model, Panel B for the second, and so forth. Note that the probabili-
ties in italics are just the hypothetical honoring probabilities for firms that might not exist in reality. 
Panel A: Targeting Likelihood for any Kind of Engagement 
Public Engagement t-1 
Yes No 
   
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 1 
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 0 
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 1
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 0 
Pr
iv
at
e 
E
ng
ag
em
en
t  
T
-1
 
Y
es
 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 1 34.0% 71.3% 6.8% 26.0% 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 0 43.1% 78.5% 9.7% 34.1% 
N
o 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 1 24.3% 60.8% 3.1% 13.2% 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 0 32.1% 69.5% 4.4% 18.3% 
Panel B: Targeting Likelihood for Private Engagement 
Public Engagement t-1 
Yes No 
   
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 1 
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 0 
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 1
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 0 
Pr
iv
at
e 
E
ng
ag
em
en
t  
t-1
 
Y
es
 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 1 18.2% 20.3% 11.7% 13.2% 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 0 14.3% 16.1% 9.0% 10.2% 
N
o 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 1 7.9% 9.0% 5.0% 5.7% 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 0 6.1% 6.9% 3.8% 4.3% 
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Table 5.6 continued 
Panel C: Targeting Likelihood for Public Engagement 
Public Engagement t-1 
Yes No 
   
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 1 
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 0 
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 1
Public Eng. 
Reputation = 0 
Pr
iv
at
e 
E
ng
ag
em
en
t  
t-1
 
Y
es
 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 1 21.9% 60.0% 3.2% 15.0% 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 0 30.6% 70.2% 5.0% 21.8% 
N
o 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 1 19.3% 56.0% 1.8% 9.1% 
Private Eng. 
Reputation = 0 27.3% 66.7% 2.9% 13.6% 
Panel D: Targeting likelihood for both Engagement Types 
Public engagement t-1 
yes no 
   
Public Eng. 
reputation = 1 
Public Eng. 
reputation = 0 
Public Eng. 
reputation = 1 
Public Eng. 
reputation = 0 
Pr
iv
at
e 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t  
t-1
 
ye
s 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 1 8.1% 13.8% 2.2% 3.9% 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 0 6.3% 11.0% 1.7% 3.0% 
no
 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 1 3.8% 6.7% 0.8% 1.5% 
Private Eng. 
reputation = 0 2.9% 5.2% 0.6% 1.2% 
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Table 5.7: Determinants of targeting (sub-topics) 
This table presents the results of four different logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is 
different for each model. The dependent variables are indicator variables that equal one if the corresponding 
engagement type is present and zero otherwise. All right-hand-side variables are measured at t-1, whereas the 
dependent variables are measured at time t0. Robust p-values are reported below the coefficients in parentheses, 
and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variables: Private CG 
Engagement? 
Public CG En-
gagement? 
Private CSR 
Engagement? 
Public CSR 
Engagement? 
Public Engagement t-1 0.515*** 2.259*** 0.401*** 1.653*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Reputation Public t-1 -0.188 -1.383*** -0.284* -0.816*** 
 (0.196) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) 
Private Engagement t-1 1.023*** 0.523*** 0.790*** 0.716*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reputation Private t-1 0.334 -0.072 -0.105 -0.415** 
 (0.129) (0.742) (0.661) (0.037) 
Private* PublicEngagement t-1 -0.105 -0.231 0.303 -0.419** 
 (0.574) (0.169) (0.157) (0.020) 
Firm Size 0.814*** 0.776*** 1.057*** 0.657*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.125 0.683*** -0.051 -0.301 
 (0.625) (0.001) (0.868) (0.183) 
Cash 1.330*** 0.873*** 1.282*** 0.350 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.261) 
% Closely Held Shares -0.322 -0.235 0.133 -0.472* 
 (0.277) (0.326) (0.704) (0.066) 
1yr Sales Growth 0.158 -0.685*** 0.119 -0.290* 
 (0.400) (0.000) (0.579) (0.083) 
Dividends Per Share 0.038 0.136*** 0.131* 0.181*** 
 (0.572) (0.006) (0.073) (0.001) 
Tobin's Q 0.158*** 0.013 0.226*** 0.105*** 
 (0.000) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -10.425*** -9.141*** -11.945*** -7.867*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes 
Time Effects yes yes yes yes 
     
Number of Observations 10,801 10,801 10,801 10,801 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.346 0.391 0.395 0.300 
  
P U B L I C  A N D  P R I V A T E  S H A R E H O L D E R  E N G A G E M E N T  
C H A P T E R  5  
 152 
In order to investigate how the determinants of targeting differ across engagement top-
ics, I conduct the same analysis as before for the corporate governance and the CSR 
engagements. This is done in Table 5.7 in which it becomes apparent that a corporation’s 
exposure to these engagements is driven by the same factors as the entire sample. In 
particular, I stress the importance of a corporation’s private engagement reputation for 
the public CSR engagements (Model 4). Highly reputable corporations with respect to 
private engagements drive down the likelihood that the corporations become targeted 
with the public CSR topics.  
5.3.3 How do private and public engagements relate to the honoring likelihood? 
In this section, I investigate the effect of the private and the public engagements on the 
honoring likelihood. Table 5.8 presents the outcomes of the empirical models outlined in 
Section 5.3.1. All of the models of this table control for the corporate characteristics, and 
the year and industry effects. I focus on the effects of the engagement control variables 
on the honoring likelihood. Model 1 shows the results for the overall honoring likeli-
hood, irrespective of the engagement type. Apparently, a corporation’s honoring deci-
sion is substantially influenced by the presence of concurrent and past engagements, 
both privately and publicly. The concurrent presence of at least one public and one pri-
vate engagement significantly increases the odds that a corporation will honor any en-
gagements. To illustrate, an average corporation without any engagement reputation and 
no engagements in t-1 but with just public engagements in t0 exhibits a honoring likeli-
hood of 46.7%. The same corporation with both engagement types in t0 displays a honor-
ing likelihood of 57.8%. Hence, the simultaneous presence of both the public and the 
private shareholder engagements increases the odds that the corporation honors at least 
one engagement by more than ten percentage points – all else being equal. 
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A corporation’s engagement history also matters for its current honoring decisions. I find 
that the past public and private engagements at a corporation also significantly affect the 
corporation’s current honoring decision. More specifically, I find that when the corpora-
tion was exposed to public engagements in t-1, the chances that it will honor an engage-
ment in t0 decreases significantly. Contrarily, the corporation’s past private engagements 
significantly increase the likelihood that the target corporation will honor an engage-
ment. To illustrate these effects, consider the following example. Recall that an average 
corporation – without any engagement reputation – with just public engagements in t0 
has a honoring likelihood of 46.7%. When I take this exemplary corporation and assume 
that it also displays public engagements in t-1, I find a honoring likelihood of 33.6%. I 
conclude from this result that these kinds of corporations are less likely to honor en-
gagements when they are targeted repeatedly with the public engagements. A corpora-
tion with both engagement types in t0 but only private engagements in t-1 exhibits a 
likelihood of 68.2%. Comparatively, a corporation with both types of engagements in t0 
and t-1 displays a honoring probability of 55.3%. Hence, I conclude that the engagement 
agent should especially target those corporations at which no public engagement has 
taken place in t-1 but has in t0 and at which the private engagements were conducted in t-
1, because they increase the chances that the target corporation will honor at least one 
engagement activity of any kind. 
 Concerning the effects of a corporation’s engagement reputation, I find that highly 
reputable corporations with respect to the public engagements have a much higher hon-
oring probability than the corporations with a low public engagement reputation. Fur-
ther, I conclude from my findings that a corporation’s private engagement successes do 
not substantially affect a corporation’s current honoring likelihood. 
 An overview of the honoring probabilities arising out of the first empirical model in 
Table 5.8 can be found in Table 5.9.  
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These probabilities are based on all of the combinations of my engagement control vari-
ables, assuming the two most extreme values for the engagement reputation of zero (no 
honored engagements in the past) and one (all received engagements are honored). It is 
important to realize that these results are all based on hypothetical types of firms. In 
particular, the numbers in Table 5.9 which are displayed in italics are the results for 
types of firms which can just exist if some engagement activities earlier than in t-1 have 
been honored to the fullest extent possible. Otherwise, the engagement reputation cannot 
be equal to one, as there were no private or public engagements in t-1. This table should 
just illustrate the important effect that a firm’s past honoring behavior has on a firm’s 
current honoring probability. 
 Table 5.9 divulges an important finding concerning the honoring likelihood: A high 
public engagement reputation increases the honoring probabilities in all instances. Fur-
thermore, the corporations that are exposed to public engagements in t0, but not in t-1 
have higher honoring probabilities than the corporations with public engagements in t-1. 
Hence, the repetitive public shareholder engagements might not pay off. Contrarily, in 
combination with the private engagement, I find that the private engagements in t0 and t-
1 even further increase the honoring likelihood. According to my model, the highest 
predicted honoring probability is 80.6%. I find the honoring probability for a corporation 
that has the following engagement characteristics: public engagements in t0, no public 
engagements in t-1, public engagement reputation of one, private engagements in t0 and 
t-1, and a private engagement reputation of zero. It is important to stress the fact that the 
obtained predicted probabilities displayed in Table 5.9 are solely based on the fitted 
Model 1 in Table 5.8. Hence, the question is why the predicted probabilities in the lower 
right part of Table 5.9 – where no engagement at all take place at a particular corporation 
– are non-zero, at least in t0 and t-1. I argue that this result is because there were already 
some engagements going on that could be honored in t0. That is, the engagements initiat-
ed in t-2 or even earlier could be honored in t0, which causes the predicted probability to 
be positive. Essentially, I can derive all of the predicted probabilities for all kinds of 
corporations from Table 5.9. 
5.3.3.1 What are the effects for corporate governance engagements? 
In general, in Table 5.8, I find very similar effects for the entire universe of honored 
corporate governance engagements. Even though the coefficients are slightly smaller in 
their magnitude than for the entire sample, I find the same effects. The current private 
and public engagements significantly increase the odds that the corporations that were 
targeted with the governance engagements will honor at least one of them. As before, the 
presence of the public engagements in t-1 lowers the chances that a corporation will 
honor the CG engagements. The effect of a corporation’s public engagement reputation 
is still positive but significant just at the 10% level. 
 However, I detect some important differences when I distinguish between honored 
public and private engagements. Model 3 of Table 5.8 displays the results for the private 
governance engagements, while Model 4 shows the results for the public engagements. 
The private corporate governance engagements are more likely to be honored by the 
corporations if there were both private and public engagements in year t-1, the year be-
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fore the honoring takes place. Other engagement variables do not affect the likelihood 
that the corporations accept the shareholders’ concerns. On the other hand, for the public 
corporate governance engagements, I find that the same relations hold as for the entire 
sample of honored governance engagements. In particular, the past year’s public en-
gagement presence significantly suppresses the likelihood that the public governance 
engagements are honored. One explanation for this finding can be that the serious issues 
were discussed in the past year and that the settling of these issues is still pending or 
incompletely accomplished.  
 The remaining outcomes indicate that the public engagement reputation and the 
current and past private engagements significantly increase the honoring likelihood of 
the public governance engagements. The importance of the private engagements in the 
context of the honored public engagements could imply that the engagement agent is 
raising issues for which there were already some public engagement going on over the 
past couple of years. Hence, I argue there is a kind of bandwagon effect going on that 
implies that the engagement agent potentially picks up public events or public engage-
ments and starts to engage on similar issues as well. 
5.3.3.2 Which effects do I find for CSR engagements? 
I conduct the same analysis as before but now for honored CSR engagements. The re-
sults for the successful CSR engagements in Table 5.8 differ substantially from those of 
the entire sample and corporate governance engagements. For the entire CSR honoring 
sample (Model 5), I find the same results for my public engagement control variables as 
before. That is, the current (past) public engagements increase (decrease) the honoring 
likelihood for the CSR engagements significantly. Furthermore, a corporation’s public 
engagement reputation is positively related to the CSR honoring likelihood. However, 
the following findings differ from the ones obtained up to now. I find that out of the 
private engagement control variables, just the current private engagements significantly 
and negatively relate to the honoring likelihood of the CSR proposals. More precisely, I 
find that the corporations that receive the private engagements in the current year are less 
likely to display successful CSR engagements in the current period. Hence, more en-
gagement on the private side lowers the success potential of shareholder engagement on 
particular social and environmental corporate policies. A direct, but still speculative, 
implication is that the institutional investors should not privately engage at the corpora-
tions for which they know that the public engagements are ongoing and were performed 
in the past – at least when the agent wants to achieve a corporate change with respect to 
the CSR policies. The remaining private engagement controls do not significantly affect 
the honoring likelihood of the CSR engagements. 
 Models 6 and 7 of Table 5.8 study the private and the public honored CSR engage-
ments respectively. My results suggest that the likelihood of having successful private 
CSR engagements is basically not affected by any of the public engagement control 
variables. I conclude that the success of the private CSR engagements is completely 
independent of a corporation’s reputation concerning the public engagements as well as 
any public engagements in the current and the past year. Concerning my private en-
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gagement control variables, the results point to a positive relation between the honored 
private CSR engagements and the past year’s private engagements.  
 I find the completely reversed result for the public honored CSR engagements. None 
of the private engagement control variables exhibits a significant relation with the likeli-
hood that the corporations will honor public CSR engagements. On the other hand, I find 
that the public engagements in t-1 and a corporation’s public engagement reputation 
decrease and increase, respectively, the honoring likelihood for the public CSR engage-
ments. To investigate which effect looms larger, I take a closer look at the predicted 
honoring probabilities for three kinds of corporations. The first corporation is an average 
corporation that exhibits just the public engagements in t-1. The second average corpora-
tion displays just a public engagement reputation of one, but has no public engagements 
in t-1. Lastly, I study the predicted probability for a corporation that has a public en-
gagement in t-1 and whose public engagement reputation is equal to one. The first cor-
poration has a predicted honoring likelihood of 32.2%, the second 82.1%, and the third 
60%. Comparing the second and the third corporations, I directly see that the past peri-
od’s public engagements decrease the honoring likelihood by 22.1 percentage points to 
60%, which is of course still higher than the likelihood for corporation number one with 
just the public engagements in t-1. Hence, I infer from these results that the public CSR 
engagements are most likely honored when a corporation honored a lot of public share-
holder engagement in the past. 
5.4  Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, I take a more holistic—though most likely still incomplete—view on 
shareholder engagement and provide the first indicative evidence on both facets of 
shareholder engagement: the private and the public shareholder engagements through 
private dialogues and shareholder proposals respectively.  
 My descriptive results indeed indicate that the shareholder engagement has a public 
and a private domain. I find that over time, the number of corporations that display the 
private engagements steadily increases. This increase also holds true for the public en-
gagements. Still, a relatively large fraction of the potential engagement targets exhibit 
neither of the two engagements. On average, I find that those corporations that become 
targeted with private and/or public engagements exhibit more private engagements than 
public. However, even though the average number of public engagements is lower, the 
success rates are much higher for the public engagements. This is not surprising because 
I study just the engagement activities of one single (non-US) institutional investor whose 
power and influence cannot be as large as the engagement power of the entire sharehold-
er base, the origin of the public engagement proxy.  
 My empirical results indicate the following important relations. Shareholder en-
gagement seems to resemble a kind of repetitive game: the past public and the past pri-
vate engagements significantly increase the odds that the same corporation becomes 
targeted in the subsequent period with any kind of engagement, whether private or public 
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or even both. The past engagement success in the public engagement domain and to a 
lesser extent in the private engagement domain significantly reduce the likelihood that 
the corporations become targeted with any kind of engagement, especially public en-
gagements. 
 Regarding the success of the shareholder engagement, I show that the past honored 
public engagements significantly increase the probability that the corporations will honor 
shareholder engagements of any kind today. This increase holds true for the full subsam-
ples of corporate governance and the CSR engagements. Furthermore, I demonstrate that 
the presence of the past public engagements significantly reduces the probability of the 
public engagement success. On the other hand, the presence of the past private engage-
ments has a significant and positive effect on the honoring likelihood. Generally, I find 
that the past public engagement success is positively related to the current engagement 
success but the effect is negative and nonsignificant for the past private successes. Fur-
thermore, my results also disclose that the public (private) engagements are not relevant 
for the likelihood of the successful private (public) CSR engagements.  
 What do my results imply for shareholders, managers and researchers? Conceptual-
ly, I conjecture three important implications. First, my results suggest that especially, 
successful public engagements are a good predictor of future engagement successes of 
any kind. This is valuable information for institutional investors who have to carefully 
decide where to spend their scarce resources when it comes to engagement decisions. 
This is also important information for institutional investors who want to maximize the 
chances of the successful engagements. Based on this finding, the institutional investors 
should carefully focus their engagement resources on the corporations at which the cur-
rent public shareholder engagements are ongoing and at which the past public engage-
ments were relatively more successful (as far as it is observable).  
 Second, managers should be aware of the fact that the shareholder engagement can 
take place through public and private means. This fact implies that managers should not 
underestimate the power of the continuous private dialogues with important and presum-
ably large institutional shareholders. These institutional investors are well-connected to 
other institutions and can therefore exert a lot of pressure against the corporations and 
the management teams through other channels rather than the engagement means studied 
in this chapter. 
 Third, researchers in the field of shareholder engagement should acknowledge the 
existence of the private and the public shareholder engagements. The public shareholder 
engagement, like the shareholder proposals (being probably the most visible and popular 
public engagement tool), is most likely a last resort mechanism to promote change at the 
corporations. Consistent with Chapter 3, I posit that most of the time, the institutional 
investors take the private route first and only later go public if the private negotiations 
fail. Hence, the researchers should treat the shareholder engagement process as a dynam-
ic one that has several layers and dimensions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
Corporations around the world are earmarked by a separation between ownership and 
control: Their managers are hired by the shareholders to run the business on their behalf. 
Generally, the managers do not own significant stakes in the corporations they run. As 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally show, this fact can lead to agency costs of equity 
because the managers and the shareholders can have divergent interests. To align their 
interests, corporate governance mechanisms are put in place that should ensure that the 
corporations are run in the interest of the shareholders. The literature has investigated 
many different governance mechanisms: the market for corporate control (e.g., Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), the product market (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2010), a corpo-
ration’s capital structure (e.g., Jensen, 1986), the managerial ownership (e.g., Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988), the large shareholders (e.g., Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 
1997), and the board of directors (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Furthermore, the 
executive compensation and incentive contracts are also supposed to be governance 
mechanisms (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1999).  
 In this dissertation, I argue that shareholders as the owners of the corporation also 
have a direct corporate governance role through shareholder engagement. I claim that 
shareholders should raise their voice—as in the spirit of Hirschman (1970)—to become 
engaged and in doing so monitor the corporate management’s actions and change its 
environmental, social, and governance policies if necessary. 
 I allege that this argument holds for all kinds of shareholders be they small, individ-
ual, retail investors or be they pension funds, insurance companies, labor unions, or any 
other large institutional investor. Due to the generally dispersed ownership structures of 
the large corporations, special importance is attached to the institutional investors. Gen-
erally, few individual shareholders really vote their proxies at the annual general meeting 
(AGM) or advise their custodian how to vote on their behalf. But, proxy voting can be a 
first step in raising their voice. Larger, mostly institutional, shareholders can do more 
than mere proxy voting because they have the economic power to do so. They can file 
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shareholder proposals and enter into private engagements with the investee corporations. 
Hence, pension and mutual funds should also raise their voice on behalf of their clients 
and beneficiaries. Against the background of a growing demand for socially responsible 
and sustainable investments, I impute a special archetype function to the institutional 
investors: investing responsibly and sustainably means more than excluding particular 
stocks because of certain business models and including other stocks because of their 
relatively ‘superior’ environmental, social, or governance (ESG) standards. Investing 
responsibly also means shareholder engagement that promotes changes and sustainable 
ESG practices at investee corporations.  
 I arrive at these conclusions after having conducted four empirical studies on share-
holder engagement. The main findings can be summarized as follows: 
 In Chapter 2, I study the shareholder engagement through proxy proposals in the 
United States from 1997–2006. Specifically, I research the determinants of the proposal 
occurrences and the drivers of the outcome levels of the voted shareholder proposals. 
This chapter distinguishes itself from the other papers on shareholder engagement 
through proposals, because I incorporate both the withdrawn and the omitted shareholder 
proposals in the analyses. This inclusion implies that my results are based on a cleaner 
data set because I treat the withdrawn and the omitted proposals as ‘filed’ shareholder 
proposals. The main hypothesis of Chapter 2 is as follows: The lack of industry competi-
tion in combination with the higher managerial entrenchment increases the likelihood of 
the corporations being targeted with the shareholder proposals. My empirical results 
support this hypothesis. The poorly governed corporations, in terms of product market 
competition and exposure to the managerial labor market, are more likely to receive the 
shareholder proposals. Therefore, I claim that the shareholders are capable of selecting 
those corporations for which the shareholder engagement is necessary. Concerning pro-
posal effectiveness, I find that the insiders’ equity holdings have a significant and nega-
tive effect on the total voting outcomes of the shareholder proposals. Hence, I argue that 
the managers either explicitly vote against the shareholder proposals or that they at least 
signal to important and powerful shareholders that a supporting vote for particular share-
holder proposals is not beneficial to the corporation. 
 Chapter 3 turns the perspective from the voted shareholder proposals to those pro-
posals that are withdrawn prior to the AGM. The analysis is based on more than 12,000 
shareholder proposals that were filed at S&P1500 corporations from 1997–2009. Out of 
all of the filed shareholder proposals, more than 2,500 (or 20%) were withdrawn prior to 
the AGM. The proposals sponsored by the institutional investors and the labor unions are 
on average more frequently withdrawn than the proposals filed by the individual inves-
tors and the coordinated interest groups. As the title of this chapter suggests, I am partic-
ularly interested in the drivers of the proposals’ withdrawals. My empirical results sug-
gest that the institutional ownership is positively related to the withdrawal’s likelihood. 
By categorizing the institutional investors, I show that especially the ownership of the 
long-term, passively investing institutions significantly increase the odds of a proposal’s 
withdrawal. My proposal-level analysis shows that conditional on the fact that a proposal 
is filed by an institutional investor, the effect of the institutional ownership stake be-
comes even larger. Chapter 3 also demonstrates a negative relation between the insider 
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ownership and the withdrawal’s likelihood. This finding reflects the increased bargain-
ing power of the managers when they hold relatively more shares.  
 Chapter 3 generally investigates the public shareholder engagement through the 
shareholder proposals. However, Chapter 3 also contains a private facet of engagement: 
the private negotiations following the public filing of a proposal. Chapter 4 then turns to 
the completely private domain of the shareholder engagement: the private shareholder 
engagement of a large institutional investor. 
 In Chapter 4, I investigate the global engagement activities of a large UK-based 
asset manager. This asset manager undertakes the shareholder engagement on behalf of 
several institutional clients. Hence, the economic power standing behind the asset man-
ager is enormous. In contrast to other studies on private engagements (e.g., Dimson, 
Karakas, and Li, 2013, Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998 and Chapter 5), I provide 
the first global evidence on private shareholder engagement by studying 397 corpora-
tions from 37 different countries. My main research hypothesis is that there is a home 
bias in both the engagement intensity as well as in the engagement success. The empiri-
cal results confirm my hypothesis: the engagement intensity is significantly higher at UK 
corporations. Consistent with Chapter 2, I find that the larger corporations receive signif-
icantly more private engagements than their smaller counterparts. I interpret this finding 
as evidence in favor of the argument that the larger corporations are more likely to be in 
the asset manager’s and its clients’ portfolios and hence, make up for a substantial por-
tion of the entire investment portfolio. Therefore, engagement at these corporations is of 
particular importance. Interestingly, I am able to show that the asset manager’s past 
engagement efforts are important determinants of the current engagement activities. The 
private engagements apparently are a product of the long-term relationship between the 
engagement agent and the portfolio corporations. I also discover that geography is an 
important driver of the engagement success: The corporations from the United States and 
Continental Europe have on average significantly more successful engagements than 
their UK counterparts. I come up with two potential explanations for this latter finding. 
First, the engagement agent targets specifically those foreign corporations for which the 
necessity of engagement is also the highest and which therefore have the highest poten-
tial to change. Second, the UK corporations have tight nationwide regulations with re-
spect to corporate governance and environmental standards that limits the potential of 
change in domestic corporations. 
 Chapter 5 of this dissertation combines the research efforts undertaken in the previ-
ous chapters. In this chapter, I study both the private and the public engagements at the 
same time to uncover their interdependencies and their simultaneous effects on the cor-
poration’s likelihood of being targeted and of honoring its engagements. Conceptually, 
Chapter 5 consists of three parts. First, I document the evolution of the private and the 
public shareholder engagements at US corporations from 1999–2011. Second, I study 
the determinants of the occurrences of both the private and the public shareholder en-
gagements. And third, I investigate the drivers of the successful engagements with a 
particular focus on the presence of both engagements and a corporation’s engagement 
history.  
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I rely on the private engagement data from the same UK-based asset manager as in 
Chapter 4. However, this time, I only use the engagement data for US corporations. I 
combine this proprietary engagement data with the public data on the shareholder pro-
posals to study the aforementioned research objectives. The results of this chapter indi-
cate that the shareholder engagement indeed consists of both public and private domains. 
The corporations are exposed to either the public or the private engagements or some-
times both. However, I find that most of the corporations in the sample are still not tar-
geted with any kind of engagement. 
 Regarding the determinants of the targeting likelihood, I show the following. After 
controlling for the corporate characteristics and the industry and year effects, I find that 
those corporations that have the highest predicted targeting likelihood have both public 
and private engagements in the previous year and a low reputation regarding both en-
gagements. 
 Turning the perspective to the honoring likelihood, I find several important issues. A 
corporation must have the following characteristics to have the highest predicted honor-
ing likelihood—given my empirical model: First, the corporation must have both private 
and public engagements in the current period (where honoring takes place). Second, 
there must be private engagements in the previous period, but no public engagements. 
Lastly, a corporation must have a high public engagement reputation and a low private 
reputation.  
 What implications my thesis has for investors, managers, and researchers is outlined 
in the next sections. 
6.1  Implications of this dissertation 
Many implications can be derived from my dissertation, some of which have already 
been discussed within the corresponding chapters. I mentioned in the introduction that 
the shareholders have the responsibility to oversee the management’s actions and to 
monitor corporate behavior. What my dissertation shows is that quite a bit of shareholder 
engagement already exists especially through the shareholder proposals and the private 
engagements. Apparently, the shareholders became aware of their monitoring duty after 
certain scandals like Enron and Worldcom and after the financial crises. However, my 
dissertation results also imply that there is a potential upside to the shareholder engage-
ment.  
 I argue that based on my results, more institutional shareholder involvement is need-
ed. As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, institutional investors could and also 
should go beyond mere proxy voting. The institutional investors should become more 
active by filing shareholder proposals or even privately engaging—either themselves or 
through an engagement agency. 
 For example, I find that the shareholder proposal mechanism is frequently used by 
shareholders to influence corporate behavior. I find that a lot of individual, retail inves-
tors are filing shareholder proposals. Interestingly, my results show that the proposals of 
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individual investors are least successful in terms of their voting outcomes and their with-
drawal probabilities. The institutional investors, on the other hand, file fewer proposals 
compared to the individual investors but are on average more successful. Hence, I attrib-
ute an even more important monitoring role to the institutional investors. They have the 
incentives, the knowledge, the resources, and the economic power to really change cor-
porate behavior. The institutional investors should therefore act more collectively with 
other institutional investors but also the individual investors to make the proposal mech-
anism even more effective. I am not advocating a type of “acting in concert” engage-
ment, I am just asking for a closer collaboration between the shareholders to decently 
scrutinize the investee corporations regarding their corporate behavior. 
 Also, there has to be a consensus between the institutional investors on what topics 
exactly to engage in with the corporations. One way of dealing with this issue is the 
private engagements discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Sometimes, the shareholders have 
divergent interests and are possibly lobbying for opposite issues. Pooling resources 
through an engagement agent might help in this instance. This engagement agent could 
collect the needs and the views of every client and then design a common engagement 
policy. In doing so, the economic power behind the engagement activities could be much 
larger and therefore be more likely to be heard by the managers.  
 Much of today’s discussion is about responsible investing and the sustainability of 
corporations. Topics like reasonable executive pay practices, human rights standards, 
and global warming are more prevalent than ever. Many individual shareholders as well 
as the institutional investors are more and more willing to generate returns by relying on 
socially responsible investments. Some examples are pension funds, churches, or social-
ly responsible mutual funds. These investors generally screen certain potential invest-
ments. This screening assesses the ESG quality of the particular corporations and, based 
on this judgment, are included in the portfolio or not. Often, the first exclusion criteria 
for these investors is the fact that particular corporations are doing business in the sin 
industries like tobacco, gambling, or military defense. Another exclusion criteria might 
be the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, which has become more or less a 
standard. In conclusion, particular investors walk away from particular corporations or 
even do not start investing in them because they want socially responsible and sustaina-
ble investments. However, referring back to my introduction, are these investment strat-
egies really responsible? Given the results of my dissertation, I claim not. 
 The institutional investors who have certain moral or ethical investment beliefs and 
standards because their beneficiaries and clients demand them can do more than just 
exclude particular corporations. They can promote sustainability and responsibility 
standards at those corporations and change them for the better. In doing so, they could 
invest in a responsible way because they do not simply leave corporations operating in 
the ways they currently are. 
 By no means do I advocate that shareholders should try to change a corporation’s 
line of business or anything like that. Rather, I challenge the claim that certain ESG 
standards cannot be changed by shareholders even though particular corporations are 
operating in industries that do not comply with particular moral standards. As my results 
show, human rights policies, worker safety standards, or reasonable executive pay prac-
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tices can even be promoted by shareholders at those corporations. Shareholders have to 
realize this opportunity, but they also have a duty to do so. 
 Consistent with my previous claim, I am going to again stress that I do not postulate 
that shareholders—whether large institutions or individuals—should interfere with the 
day-to-day business of corporations. The public nature of corporations requires that the 
complex management tasks are ‘delegated’ to the top managers with the expertise to run 
the businesses. In fact, it is impossible for all kinds of shareholders to get a clear picture 
of how a corporation is run or how it should be run. The knowledge and expertise of the 
shareholders is simply not sufficient to arrogate the corporate policies by demanding 
certain changes. However, more general policies like the implementation of worker 
safety standards, human rights policies, or the introduction of more environmentally 
friendly policies can be raised by shareholders. 
6.2  Suggestions for future research 
The literature on shareholder engagement is growing rapidly. However, it is still in its 
infancy; much more has to be researched to make the definitive conclusions about the 
effectiveness and societal as well as economic additional benefit the shareholder en-
gagement creates—or does not. In this dissertation, I attempt to add to the literature, but 
several more possibilities exist that can continue the research path that I have taken. 
 First, much more research has to be done in different legal jurisdictions. Out of the 
four chapters of this dissertation, three are concerned with the United States. Also, much 
of the corporate finance literature focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries, if not only on the 
United States However, the shareholder engagement is undertaken by completely differ-
ent means in different legal jurisdictions and its potential to create benefits is also de-
pendent on the underlying legal system. The ownership regimes of Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries are very distinct from other, more bank-based countries, like Japan or Germany. 
There, the equity ownership is concentrated in the hands of the banks, financial institu-
tions, and other corporations whereas the equity ownership in Anglo-Saxon countries is 
much more dispersed. Therefore, it might be very interesting to investigate how the 
shareholder engagement works in bank-based systems. Is it more effective in those juris-
dictions? What are the obstacles that the institutional investors have to overcome in 
those markets? Does the engagement approach differ compared to the engagement in the 
Anglo-Saxon world? These kind of questions are interesting avenues for the future re-
search on this topic. 
 Second, we as researchers have to look much deeper into the “bargaining game” that 
managers are playing with shareholders who engage. As I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, 
there is always the possibility that the management teams surrender and implement, for 
example, particular CSR policies just to circumvent the introduction of much tougher 
governance standards that could erode their power and potentially their compensation. 
We have to understand what exactly is going on behind the scenes by looking at the 
interdependencies of the detailed engagements on a particular topic. 
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Third, the literature on shareholder engagement so far lacks evidence on the reputational 
costs for corporations who do not honor their engagements. So far, the evidence, and 
also this dissertation, tries to establish a link between the successful shareholder en-
gagement and the benefits to the shareholders. Notwithstanding, it is of great importance 
to investigate if and how the corporations suffer from not honoring the major sharehold-
ers’ engagements. In particular, do these corporations suffer from losses in reputation? 
Do these corporations have lower analyst coverage? Do these corporations have less 
institutional ownership? These are in my view the relevant questions that also emphasize 
the connection between the shareholder engagement and particular corporate finance 
topics. 
 Fourth, it is important to realize that my dissertation focuses on the shareholder 
engagement. However, a corporation has more capital providers, for example bondhold-
ers. As a matter of fact, the bondholders do not necessarily share the same interests as 
the shareholders. Hence, it might be important to shed more light on the consequences of 
the shareholder engagement for the bondholders. From a practical viewpoint, this is also 
important for large institutional investors: How does an investor engage with the corpo-
rations when he or she holds both an equity and a debt position in a particular corpora-
tion? Answering this question could help to increase the effectiveness of the engagement 
and possibly to reduce the conflicting interests within the organizations of the institu-
tional investors. 
 My dissertation is just the start at looking into the private shareholder engagements. 
It will be interesting to see whether similar studies on multiple institutional investors will 
be conducted to see how successful the pooled institutional ownership base that engages 
for more sustainable and responsible corporations will be. 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
(Summary in German) 
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema Corporate Governance, 
der Bezeichnung für gute Unternehmensführung und –kontrolle. Der Begriff Corporate 
Governance, wie er in dieser Arbeit definiert wird, beinhaltet alle Maßnahmen und Me-
chanismen, die von internen sowie externen Interessengruppen genutzt werden können, 
um börsennotierte Unternehmen und deren Geschäftspraktiken zu kontrollieren, zu 
beeinflussen, aber auch um Managementverhalten nachhaltiger zu gestalten. Dazu zählt 
auch die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Vergütungs- und Anreizmechanismen, die in 
der Regel installiert werden, um die Interessenkonflikte zwischen Unternehmens-
Eigentümern – den Aktionären – und den Managern zu reduzieren, wie schon durch 
Jensen und Meckling im Jahre 1976 belegt wurde.  
 Eine besondere Rolle bei der Corporate Governance schreibt diese Dissertation den 
Eigentümern börsennotierter Unternehmen zu: den Aktionären. Als direkte Eigentümer 
der Unternehmen haben Aktionäre die Aufgabe, Kontrolle über Manager und die 
Geschäftspraktiken der einzelnen Unternehmen auszuüben. In der Regel investieren 
Kleinanleger in Aktien, ohne sich bewusst zu sein, dass sie durch den Kauf eines Aktien-
teils zugleich Eigentümer des Unternehmens werden. Zumeist werden einzelne Aktien-
pakete gehalten, ohne direkte Kontrolle auszuüben. Dabei hat jeder Aktionär die Gele-
genheit mindestens einmal jährlich mittels Stimmrechtsausübung auf der Jahreshaupt-
versammlung (JHV) eines börsennotierten Unternehmens über Geschäftspolitik, Mana-
gementvergütungen, oder die Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrates direkte Kontrolle 
auszuüben. Leider findet diese Aktionärsbeteiligung von Kleinanlegern noch nicht häu-
fig genug statt. Der Grund für dieses Verhalten ist laut Grossman und Hart (1980) vor 
allem das so genannte Free-Rider Verhalten (Trittbrettfahrerverhalten), das vor allem bei 
im weiten Streubesitz befindlichen Unternehmen auftritt: Zu geringe Anteilspositionen 
bringen nicht genügend Anreize mit sich, um Kontrolle auf Manager auszuüben, da die 
Kosten den ökonomischen Nutzen – der mit allen anderen Aktionären geteilt werden 
muss – meistens übersteigen. Daher veräußern Kleinanleger eher ihre Aktien, sobald sie 
mit der finanziellen Performance des Unternehmens oder mit dessen ökologischen, 
sozialen und ethischen Standards unzufrieden sind, als dass sie aktiv einen Veränder-
ungsprozess anstoßen.  
 Daher kommt vor allem den großen, institutionellen Anlegern, wie z.B. Pensions-
kassen, Versicherungen, und Investmentfonds eine Corporate Governance Rolle zu, wie 
auch durch Shleifer und Vishny (1997) beschrieben. Diese institutionellen Anleger hal-
ten vergleichsweise große Anteile an börsennotierten Firmen und haben dementspre-
chend einen größeren finanziellen Anreiz sicherzustellen, dass das Unternehmen in 
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ihrem Sinne geleitet und ein langfristiger Planungsansatz verfolgt wird. Heutzutage 
werden institutionelle Anleger auch durch ihre eigenen Kunden und durch ihre Benefizi-
anten, wie Pensionäre und Investmentfonds-Anleger, dazu angehalten, die Geschäfts-
praktiken der einzelnen Anlagepositionen genauer zu beleuchten und kritisch zu hinter-
fragen. Dabei steht oftmals der Grundgedanke eines nachhaltigen Investments-Ansatzes 
im Vordergrund, wie weiter unten beschrieben wird.  
 Diese Dissertation argumentiert, dass ökologische, soziale und ethische Belange 
stärker von Anlegern in den Unternehmensgestaltungsprozess mit eingebracht werden 
müssen. In Zeiten von Klimaerwärmung, Umweltverschmutzung, Menschenrechts-
Verletzungen in Produktionsprozessen, sowie die Nichteinhaltung von Sicherheitsstan-
dards, haben vor allem die Eigentümer und Investoren eine direkte Pflicht, Unternehmen 
dahingehend zu kontrollieren und zu verändern, sodass die Geschäftspraktiken nachhal-
tiger ausgestaltet werden, und Manager noch verantwortlicher die Geschicke der ihnen 
anvertrauten Firmen leiten. Ich argumentiere, dass sich vor allem die Eigentümer der 
Unternehmen einbringen sollen, um bessere soziale, ökologische, und ethische Standards 
durchzusetzen, damit eine Rendite nicht um jeden Preis erwirtschaftet wird. 
 Daher fordert die vorliegende Dissertation – folgend dem Titel der Arbeit – eine 
aktive Eigentumskultur unter Aktionären: Active ownership. Zu oft werden die Anteile 
an Unternehmen als passive Investments betrachtet, die keine direkten Pflichten nach 
sich ziehen. Ich argumentiere, dass genau das Gegenteil der Fall ist: Anleger haben eine 
Pflicht, sich aktiv an der Corporate Governance eines Unternehmens zu beteiligen. Dies 
gilt sowohl für die direkten Aktionäre als auch für Vermögensverwalter, die eine Pflicht 
haben, im Sinne ihrer Benefizianten das ihnen anvertraute Vermögen zu verwalten. Wa-
rum ist dies der Fall? 
 Kleinanleger, Pensionäre und Versicherungsnehmer verlangen immer öfter, dass 
ihre Renditen nachhaltig und verantwortlich erwirtschaftet werden, das heißt, dass 
ökologische, soziale und ethische Standards von den investierten Firmen eingehalten 
werden. In der Finanzbranche wird oftmals proklamiert, dass durch das Implementieren 
sogenannter „Ausschlusskriterien“ verantwortlich und nachhaltig investiert werde. Diese 
Ausschlusskriterien folgen vorab bestimmten Faktoren, die dazu herangezogen werden, 
um zu überprüfen, ob ein Unternehmen in das Investitionsportfolio aufgenommen wer-
den kann oder nicht. Diese Kriterien schließen von vornherein die Industrien aus, die 
gemeinhin als sin industries (Sünden-Industrien) bezeichnet werden, also all die Firmen, 
die zum Beispiel in den Geschäftsfeldern Tabakproduktion, Glücksspiel, Alkoholpro-
duktion und –vertrieb, sowie Waffenproduktion tätig sind. Ob das Ausschließen von 
ganzen Industrien als Anlagemöglichkeit finanziell sinnvoll ist, sei an dieser Stelle da-
hingestellt. Es wurde jedoch von Hong und Kascperzcyk (2009) belegt, dass vor allem 
diese Sünden-Industrien positive Renditen abwerfen, die über der durchschnittlichen 
Renditeerwartung einer konventionellen Industrie liegen. 
 Des Weiteren werden in der Finanzbranche so genannte „Auswahlkriterien“ he-
rangezogen, die dazu dienen, die besten Unternehmen einer jeden Industrie hinsichtlich 
derer ökologischen, sozialen und ethischen Leistung für das Investitionsportfolio aus-
zuwählen. Dabei werden die Firmen mittels sogenannter ökologischer und sozialer Ra-
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tings herausgefiltert, die hinsichtlich dieser Aspekte eine relativ schlechtere Performance 
abliefern.  
 Meine Dissertation wirft daher die Frage auf, ob durch das Implementieren dieser 
beiden Methoden, also das einfach Ausschließen von bestimmten Firmen und Industrien 
sowie das Investieren in die relativ besten Unternehmen hinsichtlich Ökologie, Sozia-
lem, und Ethik, wirklich verantwortliches und nachhaltiges Investieren ist. Meine Ant-
wort auf diese Frage lautet Nein. 
 Ich behaupte in dieser Arbeit, dass institutionelle Investoren nicht nachhaltig und 
verantwortlich investieren, wenn sie bestimmte Industrien und Firmen nicht in ihr Anla-
geportfolio aufnehmen. Grundlage dieser Behauptung sind die Ergebnisse von Bebchuk, 
Cohen, und Yang aus dem Jahre 2013. Bis dahin galt es als profitabel, in die nachhaltig-
sten Firmen zu investieren, da diese eine positive Rendite gegenüber weniger nachhalti-
gen Firmen abwarfen (siehe zum Beispiel Gompers, Ishii, und Metrick, 2003). Bebchuk 
und seine Co-Autoren konnten im Jahre 2013 jedoch belegen, dass dieser Effekt nicht 
mehr vorhanden ist und keine überaus positiven Renditen mit einem solchen Investmen-
tansatz zu erwirtschaften sind. Ein Grund dafür ist die Tatsache, dass der Markt all diese 
Faktoren bereits in die Aktienkurse eingepreist hat und daher keine abnormalen Renditen 
mehr zu realisieren sind. 
 Daher argumentiere ich, dass institutionelle Anleger nur dann nachhaltig und ver-
antwortlich investieren, wenn sie sich aktiv daran beteiligen, weniger nachhaltige Unter-
nehmen nachhaltiger und verantwortlicher zu gestalten, und somit auch finanziell davon 
profitieren können. Aber wie können sich Anleger aktiv in ein Unternehmen einbringen? 
 Die vier empirischen Kapitel der vorliegenden Dissertation beschäftigen sich mit 
den wichtigsten zwei Maßnahmen, die Aktionäre nutzen können, um Unternehmen zu 
beeinflussen und deren ökologische, soziale, und ethische Qualität zu verbessern. Dazu 
gehört zum einen das Einreichen von Aktionärsanträgen auf Jahreshauptversammlungen 
und zum anderen das direkte Engagement bei den investierten Firmen durch direkte 
Kontaktaufnahme mit dem Management oder dem Aufsichtsrat. Diese beiden 
Maßnahmen fasse ich unter dem Begriff „Aktionärs-Engagement“ zusammen, welches 
dem im angelsächsischen Raum bekannten Begriff shareholder engagement entspricht.  
 Im Folgenden wird diese Zusammenfassung die wichtigsten theoretischen Grundla-
gen sowie empirischen Ergebnisse eines jeden Kapitel erläutern. 
 Kapitel Zwei dieser Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem US-amerikanischen Kapi-
talmarkt und beleuchtet die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Unternehmen mit Aktionärs-
Anträgen auf einer Jahreshauptversammlung (JHV) konfrontiert werden. Ak-
tionärsanträge sind Anträge die in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika von jedem 
Aktionär eingereicht werden können, der mindestens 1% der sich im Umlauf befindli-
chen Aktien hält, oder mit mindestens 2.000 US Dollar am Unternehmen beteiligt ist. 
Oftmals fordern Aktionäre in ihren Anträgen, dass bestimmte Geschäftspolitiken verän-
dert werden, dass die Höhe der Vergütungen begrenzt wird, oder dass die Zusammenset-
zung des Management Teams oder Aufsichtsrates geändert wird. Im Allgemeinen zielen 
diese Anträge darauf ab, den Wert eines Unternehmens zu steigern, aber gleichzeitig 
auch eine nachhaltigere Unternehmenspolitik durchzusetzen. Daher ist die Frage nach 
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der Konfrontationswahrscheinlichkeit eine wichtige Fragestellung für Manager als auch 
für Aktionäre. 
 Grundhypothese dieses Kapitels ist, dass Unternehmen, die einer mangelnden Kont-
rolle durch zwei externe Mechanismen unterliegen, – dem sogenannten Übernahme-
markt sowie durch Konkurrenzdruck – eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit aufweisen, mit 
Aktionärsanträgen konfrontiert zu werden. Das heißt, dass Aktionäre schlecht kontrol-
lierte Unternehmen identifizieren können und diese infolgedessen mit Anträgen konfron-
tieren. Durch Giroud und Mueller (2011) sowie Gompers, Ishii, und Metrick (2003) 
wurde bereits belegt, dass sowohl der Übernahmedruck durch konkurrierende Unter-
nehmen sowie der Konkurrenzdruck selbst als Corporate Governance Mechanismen 
funktionieren, die Manager dazu veranlassen, das Unternehmen besser zu führen und 
profitabler zu machen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse meines zweiten Kapitels stützen 
diese Hypothese: Schlecht kontrollierte Unternehmen weisen eine statistisch und öko-
nomisch höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit auf, mit Aktionärsanträgen konfrontiert zu werden. 
 Des Weiteren wird in diesem Kapitel untersucht, welche Faktoren die Abstim-
mungsresultate dieser Anträge beeinflussen. Wie viele Stimmen Aktionärsanträge auf 
der JHV schlussendlich bekommen ist eine Maßgröße für den Erfolg der Anträge. Zwar 
sind in Aktionärsanträge in den USA nicht bindend für das Management, d.h. selbst 
wenn die Anträge mehr als 50% der Stimmrechte auf sich vereinigen können, muss das 
Management die Vorgaben des jeweiligen Antrages nicht zwingend implementieren. Die 
Bedeutung eines Abstimmungsresultates eines Aktionärsantrags über 20% sollte jedoch 
nicht unterschätzt werden. Oft reicht ein solches Ergebnis aus, um genügend Druck auf 
das Management auszuüben, bestimmte Praktiken zu verändern. Die Arbeitshypothese 
zu den Abstimmungsergebnissen lautet, dass der Anteil von Stimmrechten, die 
sogenannte Unternehmens-Insider, also Manager, Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, und andere 
dem Management nahe stehende Personen, auf sich vereinigen, einen negativen Einfluss 
auf die Abstimmungsergebnisse von Aktionärsanträgen haben, da diese Unternehmens-
Insider generell gegen Aktionärsanträge stimmen. Auch hier belegen die empirischen 
Ergebnisse meine Hypothese: Die Stimmrechte von Unternehmens-Insider haben einen 
negativen Einfluss auf die Ergebnisse von Aktionärsanträgen bei Abstimmungen auf der 
JHV. Zum einen argumentiere ich in diesem Kapitel, dass die Unternehmens-Insider 
selbst gegen diese Anträge stimmen, zum anderen können auch die Managemen-
tempfehlungen zu jedem der Aktionärsanträge einen negativen Einfluss haben, da diese 
in den meisten Fällen eine Empfehlung gegen diese Anträge zu stimmen beinhaltet. 
 Zusammenfassend zeigt dieses Kapitel, dass Investoren – sowohl Kleinanleger als 
auch institutionelle Anleger – richtigerweise schlecht kontrollierte Unternehmen, die 
eine relative schlechtere finanzielle Performance aufweisen, mit ihren Anträgen auf 
Jahreshauptversammlungen konfrontieren. Des Weiteren wird die Effizienz eines Kont-
rollmechanismus durch Aktionärsanträge dadurch limitiert, dass Unternehmens-Insider 
ihre Stimmrechte dazu nutzen, um die Ergebnisse dieser Anträge negativ zu beeinflus-
sen. Generell argumentiere ich, dass dieser Mechanismus durch Aktionärsanträge aber 
als wichtiger Bestandteil der Corporate Governance gesehen werden muss, da öf-
fentlicher Druck auf Manager ausgeübt werden kann, selbst wenn die Abstimmungser-
gebnisse nicht über 20% liegen. 
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Kapitel Drei meiner Dissertation untersucht ebenfalls den Kontrollmechanismus durch 
Aktionärsanträge. Dieses Kapitel fokussiert sich aber in seiner Fragestellung auf eine 
bestimmte Gruppe von Anträgen, nämlich die Anträge, die bereits im Vorfeld der JHV 
durch die Aktionäre wieder zurückgezogen werden, und welche daher nicht zur Ab-
stimmung auf der Tagesordnung der JHV erscheinen. Dieses Kapitel zielt darauf ab, 
einerseits die Gründe für das Zurückziehen von Anträgen zu erläutern, und andererseits 
die statistischen und ökonomischen Bestimmungsgrößen aufzuzeigen, die dazu führen, 
dass einige Anträge zurückgezogen werden, und andere nicht. 
 In Kapitel Drei argumentiere ich, dass vor allem die Anträge von Aktionären, die 
nachteilig für Manager sein könnten, etwa hinsichtlich der Höhe der Vergütungen oder 
in anderer Weise der Reputation der Manager und Aufsichtsratsmitglieder schaden könn-
ten, zurückgezogen werden. Ich schließe jedoch nicht aus, dass auch andere Anträge, die 
nicht direkt auf die Manager und deren Macht abzielen, zurückgezogen werden.  
 Wenn im Vorfeld der JHV alle Aktionärsanträge eingegangen sind, hat das Ma-
nagement in den Vereinigten Staaten die Möglichkeit den eingereichten Antrag entweder 
zur Abstimmung auf der JHV zuzulassen, ihn abzulehnen, oder den einreichenden Ak-
tionär zu Verhandlungen über eine Zurückziehung des Antrags einzuladen. Dies bedeu-
tet im Rückschluss, dass nicht alle eingereichten Anträge auch zur JHV zugelassen. Das 
Management darf bestimmte Anträge ablehnen, wenn die Finanzaufsichtsbehörde, die 
Securities and Exchange Commission (kurz SEC), dies erlaubt. In den meisten Fällen 
geschieht eine Ablehnung, wenn der Antrag grundsätzliche Veränderungen in den 
Geschäftsfeldern des Unternehmens fordert, wie z.B. die Umstrukturierung eines Che-
miekonzerns in einen Mischkonzern.  
 Wie bereits erläutert, werden einige Aktionäre zu Verhandlungen über eine freiwil-
lige Zurückziehung ihres Antrages eingeladen. In vielen Fällen sind diese Verhandlun-
gen erfolgreich, und der Antragssteller zieht seinen oder ihren Antrag zurück. Falls die 
Verhandlungen nicht erfolgreich verlaufen, wird der Antrag in der Regel zur Abstim-
mung auf der JHV zugelassen. Dass Aktionärsanträge zurückgezogen werden, geschieht 
relativ oft in den USA. Meine Resultate in Kapitel Drei zeigen, dass durchschnittlich 
20% aller in jedem Jahr eingereichten Anträge zurückgezogen werden, und somit nicht 
auf der Tagesordnung der JHV erscheinen. Warum aber ziehen so viele Aktionäre ihre 
eingereichten Anträge zurück? 
 Im dritten Kapitel argumentiere ich, dass dies meistens dann geschieht, wenn das 
Management einen zufriedenstellenden Kompromiss anbietet, wie z.B. die komplette 
oder zumindest die teilweise Implementierung der im Antrag formulierten Forderungen. 
Ansonsten würde der antragstellende Aktionär nicht freiwillig den Antrag zurückziehen. 
Daher bewerte ich – wie zum Beispiel auch Landier und Nair (2009) – einen zurückge-
zogenen Antrag als erfolgreiches Aktionärs-Engagement, da das Management den An-
trag in gewisser Weise implementiert hat.  
 Der empirische Teil des dritten Kapitels geht der Frage nach, welche Faktoren dazu 
führen, dass Aktionäre ihren eingereichten Antrag zurückziehen. Dieser Analyse liegen 
drei Hypothesen zugrunde. Erstens argumentiere ich, dass Anträge von institutionellen 
Investoren eher zurückgezogen werden als Anträge von Kleinanlegern. Zweitens stelle 
ich die Hypothese auf, dass Aktionäre eher ihre Anträge zurückziehen, wenn diese bei 
D E U T S C H E  ZU S A M M E N F A S S U N G  
 180 
Unternehmen eingereicht wurden, die einen hohen Anteil an institutionellen Anlegern 
aufweisen. Drittens argumentiere ich, dass der Anteil an Stimmrechten, die von Unter-
nehmens-Insidern gehalten werden, einen negativen Einfluss auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit 
hat, dass Anträge vorab zurückgezogen werden. 
 Meine empirischen Ergebnisse stützen diese drei Hypothesen. Zum einen belegen 
meine Ergebnisse die These, dass Anträge von institutionellen Anlegern eher zurückge-
zogen werden, als Anträge, die von Kleinanlegern eingereicht wurden. Ein Grund hierfür 
ist die Tatsache, dass sich Manager von institutionellen Anträgen stärker konfrontiert 
und unter Umständen einer negativen Presse ausgesetzt sehen, als das bei Anträgen von 
Kleinanlegern der Fall ist. Dies spiegelt auch die Verhandlungsstärke der institutionellen 
Anleger wider: Manager sind eher dazu bereit Kompromisse einzugehen und die in den 
Anträgen gestellten Forderungen ganz oder teilweise zu implementieren, wenn diese von 
Großanlegern vorgebracht werden. Ferner belegen meine Ergebnisse, dass Anträge eher 
zurückgezogen werden, wenn das Unternehmen einen hohen Anteil von institutionellen 
Anlegern aufweist. Dieser Effekt ist statistisch und ökonomisch signifikant, was bedeu-
tet, dass Anträge am ehesten zurückgezogen werden, wenn diese bei Unternehmen mit 
einem hohen Anteil an institutionellen Aktionären eingereicht wurden. Abschließend 
stützen meine Ergebnisse meine dritte Hypothese: Halten Manager oder Aufsichtsrats-
mitglieder einen relativ höheren Anteil an Stimmrechten, wird es unwahrscheinlicher, 
dass ein Antrag zurückgezogen wird. Das bedeutet, dass Manager – sofern sie selbst ein 
großes Paket an Aktien halten – weniger dazu bereit sind, Kompromisse einzugehen und 
die Forderungen der Aktionäre zu implementieren. In diesem Falle sehen sich die Mana-
ger in günstigerer Verhandlungsposition und lassen dann den Antrag zur Abstimmung 
auf der JHV zu. Dann können sie ihre Stimmrechte selbst ausüben und gegen den jewei-
ligen Aktionärsantrag stimmen und so das Abstimmungsergebnis zu ihren Gunsten 
beeinflussen – wie auch in Kapitel Zwei beschrieben wurde. 
 Zusammenfassend kann konstatiert werden, dass meine Ergebnisse in Kapitel Drei 
auf die außergewöhnlich wichtige Rolle von institutionellen Anlegern in der Corporate 
Governance hinweisen. Grundlage für diese Behauptung sind die empirischen Ergebnis-
se dieses Kapitels: Manager sind eher dazu bereit, Aktionärsanträge zu implementieren, 
wenn diese von institutionellen Anlegern eingereicht wurden und wenn der Anteil von 
institutionellen Anlegern am Unternehmen hoch ist.  
 In Kapitel Vier meiner Dissertation beleuchte ich die Aktionärs-Engagement Akti-
vitäten eines großen britischen Vermögensverwalters etwas genauer. Dieser Vermögens-
verwalter ist verantwortlich für mehr als 100 Milliarden US Dollar und führt die direkten 
Aktionärs-Engagements für weitere institutionelle Anleger, wie Versicherungen oder 
Pensionskassen aus. Wie weiter oben beschrieben, beinhaltet Aktionärs-Engagement alle 
Maßnahmen, die von Aktionären ergriffen werden, um Unternehmenspraktiken zu 
verändern, Unternehmen nachhaltiger zu machen, oder Managementvergütungs-Systeme 
zu reformieren. Kapitel Vier beschäftigt sich mit allen Maßnahmen, die von dem gen-
annten britischen Vermögensverwalter ergriffen wurden, um – im Auftrag von weiteren 
institutionellen Anlegern – Unternehmen und deren Verhalten zu verändern. Dazu zäh-
len der direkte, aber private, Management-Kontakt (über Telefonate, Emails oder Brie-
fe), Unternehmensbesuche, regelmäßiger Email Kontakt zu Vorstandsmitgliedern, und 
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andere Kontaktaufnahmen, die allesamt dazu genutzt werden, um die ökologischen, 
sozialen, und ethischen Aspekte eines Unternehmens zu verbessern.  
 Der hier beschriebene britische Vermögensverwalter ermöglichte mir Einblicke in 
seine Engagement Politik und stellte mir seine vertraulichen Daten über die jeweiligen 
Engagements zur Verfügung. Mittels dieser Daten war es mir möglich, alle einzelnen 
Engagements bei 397 Unternehmen aus 37 verschiedenen Ländern zu analysieren. Fer-
ner stellte mir der Vermögensverwalter alle Informationen über erfolgreiche Engage-
ments zur Verfügung. Das heißt, dass ich in meiner Studie genau nachvollziehen kann, 
wann und bei welchem Unternehmen ein Engagement erfolgreich war. Dies bedeutet, 
dass meine Studie in Kapitel Vier eine der ersten Studien ist, die direkte Rückschlüsse 
auf den Erfolg von Aktionärs-Engagement zulässt. 
 Grundidee dieses Kapitels ist die Untersuchung der geografischen Breite der Enga-
gements des britischen Vermögensverwalters. Dies ist vor allem wichtig vor dem Hin-
tergrund der Tatsache, dass dieser Vermögensverwalter von anderen institutionellen 
Großanlegern aus ganz Europa angeheuert wird, ihre Engagements durchzuführen, da sie 
unter Umständen nicht die Kapazitäten besitzen, selbst Aktionärs-Engagements durch-
zuführen.  
 Die Haupthypothese dieses Kapitels lautet, dass britische Unternehmen eher vom 
untersuchten Vermögensverwalter mit Engagement konfrontiert werden, als Unter-
nehmen aus anderen Kapitalmärkten, wie z.B. den USA oder Kontinentaleuropa. Dieser 
These liegen die Ergebnisse der Investmentliteratur zu Grunde – wie z.B. Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) –, die belegen, dass Investoren vor allem in naheliegende Unter-
nehmen investieren, die sie kennen und sich daher eher mit diesen identifizieren können 
(das sogenannte „home bias“). In meinem Kapitel schreibe ich auch möglichen Informa-
tions-Asymmetrien und Transaktionskosten eine wichtige Rolle bei der Entscheidung 
über bestimmte Engagements zu, da der Vermögensverwalter eine genaue Auswahl über 
die Ziele seines Engagements treffen muss. Da Informations-Asymmetrien und Transak-
tionskosten von Aktionärs-Engagement im heimischen Kapitalmarkt niedriger sind, als 
bei Engagements im Ausland, behaupte ich, dass britische Unternehmen häufiger das 
Ziel der Aktionärs-Engagements sind, als ausländische Firmen.  
 Die empirischen Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels bestätigen meine Hypothese: Britische 
Unternehmen weisen statistisch und ökonomisch mehr Engagements auf, als ausländi-
sche Unternehmen. Die Implikationen sind vor allem für andere institutionelle Anleger 
von großer Bedeutung. Wenn zum Beispiel ein deutscher institutionelle Investor Ak-
tionärs-Engagement durchführen möchte und einen ausländischen Vermögensverwalter 
auswählt, um diese Engagements auszuführen, muss sich der deutsche Anleger dessen 
bewusst sein, dass der ausländische Vermögensverwalter unter Umständen eine ganz 
andere geografische Ausrichtung besitzt, als der deutsche Investor selbst. Dies kann dazu 
führen, dass sich die Engagements auf einzelne Unternehmen konzentrieren, die für den 
deutschen Investor nicht unbedingt von höchster Wichtigkeit sind. Daher machen meine 
empirischen Ergebnisse deutlich, dass sich Investoren bewusst sein müssen, welchen 
geografischen Fokus das Engagement-Portfolio des angeheuerten Engagement-Anbieters 
tatsächlich hat.  
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Die Untersuchung der erfolgreichen Aktionärs-Engagements ergibt, dass Unternehmen 
aus dem US-amerikanischen Raum und aus Japan die höchsten Erfolgsraten aufweisen. 
Diese Ergebnisse bedeuten, dass der britische Vermögensverwalter zwar häufiger ein-
heimische, britische Unternehmen mit Engagements konfrontiert, aber in bestimmten 
ausländischen Märkten erfolgreicher die Unternehmenspolitik beeinflusst. Eine mögliche 
Erklärung hierfür ist vor allem die ebenfalls vorhandene Ressourcenknappheit beim 
Vermögensverwalter selbst. Dieser unterzieht ausländische Unternehmen einer sorgfälti-
geren Voruntersuchung, bevor tatsächliche Engagements durchgeführt werden, als dies 
bei einheimischen Unternehmen der Fall ist. Daher werden womöglich nur diese Enga-
gements durchgeführt, für welche sich der Vermögensverwalter die größte ex-ante Erf-
olgswahrscheinlichkeit errechnet. 
 Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass die privaten Aktionärs-
Engagements durch spezialisierte Intermediär-Unternehmen, wie den hier beschriebenen 
britischen Vermögensverwalter, eine durchaus praktikable Alternative zu den gängigen, 
publik durchgeführten Engagement Methoden, wie z.B. Aktionärs-Anträge darstellen. 
Zwar sollten sich Investoren einer gewissen Tendenz dieser Intermediäre bewusst sein, 
eher einheimische Firmen anzusprechen (das sogenannte „home bias“). Die Erfolgsraten 
solcher Aktionärs-Engagements sind durchaus ansehnlich und stellen daher für institu-
tionelle Anleger eine effiziente Methode dar, sich aktiv an der Corporate Governance zu 
beteiligen. 
 Im fünften und letzten empirischen Kapitel dieser Arbeit kombiniere ich die zugrun-
deliegenden Datensätze aus den vorangegangenen Kapiteln. Das Ziel dieses Kapitels ist 
es, die Interaktion von publik durchgeführten Aktionärs-Engagements, also Aktionärs-
Anträgen, und von privaten Engagements, also den privaten Kontaktaufnahmen durch 
wie den in Kapitel Vier beschriebenen britischen Vermögensverwalter zu dokumentie-
ren. Folgender Grundgedanke steht bei diesem Kapitel im Vordergrund: Viele Unter-
nehmen werden sowohl mit publik durchgeführten, aber gleichzeitig auch mit privaten 
Aktionärs-Engagements konfrontiert. Die Eigentümerbasis von Unternehmen ist oft sehr 
breit gestreut und besteht aus einer Vielzahl von verschiedenen institutionellen Investo-
ren. Daher liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass Unternehmen, sowohl mit publiken Engage-
ments als auch mit privaten konfrontiert werden. Die Frage wie diese beiden Mechanis-
men interagieren und die Wahrscheinlichkeit beeinflussen, mit Aktionärs-Engagements 
konfrontiert zu werden, steht im Mittelpunkt dieses Kapitels. Des Weiteren wird un-
tersucht, was den Erfolg der verschiedenen Aktionärs-Engagements beeinflusst. Hier 
spielt auch die Zusammenwirkung von publiken und privaten Aktionärs-Engagement 
Strategien womöglich eine wichtige Rolle, da diese unter Umständen positiv zu einander 
korreliert sind.  
 Meine empirischen Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels verdeutlichen die Bedeutung beider 
Engagement Strategien (publik und privat) für die Wahrscheinlichkeit das Unternehmen 
auch in Zukunft mit mindestens einem dieser beiden Mechanismen konfrontiert werden. 
Dies bedeutet, dass Firmen, die mit publiken und privaten Aktionärs-Engagements kon-
frontiert werden, weisen eine statistisch und ökonomisch signifikant höhere Wahrschein-
lichkeit auf, auch im kommenden Jahr mit mindestens einem dieser beiden Mechanis-
men konfrontiert zu werden. Ferner kann ich die These belegen, dass Unternehmen, die 
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eine hohe Reputation hinsichtlich publiker Engagement Strategien aufgebaut haben eine 
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit aufweisen, auch in Zukunft häufiger publike Aktionärs-
Engagements zu implementieren. Diese Ergebnisse haben eine große Bedeutung für 
institutionelle Anleger, die sich aktiv an der Corporate Governance beteiligen wollen, 
und für Unternehmen, die sich verschiedener Aktionärs-Engagements ausgesetzt sehen. 
Die Ergebnisse können helfen, dass institutionelle Anleger besser attraktive Ziele für 
ihre Engagements auswählen.  
 Alles in allem verdeutlicht die vorliegende Dissertation, dass Aktionäre – sowohl 
Kleinanleger aber auch institutionelle Investoren – mehrere Möglichkeiten besitzen, sich 
aktiv an der Corporate Governance zu beteiligen und auch ökologisches, soziales, und 
ethisches Fehlverhalten von Unternehmen zu korrigieren. Im Falle eines institutionellen 
Anlegers sollte dies in engem Dialog mit den eigenen Kunden und Benefizianten erfol-
gen. Institutionelle Investoren haben die ökonomische Macht, von Unternehmen gehört 
zu werden und sollten daher noch stärker Teil der Corporate Governance werden. Dabei 
geht es nicht darum, Renditen aufzugeben, sondern vielmehr darum, Renditen noch 
verantwortlicher und nachhaltiger zu erwirtschaften. Aktionärs-Engagements, wie sie in 
dieser Arbeit beschrieben wurden, stellen eine Möglichkeit dar. Auf der anderen Seite 
sollten sich auch Kleinanleger stärker in die Coprporate Governance einbringen, indem 
sie z.B. aktiv von ihrem Stimmrecht auf der JHV Gebrauch machen. Dies kann durchaus 
auch über Treuhänder geschehen.  
 Ein Investor sollte sich meiner Meinung nach jederzeit darüber bewusst sein, dass 
mit einer gewissen ökonomischen Macht auch eine gesellschaftliche Verantwortung 
einhergeht, die es zu erfüllen gilt. 
 
  

 185
Curriculum Vitae  
Peter Michael Viehs was born on 13 February 1985 in Aachen, Germany. He attended 
high school at the Gymnasium der Gemeinde Kreuzau and studied at Maastricht Univer-
sity International Business Economics. He obtained his Bachelor of Science in 2007. 
Afterwards, he studied International Business with concentration Finance at Maastricht 
University and graduated in 2008 with the Master of Science. During his studies, Mi-
chael visited the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, for an exchange semester.  
 In September 2008, he joined the Finance Department of the School of Business and 
Economics at Maastricht University as a teaching assistant. Back then, he was involved 
in teaching undergraduate courses on corporate governance, investment management, 
corporate finance and accounting. In January 2009, Michael became a Ph.D. student at 
both the Department of Finance and Department of Accounting and Information Man-
agement at the School of Business and Economics.  
 In 2012, Michael attended Oxford University School of Geography as a visiting 
scholar to work under the supervision of Prof. Gordon Clark. Substantial parts of this 
dissertation have been completed during Michael’s time in the UK. 
 As a PhD candidate, Michael was responsible for teaching graduate students in the 
fields of corporate governance, institutional investors, and fixed-income management. 
Michael presented his work at several top-notch academic conferences including the 
conference on Financial Globalisation and Sustainable Finance in Cape Town, South 
Africa, the Annual Meeting of the Financial Management Association (FMA) in Atlanta, 
USA, the 10th International Conference on Corporate Governance in Birmingham, UK, 
the Graduate Student Conference on Institutional Investors in Oxford, UK, the Confer-
ence on Finance and Responsible Business Practices: Research, Practice and Policy at 
Haas School of Business in Berkeley, USA, the 9th Corporate Finance Day in Lille, 
France, the Mistra Workshop on Sustainable Investment Research in Bilbao, Spain, and 
the Mistra Workshop on Fiduciary Duties in Gothenburg, Sweden.  
 He also held multiple industry presentations at, for example, Nordea Asset Manage-
ment, F&C Asset Management, Generation Investment Management and Hermes Equity 
Ownership Services. He was also involved in writing research reports for Deutsche 
Bank.  
 Since September 2013, Michael is a Research Fellow at University of Oxford Smith 
School of Enterprise and the Environment. He also is affiliated with The European Cen-
tre for Corporate Engagement (ECCE).  
